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Serialized objects can be altered unless they are protected using mechanisms such as sealing and signing. (See guideline VOID SEC16ENV01-J. Sign and seal sensitive objects before transitPlace all security-sensitive code in a single JAR and sign and seal it.) If an attacker can alter the serialized form of the object, it becomes possible to modify the system resource that the serialized handle refers to. For example, an attacker may modify a serialized file handle to refer to an arbitrary file on the system. In the absence of a security manager, any operations that use the file handle will be carried out using the attacker-supplied file path and file name.

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example declares a serializable File object in the class BadSer. The serialized form of the object exposes the file path, which can be altered. When the object is deserialized, the operations will be performed using the altered path.

Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc

final class BadSer implements Serializable { 	
  File f;
  public BadSer() throws FileNotFoundException {
    f  = new File("c:\\filepath\\filename");
  }	 
}

Compliant Solution (Not Implementing Serializable)

This compliant solution shows a final class Ser that does not implement java.io.Serializable. Consequently, the File object cannot be serialized.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff

final class Ser { 	
  File f;
  public Ser() throws FileNotFoundException {
    f  = new File("c:\\filepath\\filename");
  }	 
}

Compliant Solution (Object Marked Transient)

This compliant solution declares the File object transient. Consequently, the file path is not exposed.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff

final class Ser implements Serializable { 	
  transient File f;
  public Ser() throws FileNotFoundException {
    f  = new File("c:\\filepath\\filename");
  }	 
}

Risk Assessment

Deserializing direct handles to system resources can allow the modification of the resources being referred to.

Guideline

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

SER10SEC61-J JG

high

probable

low

P18

L1

Automated Detection

TODOAutomated detection is not feasible.

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this guideline on the CERT website.

Bibliography

[Sun 2006] "Serialization specification"

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