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In almost every case, an attempt to shift by a negative number of bits or by more bits than exist in the operand indicates a bug (logic error). This is different than overflow, where there is simply a representational deficiency (see INT32-C. Ensure that operations on signed integers do not result in overflow).

Non-Compliant Code Example (Left Shift, Signed Type)

The result of E1 << E2 is E1 left-shifted E2 bit positions; vacated bits are filled with zeros. If E1 has a signed type and nonnegative value and E1 * 2 E2 is representable in the result type, then that is the resulting value; otherwise, the behavior is undefined.

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int si1, si2, sresult;

sresult = si1 << si2;

Compliant Solution (Left Shift, Signed Type)

This compliant solution eliminates the possibility of undefined behavior resulting from a left shift operation on signed and unsigned integers. Smaller sized integers are promoted according to the integer promotion rules (see INT02-A. Understand integer conversion rules).

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In C99, the CHAR_BIT macro defines the number of bits for the smallest object that is not a bit-field (byte). Consequently, a byte contains CHAR_BIT bits.

Non-Compliant Code Example (Left Shift, Unsigned Type)

The result of E1 << E2 is E1 left-shifted E2 bit positions; vacated bits are filled with zeros. According to C99, if E1 has an unsigned type, the value of the result is E1 * 2 E2, reduced modulo one more than the maximum value representable in the result type. Although C99 specifies modulo behavior for unsigned integers, unsigned integer overflow frequently results in unexpected values and resultant security vulnerabilities (see INT32-C. Ensure that operations on signed integers do not result in overflow). Consequently, unsigned overflow is generally non-compliant, and E1 * 2 E2 must be representable in the result type. Modulo behavior is allowed if the conditions in the exception section are met.

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unsigned int ui1, ui2, uresult;

uresult = ui1 << ui2;

Compliant Solution (Left Shift, Unsigned Type)

This compliant solution eliminates the possibility of undefined behavior resulting from a left shift operation on unsigned integers. Example solutions are provided for the fully compliant case (unsigned overflow is prohibited) and the exceptional case (modulo behavior is allowed).

unsigned int ui1, ui2, uresult;
unsigned int mod1, mod2;  /* modulo behavior is allowed on mod1 and mod2 by exception */

if ( (ui2 >= sizeof(unsigned int)*CHAR_BIT) || (ui1 > (UINT_MAX  >> ui2))) ) {
  /* handle error condition */
}
else {
  uresult = ui1 << ui2;
}

if (mod2 >= sizeof(unsigned int)*CHAR_BIT) {
  /* handle error condition */
}
else {
  uresult = mod1 << mod2; /* modulo behavior is allowed by exception */
}

Non-Compliant Code Example (Right Shift)

The result of E1 >> E2 is E1 right-shifted E2 bit positions. If E1 has an unsigned type or if E1 has a signed type and a nonnegative value, the value of the result is the integral part of the quotient of E1 / 2 E2. If E1 has a signed type and a negative value, the resulting value is implementation-defined and may be either an arithmetic (signed) shift, as depicted here,

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Making assumptions about whether a right shift is implemented as an arithmetic (signed) shift or a logical (unsigned) shift can also lead to vulnerabilities (see INT13-A. Use bitwise operators only on unsigned operands).

Compliant Solution (Right Shift)

This compliant solution tests the suspect shift operations to guarantee there is no possibility of undefined behavior.

int si1, si2, sresult;
unsigned int ui1, ui2, result;

if ( (si2 < 0) || (si2 >= sizeof(int)*CHAR_BIT) ) {
  /* handle error condition */
}
else {
  sresult = si1 >> si2;
}

if (ui2 >= sizeof(unsigned int)*CHAR_BIT) {
  /* handle error condition */
}
else {
  uresult = ui1 >> ui2;
}

Exceptions

INT36-EX1: Unsigned integers can be allowed to exhibit modulo behavior if and only if

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If the integer exhibiting modulo behavior contributes to the value of an integer not marked as exhibiting modulo behavior, the resulting integer must obey this rule.

Risk Assessment

Improper range checking can lead to buffer overflows and the execution of arbitrary code by an attacker.

Automated Detection

Fortify SCA Version 5.0 with CERT C Rule Pack can detect violations of this rule.

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

References

A test program for this rule is available.

\[[Dowd 06|AA. C References#Dowd 06]\] Chapter 6, "C Language Issues"
\[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\] Section 6.5.7, "Bitwise shift operators"
\[[Seacord 05|AA. C References#Seacord 05]\] Chapter 5, "Integers"
\[[Viega 05|AA. C References#Viega 05]\] Section 5.2.7, "Integer overflow"
\[[ISO/IEC 03|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 03]\] Section 6.5.7, "Bitwise shift operators"

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INT33-C. Ensure that division and modulo operations do not result in divide-by-zero errors      04. Integers (INT)       INT35-C. Evaluate integer expressions in a larger size before comparing or assigning to that size      04. Integers (INT)       05. Floating Point (FLP)