Formatting in Java is stricter as compared to traditional languages such as C. Exceptions are thrown if any conversion argument mismatches with the corresponding flag. Although not easily exploitable, it is possible for user input to taint the format string and cause information leakage or denial of service in some cases.
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Noncompliant Code Example
This non-compliant noncompliant example demonstrates a careless information leak. The code accepts the credit card expiration date as an input argument and uses it within the format string. In the absence of proper input validation, an artful attacker can observe the very date that has been asked to be inputted. Any of the arguments %1$tm, %1$te or %1$tY
can further such an attempt.
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import java.util.Calendar; import java.util.GregorianCalendar; import static java.util.Calendar.*; class Format { static Calendar c = new GregorianCalendar(1995, MAY, 23); public static void main(String[] args) { //args[0] is the credit card expiration date //args[0] can contain either %1$tm, %1$te or %1$tY as malicious arguments //perform comparison with c, if it doesn't match print the following line System.out.printf(args[0] + " did not match! HINT: It was issued on %1$terd of some month", c); } } |
Compliant Solution
The perfect remedy to format string problems is to ensure that user generated input never shows up in format strings. This will safeguard the code from unforeseen exploitation.
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class Format { static Calendar c = new GregorianCalendar(1995, MAY, 23); public static void main(String[] args) { //args[0] is the credit card expiration date //perform comparison with c, if it doesn't match print the following line System.out.printf("The input did not match! HINT: It was issued on %1$terd of some month", c); } } |
Risk Assessment
TODO
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
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FIO35-J | ?? | ?? | ?? | P?? | L?? |
Automated Detection
TODO
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
References
Java Documentation http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/java/util/Formatter.html
Seacord Secure Coding in C and C++, Chapter 6, Formatted Output