For a non-final class, if a constructor throws an exception before fully initializing the object, it becomes possible to maliciously obtain its instance. For example, an attack that uses the finalizer construct allows an attacker to invoke arbitrary methods within the class despite authorization measures.
h2. Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example, based on an example by Kabutz \[[Kabutz 2001|AA. Bibliography#Kabutz 01]\], defines the constructor of {{BankOperations}} class so that it performs SSN verification using the method {{performSSNVerification()}}. Assume that an attacker does not know the correct SSN. As a result, this method trivially returns {{false}} in this example.
When the SSN verification fails, a {{SecurityException}} is thrown. The {{UserApp}} class appropriately catches this exception and an access denied message is displayed. However, this does not prevent a malicious program from invoking methods of the partially initialized class {{BankOperations}}. This is illustrated in the code that follows this noncompliant code example example.
{code:bgColor=#FFcccc}
public class BankOperations {
public BankOperations() {
if (!performSSNVerification()) {
throw new SecurityException("Invalid SSN!");
}
}
private boolean performSSNVerification() {
return false; // Returns true if data entered is valid, else false. Assume that the attacker just enters invalid SSN.
}
public void greet() {
System.out.println("Welcome user! You may now use all the features.");
}
}
public class UserApp {
public static void main(String[] args) {
BankOperations bo;
try {
bo = new BankOperations();
} catch(SecurityException ex) { bo = null; }
Storage.store(bo);
System.out.println("Proceed with normal logic");
}
}
public class Storage {
private static BankOperations bop;
public static void store(BankOperations bo) {
// Only store if it is not initialized
if (bop == null) {
if (bo == null) {
System.out.println("Invalid object!");
System.exit(1);
}
bop = bo;
}
}
}
{code}
Note that even if a malicious subclass catches the {{SecurityException}} that the {{BankOperations}} constructor throws, it cannot obtain its instance to cause further harm. To exploit this code, an attacker extends the {{BankOperations}} class and overrides the {{finalize()}} method. The gist of the attack is the capture of a handle of the partially initialized base class.
When the constructor throws an exception, the garbage collector waits to grab the object reference. However, by overriding the finalizer, a reference is obtained using the {{this}} keyword. Consequently, any instance method on the base class can be invoked maliciously by using the stolen {{this}} instance. Even a security manager check can be bypassed this way.
{code}
public class Interceptor extends BankOperations {
private static Interceptor stealInstance = null;
public static Interceptor get() {
try {
new Interceptor();
} catch(Exception ex) { } // Ignore the exception
try {
synchronized(Interceptor.class) {
while (stealInstance == null) {
System.gc();
Interceptor.class.wait(10);
}
}
} catch(InterruptedException ex) { return null; }
return stealInstance;
}
public void finalize() {
synchronized(Interceptor.class) {
stealInstance = this;
Interceptor.class.notify();
}
System.out.println("Stolen the instance in finalize of " + this);
}
}
public class AttackerApp { // Invoke class and gain access to the restrictive features
public static void main(String[] args) {
Interceptor i = Interceptor.get(); // stolen instance
// Can store the stolen object though this should have printed "Invalid Object!"
Storage.store(i);
// Now invoke any instance method of BankOperations class
i.greet();
UserApp.main(args); // Invoke the original UserApp
}
}
{code}
The attacker's code violates the guideline [OBJ08-J. Avoid using finalizers].
h2. Compliant Solution
This compliant solution declares the partially-initialized class {{final}} so that it cannot be extended.
{code:bgColor=#ccccff}
public final class BankOperations {
// ...
}
{code}
{mc}
/**
This is an example of a finalizer attack in serialization. (Deserialization of cyclic references)
*/
import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.FileOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InvalidObjectException;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.ObjectInputValidation;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.io.Serializable;
class A implements Serializable, ObjectInputValidation {
B b;
private void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
System.out.println("invoked");
in.registerValidation(this, 5);
in.defaultReadObject();
}
public void doSomething1(ObjectInputStream ois) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
ois.readObject();
}
public void doSomething2() {
System.out.println("bypassed");
}
public void validateObject() throws InvalidObjectException {
throw new InvalidObjectException("Something is wrong");
}
}
class B implements Serializable { C c; }
class C implements Serializable { A a; }
class Test {
public static void main( String [] args ) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
A a = new A();
a.b = new B();
a.b.c = new C();
a.b.c.a = a;
FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream("c:\\cmu\\cyclic.txt");
ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(fos);
oos.writeObject(a);
Interceptor i = Interceptor.get();
i.doSomething2();
}
}
class Interceptor extends A {
private static Interceptor stealInstance = null;
public static Interceptor get() {
try {
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream("c:\\cyclic.txt");
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(fis);
new Interceptor().doSomething1(ois);
} catch(Exception ex) { } // Ignore the exception
try {
synchronized(Interceptor.class) {
while (stealInstance == null) {
System.gc();
Interceptor.class.wait(10);
}
}
} catch(InterruptedException ex) { return null; }
return stealInstance;
}
public void finalize() {
synchronized(Interceptor.class) {
stealInstance = this;
Interceptor.class.notify();
}
System.out.println("Stolen the instance in finalize of " + this);
}
}
{mc}
h2. Compliant Solution
This compliant solution prevents a hostile caller from using a partially initialized instance of the class. In the case of the noncompliant code example, the {{BankOperations}} class's superclass's constructor is called implicitly from the {{BankOperations}} constructor, just before the check. This exposes the partially initialized object to the finalizer attack.
In this compliant solution, the check is carried out before the superclass's constructor executes. This forbids hostile code from obtaining a partially initialized instance.
{code:bgColor=#ccccff}
public class {
public BankOperations() {
this(performSSNVerification());
}
private BankOperations(boolean performSSNVerification) {
// ...
}
private static boolean performSSNVerification() {
// Returns true if data entered is valid, else throws a SecurityException
// Assume that the attacker just enters invalid SSN; so this method always throws the exception
throw new SecurityException("Invalid SSN!");
}
public void greet() {
System.out.println("Welcome user! You may now use all the features.");
}
}
{code}
This compliant solution is specific to Java SE 6 and onwards, where a finalizer is prevented from being executed when an exception is thrown before the {{java.lang.Object}} constructor exits \[[SCG 2009|AA. Bibliography#SCG 09]\].
The method call {{performSSNVerification()}} is passed as an argument to a {{private}} constructor because the first statement in a constructor must be a call to either a super constructor, or to another constructor in the same subclass. If such a call is not provided, the default constructor of the superclass executes. This is not desirable because if the superclass constructor exits before the security check, the class would be exposed to the perils of a finalizer being added and executed.
h2. Compliant Solution
When the API can be extended (consider a non-final class, for example), it is permissible to use a flag to signal the successful completion of object construction. This is shown below.
{code:bgColor=#ccccff}
class BankOperations {
public volatile boolean initialized = false; // volatile flag
public BankOperations() {
if (!performSSNVerification()) {
throw new SecurityException("Invalid SSN!");
}
else {
initialized = true; // object construction succeeded
}
}
private boolean performSSNVerification() {
return false;
}
public void greet() {
if(initialized == true) {
System.out.println("Welcome user! You may now use all the features.");
// ...
}
else {
System.out.println("You are not permitted!");
}
}
}
{code}
"If an object is only partially initialized, its internal fields likely contain safe default values such as {{null}}. Even in an untrusted environment, such an object is unlikely to be useful to an attacker. If the developer deems the partially initialized object state secure, then the developer doesnât have to pollute the class with the flag. The flag is necessary only when such a state isnât secure or when accessible methods in the class perform sensitive operations without referencing any internal field" \[[Lai 2008|AA. Bibliography#Lai 08]\].
h2. Exceptions
*OBJ04-EX1:* It is permissible to use the telescoping pattern when the overhead of the builder pattern is significant as compared to the number of parameters required to be initialized. This pattern prescribes a constructor to initialize the required parameters and individual constructors for each optional parameter that is added.
h2. Risk Assessment
Allowing a partially initialized object to be accessed can provide an attacker with an opportunity to resurrect the object before its finalization and bypass any security checks.
|| Guideline || Severity || Likelihood || Remediation Cost || Priority || Level ||
| OBJ04-J | high | probable | medium | {color:red}{*}P12{*}{color} | {color:red}{*}L1{*}{color} |
h3. Automated Detection
TODO
h3. Related Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability CVE-2008-5339 concerns a series of vulnerabilities in Java. In one of the vulnerabilities, an applet causes an object to be deserialized using {{ObjectInputStream.readObject()}}, but the input is controlled by an attacker. The object actually read is a serializable subclass of {{ClassLoader}}, and it has a {{readObject()}} method that stashes the object instance into a static variable; consequently the object survives the serialization. As a result, the applet has managed to construct a {{ClassLoader}} object, by-passing the restrictions against doing so in an applet, and that {{ClassLoader}} allows it to construct classes that are not subject to the security restrictions of an applet. The vulnerability is described in depth in guideline [SER09-J. Do not deserialize from a privileged context].
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the [CERT website|https://www.kb.cert.org/vulnotes/bymetric?searchview&query=FIELD+KEYWORDS+contains+OBJ32-J].
h2. ReferencesBibliography
\[[JLS 2005|AA. Bibliography#JLS 05]\] Section 12.6, Finalization of Class Instances
\[[API 2006|AA. Bibliography#API 06]\] [finalize()|http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.4.2/docs/api/java/lang/Object.html#finalize()]
\[[SCG 2007|AA. Bibliography#SCG 07]\] Guideline 4-2 Defend against partially initialized instances of non-final classes
\[[SCG 2009|AA. Bibliography#SCG 09]\] Guideline 1-2 Limit the extensibility of classes and methods
\[[Kabutz 2001|AA. Bibliography#Kabutz 01]\] Issue 032 - Exceptional Constructors - Resurrecting the dead
\[[Darwin 2004|AA. Bibliography#Darwin 04]\] Section 9.5, The Finalize Method
\[[Flanagan 2005|AA. Bibliography#Flanagan 05]\] Section 3.3, Destroying and Finalizing Objects
\[[Lai 2008|AA. Bibliography#Lai 08]\]
----
[!The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java^button_arrow_left.png!|OBJ03-J. Do not use public static non-final variables] [!The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java^button_arrow_up.png!|08. Object Orientation (OBJ)] [!The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java^button_arrow_right.png!|OBJ05-J. Limit the extensibility of non-final classes and methods to only trusted subclasses]
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