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Note that this rule lacks any assumptions about the integrity of the data being sent down a socket. For information about ensuring data integrity, see SER02-J. Sign then seal sensitive objects before sending them outside a trust boundary.
Noncompliant Code Example
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Note that SSLSocket
does not validate host names, so providing an arbitrary host name to an SSLSocket
is still vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. Host names should be validated separately. The HttpsURLConnection
class validates host names and is a suitable solution for secure web sockets.
Exceptions
MSC00-J-EX0: Because of the mechanisms that SSLSocket
provides to ensure the secure transfer of packets, significant performance overhead may result. Regular sockets are sufficient under the following circumstances:
- The data being sent over the socket is not sensitive.
- The data is sensitive but properly encrypted (see SER02-J. Sign then seal sensitive objects before sending them outside a trust boundary for more information).
- The network path of the socket never crosses a trust boundary. This could happen when, for example, the two endpoints of the socket are within the same local network and the entire network is trusted.
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The general case of automated detection appears to be infeasible because determining which specific data may be passed through the socket is not statically computable. An approach that introduces a custom API for passing sensitive data via secure sockets may be feasible. User tagging of sensitive data is a necessary requirement for such an approach.
Tool | Version | Checker | Description |
---|---|---|---|
Parasoft Jtest | 9.5 | SECURITY.WSC.USC | Implemented |
Related Guidelines
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