...
The permission java.security.AllPermission
grants all possible permissions to code. This facility was included to reduce the burden of managing a multitude of permissions during routine testing as well as when a body of code is completely trusted. Code is typically granted AllPermission
via the security policy file; it is also possible to programmatically associate AllPermission
with a ProtectionDomain
. This permission is dangerous in production environments. Never grant AllPermission
to untrusted code.
ReflectPermission
, suppressAccessChecks
Granting ReflectPermission
on the target suppressAccessChecks
suppresses all standard Java language access checks when the permitted class attempts to operate on package-private, protected, or private members of another class. Consequently, the permitted class can obtain permissions to examine any field or invoke any method belonging to an arbitrary class [Reflect 2006]. As a result, ReflectPermission
must never be granted with target suppressAccessChecks
.
According to the technical note Permissions in the Java SE 6 Development Kit [Permissions 2008], Section ReflectPermission, target suppressAccessChecks
:
...
The permission java.lang.RuntimePermission
applied to target createClassLoader
grants code the permission to create a ClassLoader
object. This permission is extremely dangerous because malicious code can create its own custom class loader and load classes by assigning them arbitrary permissions. A custom class loader can define a class (or ProtectionDomain
) with permissions that override any restrictions specified in the systemwide security policy file.
Permissions in the Java SE 6 Development Kit [Permissions 2008] states:
This is an extremely dangerous permission to grant. Malicious applications that can instantiate their own class loaders could then load their own rogue classes into the system. These newly loaded classes could be placed into any protection domain by the class loader, thereby automatically granting the classes the permissions for that domain.
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This noncompliant example grants AllPermission
to the klib
library. :
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
// Grant the klib library AllPermission
grant codebase "file:${klib.home}/j2se/home/klib.jar" {
permission java.security.AllPermission;
};
|
The permission itself is specified in the the security policy file used by the security manager. Program code can obtain a permission object by subclassing the java.security.Permission
class or any of its subclasses (BasicPermission
, for example). The code can use the resulting object to grant AllPermission
to a ProtectionDomain
.
...
This compliant solution shows a policy file that can be used to enforce fine-grained permissions. :
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
grant codeBase
"file:${klib.home}/j2se/home/klib.jar", signedBy "Admin" {
permission java.io.FilePermission "/tmp/*", "read";
permission java.io.SocketPermission "*", "connect";
};
|
To check whether the caller has the requisite permissions, standard Java APIs use code such as the following:
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
// Security manager check
FilePermission perm =
new java.io.FilePermission("/tmp/JavaFile", "read");
AccessController.checkPermission(perm);
// ...
|
...
This noncompliant code example shows an overridden getPermissions()
method, defined in a custom class loader. It grants java.lang.ReflectPermission
with target suppressAccessChecks
to any class that it loads.
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
protected PermissionCollection getPermissions(CodeSource cs) { PermissionCollection pc = super.getPermissions(cs); pc.add(new ReflectPermission("suppressAccessChecks")); // permissionPermission to create a class loader // otherOther permissions return pc; } |
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution does not grant java.lang.ReflectPermission
with target suppressAccessChecks
to any class that it loads.:
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
protected PermissionCollection getPermissions(CodeSource cs) { PermissionCollection pc = super.getPermissions(cs); // otherOther permissions return pc; } |
Exceptions
ENV03-J-EX0: It may be necessary to grant AllPermission
to trusted library code so that callbacks work as expected. For example, it is common practice, and acceptable, to grant AllPermission
to the optional Java packages (extension libraries):
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
// Standard extensions extend the core platform and are granted all permissions by default
grant codeBase "file:${{java.ext.dirs}}/*" {
permission java.security.AllPermission;
};
|
Risk Assessment
Granting AllPermission
to to untrusted code allows it to perform privileged operations.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ENV03-J |
High |
Likely |
Low | P27 | L1 |
Automated Detection
Static detection of potential uses of dangerous permissions is a trivial search. Automated determination of the correctness of such uses is not feasible.
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CodeSonar |
| JAVA.IO.PERM | Permissive File Mode (Java) |
Related Vulnerabilities
CVE-2007-5342 describes a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat 5.5.9 through 5.5.25 and 6.0.0 through 6.0.15. The security policy used in the JULI logging component failed to restrict certain permissions for web applications. An attacker could modify the log level, directory, or prefix attributes in the org.apache.juli.FileHandler
handler, permitting them to modify logging configuration options and overwrite arbitrary files.
Related Guidelines
, Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource |
Android Implementation Details
The java.security
package exists on Android for compatibility purposes only, and it should not be used. Android uses another permission mechanism for security purposes.
Bibliography
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