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Sensitive data stored in reusable resources may be inadvertently leaked to a less privileged user or attacker if not properly cleared. Examples of reusable resources include

• dynamically Dynamically allocated memory
• statically Statically allocated memory
• automatically Automatically allocated (stack) memory
• memory Memory caches
• diskDisk
• disk Disk caches

The manner in which sensitive information can be properly cleared varies depending on the resource type and platform.

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Dynamic memory managers are not required to clear freed memory and generally do not because of the additional runtime overhead. Furthermore, dynamic memory managers are free to reallocate this same memory. As a result, it is possible to accidentally leak sensitive information if it is not cleared before calling a function that frees dynamic memory. Programmers also cannot rely on memory being cleared during allocation. (See recommendation MEM09-C. Do not assume memory allocation routines initialize memory.)

To prevent information leakage, sensitive information must be cleared from dynamically allocated buffers before they are freed. Calling free() on a block of dynamic memory causes the space to be deallocated; that is, the memory block is made available for future allocation. However, the data stored in the block of memory to be recycled may be preserved. If this memory block contains sensitive information, that information may be unintentionally exposed.

In this noncompliant example, sensitive information stored in the dynamically allocated memory referenced by secret is copied to the dynamically allocated buffer, new_secret, which is processed and eventually deallocated by a call to free(). Because the memory is not cleared, it may be reallocated to another section of the program where the information stored in new_secret may be unintentionally leaked.

char *secret;

/* initializeInitialize secret to a null-terminated byte string, 
   of less than SIZE_MAX chars */

char *new_secret;
size_t size = strlen(secret);
if (size == SIZE_MAX) {
  /* Handle error */
}

char *new_secret;
new_secret = (char *)malloc(size+1);
if (!new_secret) {
  /* Handle error */
}
strcpy(new_secret, secret);

/* Process new_secret... */

free(new_secret);
new_secret = NULL;

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To prevent information leakage, dynamic memory containing sensitive information should be sanitized before being freed. This Sanitization is commonly accomplished by clearing the allocated space (that is, filling the space with '\0' characters).

char *secret;

/* initializeInitialize secret to a null-terminated byte string, 
   of less than SIZE_MAX chars */

char *new_secret;
size_t size = strlen(secret);
if (size == SIZE_MAX) {
  char *new_secret;
/* Handle error */
}

/* use Use calloc() to zero-out allocated space */
new_secret = (char *)calloc(size+1, sizeof(char));
if (!new_secret) {
  /* Handle error */
}
strcpy(new_secret, secret);

/* Process new_secret... */

/* sanitizeSanitize memory  */
memset_s(new_secret, '\0', size);
free(new_secret);
new_secret = NULL;

The calloc() function ensures that the newly allocated memory has also been cleared. Because sizeof(char) is guaranteed to be 1, this solution does not need to check for a numeric overflow as a result of using calloc(). (See recommendation MEM07-C. Ensure that the arguments to calloc(), when multiplied, can be represented as a size_tdo not wrap.)

See recommendation MSC06-C. Be aware Beware of compiler optimization when dealing with sensitive dataoptimizations for a definition and discussion of using the memset_s() function.

Noncompliant Code Example (realloc())

Reallocating memory using the using realloc() function is a regenerative case of  can have the same problem as freeing memory. The realloc() function deallocates the old object and returns a pointer to a new object. Wiki MarkupUsing {{Using realloc()}} to resize dynamic memory may inadvertently expose sensitive information, or it may allow heap inspection , as described in the _Fortify Taxonomy: Software Security Errors_ \ [[Fortify 2006|AA. Bibliography#Fortify 06]\] and NIST's _Source Code Analysis Tool Functional Specification_ \ [[Black 2007].

In this example, when |AA. Bibliography#Black 07]\]. When {{realloc()}} is called , it may allocate a new, larger object, copy the contents of {{secret}} to this new object, {{free()}} the original object, and assign the newly allocated object to {{secret}}. However, the contents of the original object may remain in memory.

char *secret;

/* initializeInitialize secret */

size_t secret_size = strlen(secret);
/* ... */
if (secret_size > SIZE_MAX/2) {
   /* handleHandle error condition */
}
else {
secret = (char *)realloc(secret, secret_size * 2);
}

The secret_size is tested to ensure that the integer multiplication (secret_size * 2) does not result in an integer overflow. (See rule INT32INT30-C. Ensure that unsigned integer operations on signed integers do not result in overflowwrap.)

Compliant Solution

A compliant program cannot rely on realloc() because it is not possible to clear the memory prior to memory before the call. Instead, a custom function must be used that operates similar similarly to realloc() but sanitizes sensitive information as heap-based buffers are resized. Again, this sanitization is done by overwriting the space to be deallocated with '\0' characters.

char *secret;

/* initializeInitialize secret */

size_t secret_size = strlen(secret);
char *temp_buff;
/* ... */
if (secret_size > SIZE_MAX/2) {
   /* handleHandle error condition */
}
/* calloc() initializes memory to zero */
temp_buff = (char *)calloc(secret_size * 2, sizeof(char));
if (temp_buff == NULL) {
 /* Handle error */
}

memcpy(temp_buff, secret, secret_size);

/* sanitizeSanitize the buffer */
memset((volatile char *)secret, '\0', secret_size);

free(secret);
secret = temp_buff; /* installInstall the resized buffer */
temp_buff = NULL;

The calloc() function ensures that the newly allocated memory has also been clearedmemory is also cleared. Because sizeof(char) is guaranteed to be 1, this solution does not need to check for a numeric overflow as a result of using calloc(). (See recommendation MEM07-C. Ensure that the arguments to calloc(), when multiplied, can be represented as a size_tdo not wrap.)

Risk Assessment

Wiki MarkupIn practice, this type of [security flaw|BB. Definitions#security flaw] can expose sensitive information to unintended parties. The Sun tarball vulnerability discussed in _Secure Coding Principles & Practices: Designing and Implementing Secure Applications_ \ [[Graf 2003|AA. Bibliography#Graf 03]\] and Sun Security Bulletin #00122 \[ [Sun |AA. Bibliography#Sun]\] shows a violation of this recommendation, leading to sensitive data being leaked. Attackers may also be able to leverage this defect to retrieve sensitive information using techniques such as _heap inspection_1993] shows a violation of this recommendation, leading to sensitive data being leaked. Attackers may also be able to leverage this defect to retrieve sensitive information using techniques such as heap inspection.

Automated Detection

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

CERT C++ Secure Coding Standard: MEM03-CPP. Clear sensitive information stored in returned reusable resources

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Bibliography

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Image Added Image Added Image Added

ISO/IEC 9899:1999 Section 7.20.3, "Memory management functions"

ISO/IEC TR 24772 "XZK Sensitive Information Uncleared Before Use"

Bibliography

\[[Black 2007|AA. Bibliography#Black 07]\]
\[[Fortify 2006|AA. Bibliography#Fortify 06]\]
\[[Graff 2003|AA. Bibliography#Graf 03]\]

Image Removed      08. Memory Management (MEM)      MEM04-C. Do not perform zero length allocations