Page History

Security checks based on untrusted sources can be bypassed. The untrusted object or parameter should be defensively copied before the security check is performed. The copy operation must be a deep copy; the implementation of the clone() method may produce a shallow copy, which can still be compromised. In addition, the implementation of the clone() method can be provided by the attacker. See OBJ06-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components for more information.

Noncompliant Code Example

...

This noncompliant code example describes a security vulnerability from the JDK 5.0 java.io package. In this release, java.io.File was non-final, allowing an attacker to supply an untrusted parameter constructed by extending the legitimate File class. In this manner, the getPath() method can be overridden so that the security check passes the first time it is called but the value changes the second time to refer to a sensitive file such as /etc/passwd. This is a form of time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability.

...

Code Block
public class BadFile extends java.io.File { private int count; public String getPath() { return (++count == 1) ? "/tmp/foo" : "/etc/passwd"; } }

Compliant Solution (

...

Final)

This vulnerability could have been can be mitigated by making java.io.File final.

Compliant Solution (

...

Copy)

This compliant solution ensures that the java.io.File object can be trusted, despite not being final. The solution creates a new File object using the standard constructor. This ensures that any methods invoked on the File object are the standard library methods rather than overriding methods potentially provided by the attacker.

...

...

...