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This compliant solution retrieves the server IP address from an external file located in a secure directory. Exposure , as recommended by FIO00-J. Do not operate on files in shared directories. It reads the file in compliance with FIO10-J. Ensure the array is filled when using read() to fill an array. Exposure of the IP address is further limited by clearing storing it in a char array rather than a java.lang.String, and by clearing the server IP address from memory immediately after use.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
class IPaddress {
  public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
    char[] ipAddress = new char[100];
    int offset = 0;
    int charsRead = 0;
    BufferedReader br = null;
    try {
      br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(
             new FileInputStream("serveripaddress.txt")));

    // Reads thewhile server((charsRead IP address into the char array,= br.read(ipAddress, offset, ipAddress.length - offset))
    //  returns the number of bytes read 
!= -1) {
      int  noffset += br.read(ipAddress);  
charsRead;
        if (offset >= ipAddress.length) {
      // Validate server IP addressbreak;
    //   Manually clear}
 the server IP address
  }
  // immediately after use 
    for (int i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {  // ... Work with IP address

    } finally {
      ipAddress[i] =Arrays.fill(ipAddress,  (byte) 0);
    }
    br.close();
    }
  }
}

To further limit the exposure time of the sensitive server IP address, replace BufferedReader with a direct native input/output (NIO) buffer, which can be cleared immediately after use.

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Hard coding sensitive information exposes that information to attackers. The severity of this rule can vary depending on the kind of information that is disclosed. Frequently, the information disclosed is password or key information, which can lead to remote exploitation. Consequently, a high severity rating is given but may be adjusted downwards according to the nature of the sensitive data

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

MSC03-J

High

Probable

Medium

P12

L1

Automated Detection

ToolVersionCheckerDescription
CodeSonar

Include Page
CodeSonar_V
CodeSonar_V

JAVA.HARDCODED.PASSWD
JAVA.MISC.SD.EXT

Hardcoded Password (Java)
Sensitive Data Written to External Storage (Java)

Coverity7.5

HARDCODED_CREDENTIALS
CONFIG
FB.DMI_CONSTANT_DB_ PASSWORD
FB.DMI_EMPTY_DB_PASSWORD

Implemented
Fortify1.0

Password_Management
Password_Management__Hardcoded_Password

Partially implemented
Parasoft Jtest
9.5SECURITY.WSC.HCCS, SECURITY.WSC.HCCK, SECURITY.WSC.AHCA
Include Page
Parasoft_V
Parasoft_V
CERT.MSC03.HCCS
CERT.MSC03.HCCK
CERT.MSC03.AHCA
Avoid passing hardcoded usernames/passwords/URLs to database connection methods
Avoid using hard-coded cryptographic keys
Avoid hard-coding the arguments to certain methods
Implemented
PMD1.0AvoidUsingHardCodedIPPartially implemented
SonarQube
Plugin
Include Page
SonarQube
Plugin
_V
SonarQube
Plugin
_V
S1313
S2068
Partially implemented

Related Vulnerabilities

GERONIMO-2925 describes a vulnerability in the WAS CE tool, which is based on Apache Geronimo. It uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to encrypt passwords but uses a hard-coded key that is identical for all the WAS CE server instances. Consequently, anyone who can download the software is provided with the key to every instance of the tool. This vulnerability was resolved by having each new installation of the tool generate its own unique key and use it from that time on.

Related Guidelines

Android Implementation Details

Hard-coded information can be easily obtained on Android by using the apktool to decompile an application or by using dex2jar to convert a dex file to a jar file.

Bibliography

[Chess 2007]

Section 11.2, "Outbound Passwords: Keep Passwords out of Source Code"

[Fortify 2008]

"Unsafe Mobile Code: Database Access"

[Gong 2003]

Section 9.4, "Private Object State and Object Immutability"

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