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- ISO/IEC 9899:2011 ISO/IEC. Programming Languages—C, 3rd ed. [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]
- ISO/IEC 9899:2011/Cor.1:2012, Technical Corrigendum 1
- ISO/IEC 9899:1999 Programming Languages—C, 2nd ed. [ISO/IEC 9899:1999]
- ISO/IEC 9899:1999/Cor.1:2001, Technical Corrigendum 1
- ISO/IEC 9899:1999/Cor.2:2004, Technical Corrigendum 2
- ISO/IEC 9899:1999/Cor.3:2007, Technical Corrigendum 3
- ISO/IEC TR 24731-1 Extensions to the C Library—Part I: Bounds-Checking Interfaces [ISO/IEC TR 24731-1-2007]
- ISO/IEC TR 24731-2 Extensions to the C Library—Part II: Dynamic Allocation Functions [ISO/IEC TR 24731-2:2010]
Most of the material included in this standard can also be applied to earlier versions of the C programming language.
Rules and recommendations included in the Noncompliant examples in CERT C Secure Coding Standard guidelines are designed to be operating system and platform independent. However, the best solutions to secure coding problems are often platform specific. In most cases, this standard provides appropriate compliant solutions for POSIX-compliant and Windows operating systems. Language and library extensions that have been published as ISO/IEC Technical Reports or Technical Specifications are frequently given precendence, such has those described by ISO/IEC TR 24731-2 Extensions to the C Library—Part II: Dynamic Allocation Functions [ISO/IEC TR 24731-2:2010]. In many cases, compliant solutions are also provided for specific platforms such as Linux or OpenBSD. Occasionally, we also point out implementation-specific behaviors when these behaviors are of interest.
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The C Standard documents existing practice where possible. That is, most features must be tested in an implementation before being included in the standard. The CERT C Secure Coding Standard has a different purpose. When existing practice serves this purpose, that is fine, but the goal is to create a new set of best practices, and that includes introducing some concepts that are not yet widely known. To put it a different way, the CERT C Secure Coding Standard attempts to drive change rather than just document it.
For example, the optional but normative Annex K (based on TR 24731-1) , "Bounds-Checking Interfaces" introduced in C11 is gaining support but at present is implemented by only a few vendors. It introduces functions such as memcpy_s(), which serve the purpose of security by adding the destination buffer size to the API. A forward-looking document could not reasonably ignore these functions simply because they are not yet widely implemented.
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