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Java language's access control mechanisms cease to remain effective after a class is serialized. Consequently, any sensitive data that was originally protected using access qualifiers (such as the private
keyword) gets exposed. Moreover, the security manager does not provide any checks to guarantee integrity of serialized data.
Non-Compliant Code Example
The data members of class Point
are declared as private
. The saveState
and readState
methods are used for serialization and de-serialization respectively. The coordinates (x,y)
that are written to the data stream are susceptible to malicious tampering.
Code Block | ||
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| ||
public class Point { private double x; private double y; public Point(double x, double y) { this.x = x; this.y = y; } public Point() { //no argument constructor } } public class Coordinates extends Point implements Serializable { public static void main(String[] args) { try { Point p = new Point(5,2); FileOutputStream fout = new FileOutputStream("point.ser"); ObjectOutputStream oout = new ObjectOutputStream(fout); oout.writeObject(p); oout.close(); } catch (Exception e) {System.err.println(e);} } } |
Compliant Solutions
In the absence of sensitive data, a class can be serialized by implementing the java.io.Serializable
interface. By doing so, the class indicates that no security issues may result from the object's serialization. Note that any sub classes will also inherit this interface and will thus be serializable.
...
Other ruses include custom implementation of writeObject
, writeReplace
and writeExternal
methods such that sensitive fields are not written to the serialized stream or alternatively, conducting proper validation checks while de-serializing. Yet another remediation is to define the serialPersistentFields
array field and ensuring that sensitive fields are not added to the array. Sometimes it is necessary to prevent a serializable object (whose superclass implements serializable) from getting serialized. This can be achieved by throwing a NotSerializableException
from the custom writeObject()
method.
References
Transient Keyword, http://java.sun.com/docs/books/jls/second_edition/html/classes.doc.html#78119
Java I/O, by Elliotte Rusty Harold
Java Secure Coding, http://java.sun.com/security/seccodeguide.html