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Comparing classes solely using their names can allow a malicious class to bypass security checks and gain access to protected resources.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
OBJ09-J | High | Unlikely | Low | P9 | L2 |
Automated Detection
| Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Checker Framework |
| Signature String Checker | Ensure that the string representation of a type is properly used for example in Class.forName (see Chapter 13) | ||||||
| CodeSonar |
| FB.CORRECTNESS.EQ_COMPARING_CLASS_NAMES | equals method compares class names rather than class objects | ||||||
| Parasoft Jtest |
| SECURITY.EAB.CMP | Implemented | ||||||
| SonarQube |
| S1872 |
| Classes should not be compared by name |
Related Guidelines
Bibliography
Internals of Java Class Loading | |
"Twelve Rules for Developing More Secure Java Code" | |
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