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Failure to account for integer overflow has resulted in failures of real systems, for example, when implementing the {{compareTo()}} method. The meaning of the return value of the {{compareTo()}} method is defined only in terms of its sign and whether it is zero; the magnitude of the return value is irrelevant. Consequently, an apparent but incorrect optimization would be to subtract the operands and return the result. For operands of opposite signs, this can result in integer overflow, consequently violating the {{compareTo()}} contract \[[Bloch 2008, Item 12|AA. Bibliography#Bloch 08]\].

Overview of Compliant Techniques

The three main techniques for detecting unintended integer overflow are

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The "Use BigInteger" technique is conceptually the simplest of the three techniques. However, it requires the use of method calls for each operation in place of primitive arithmetic operators; this may obscure the intended meaning of the code. This technique will take more time and memory than the other techniques.

Pre-conditioning the Inputs

The following code example shows the necessary pre-conditioning checks required for each arithmetic operation on arguments of type int. The checks for the other integral types are analogous. In this example, we choose to throw an exception when integer overflow would occur; any other error handling is also acceptable.

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These checks can be simplified when the original type is char. Because the range of type char includes only positive values, all comparisons with negative values may be omitted.

Noncompliant Code Example

Either operation in this noncompliant code example could produce a result that overflows the range of int. When overflow occurs, the result will be incorrect.

Code Block
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public int multAccum(int oldAcc, int newVal, int scale) {
  // May result in overflow 
  return oldAcc + (newVal * scale);
}

Compliant Solution (Pre-Condition the Inputs)

This compliant solution uses the preAdd() and preMultiply() methods defined above to indicate errors if the corresponding operations might overflow.

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public int multAccum(int oldAcc, int newVal, int scale) throws ArithmeticException {
  preMultiply(newVal, Scale);
  final int temp = newVal * scale;
  preAdd(oldAcc, temp);
  return oldAcc + temp;
}

Compliant Solution (Use a Larger Type and Downcast)

For all integral types other than long, the next larger integral type can represent the result of any single integral operation. For example, operations on values of type int can be safely performed using type long. Therefore, we can perform an operation using the larger type and range-check before downcasting to the original type. Note, however, that this guarantee holds only for a single arithmetic operation; larger expressions without per-operation bounds checking may overflow the larger type.

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Code Block
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public long intRangeCheck(long value) throws ArithmeticOverflow {
  if ((value < Integer.MIN_VALUE) || (value > Integer.MAX_VALUE)) {
    throw new ArithmeticException("Integer overflow");
  }
  return value;
}

public int multAccum(int oldAcc, int newVal, int scale) throws ArithmeticException {
  final long res = 
    intRangeCheck(((long) oldAcc) + intRangeCheck((long) newVal * (long) scale));
  return (int) res; // safe down-cast
}

Compliant Solution (Use BigInteger)

Type BigInteger is the standard arbitrary-precision integer type provided by the Java standard libraries. The arithmetic operations implemented as methods of this type cannot themselves overflow; instead, they produce the numerically correct result. As a consequence, compliant code performs only a single range check—just before converting the final result to the original smaller type. This property provides conceptual simplicity. An unfortunate consequence of this technique is that compliant code must be written using method calls instead of primitive arithmetic operators; this can obscure the intent of the code. Operations on objects of type BigInteger can also be significantly less efficient than operations on the original primitive integer type.

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private static final BigInteger bigMaxInt = BigInteger.valueOf(Int.MAX_VALUE);
private static final BigInteger bigMinInt = BigInteger.valueOf(Int.MIN_VALUE);

public BigInteger intRangeCheck(BigInteger val) throws ArithmeticException {
  if (val.compareTo(bigMaxInt) == 1 ||
      val.compareTo(bigMinInt) == -1) {
    throw new ArithmeticException("Integer overflow");
  }
  return val;
}

public int multAccum(int oldAcc, int newVal, int scale) throws ArithmeticException { 
  BigInteger product =
    BigInteger.valueOf(newVal).multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(scale));
  BigInteger res = intRangeCheck(BigInteger.valueOf(oldAcc).add(product));
  return res.intValue(); // safe conversion
}

Noncompliant Code Example AtomicInteger

Operations on objects of type AtomicInteger suffer from the same overflow issues as do the other integer types. The solutions are generally similar to those shown above; however, concurrency issues add additional complications. First, potential issues with time-of-check-time-of-use must be avoided. (See guidleine VNA02-J. Ensure that compound operations on shared variables are atomic for more information). Secondly, use of an AtomicInteger creates happens-before relationships between the various threads that access it. Consequently, changes to the number or order of accesses may alter the execution of the overall program. In such cases you must either choose to accept the altered execution or carefully craft the implementation of your compliant technique to preserve the exact number and order of accesses to the AtomicInteger.

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Consequently, itemsInInventory may wrap around to Integer.MIN_VALUE after the increment operation.

Compliant Solution (AtomicInteger)

This compliant solution uses the get() and compareAndSet() methods provided by AtomicInteger to guarantee successful manipulation of the shared value of itemsInInventory. Note the following:

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Wiki Markup
The arguments to the {{compareAndSet()}} method are the expected value of the variable when the method is invoked and the intended new value. The variable's value is updated if, and only if, the current value and the expected value are equal (see \[[API 2006|AA. Bibliography#API 06]\] class [{{AtomicInteger}}|http://download.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/api/java/util/concurrent/atomic/AtomicInteger.html]). Refer to guideline [VNA02-J. Ensure that compound operations on shared variables are atomic] for more details.

Exceptions

INT00-EX1: Depending on circumstances, integer overflow could be benign. For instance, the Object.hashcode() method could return all representable values of type int. Furthermore, many algorithms for computing hashcodes intentionally allow overflow to occur.

INT00-EX2: The added complexity and cost of programmer-written overflow checks may exceed their value for all but the most critical code. In such cases, consider the alternative of treating integral values as though they are tainted data, using appropriate range checks as the sanitizing code. These range checks should ensure that incoming values cannot cause integer overflow. Note that sound determination of allowable ranges may require deep understanding of the details of the code protected by the range checks; correct determination of the allowable ranges may be extremely difficult.

Risk Assessment

Failure to perform appropriate range checking can lead to integer overflows, which can cause unexpected program control flow or unanticipated program behavior.

Guideline

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

INT00-J

medium

unlikely

medium

P4

L3

Automated Detection

Automated detection of integer operations that can potentially overflow is straightforward. Automatic determination of which potential overflows are true errors and which are intended by the programmer is infeasible. Heuristic warnings could be helpful.

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this guideline on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

C Secure Coding Standard: INT32-C. Ensure that operations on signed integers do not result in overflow

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MITRE CWE: CWE-191 "Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)"

Bibliography

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\[[API 2006|AA. Bibliography#API 06]\] class [{{AtomicInteger}}|http://download.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/api/java/util/concurrent/atomic/AtomicInteger.html]
\[[Bloch 2005|AA. Bibliography#Bloch 05]\] Puzzle 27: Shifty i's\[[SCG 2007|AA. Bibliography#SCG 07]\] Introduction
\[[JLS 2005|AA. Bibliography#JLS 05]\] [Section 4.2.2|http://java.sun.com/docs/books/jls/third_edition/html/typesValues.html#4.2.2] "Integer Operations," [Section 15.22|http://java.sun.com/docs/books/jls/third_edition/html/expressions.html#15.22] "Bitwise and Logical Operators"
\[[Seacord 2005|AA. Bibliography#Seacord 05]\] Chapter 5. Integers
\[[Tutorials 2008|AA. Bibliography#Tutorials 08]\] Primitive Data Types

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