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Accepting user input in log files can result in log forging. For example, if a user enters A log injection vulnerability arises when a log entry contains unsanitized user input. A malicious user can insert fake log data and consequently deceive system administrators as to the system's behavior [OWASP 2008]. For example, an attacker might split a legitimate log entry into two log entries by entering a carriage return and line feed (CRLF) sequences, it may be possible to break apart a legit log entry into two log entries. The second entry can be intentionally misleading, for instance, it may warn the administrator that a reboot is required to install critical security updatessequence to mislead an auditor. Log injection attacks can be prevented by sanitizing and validating any untrusted input sent to a log.

Logging unsanitized user input can also result in leaking sensitive data across a trust boundary. For example, an attacker might inject a script into a log file such that when the file is viewed using a web browser, the browser could provide the attacker with a copy of the administrator's cookie so that the attacker might gain access as the administrator.

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example logs the user's login user name when an invalid request is received. No input sanitization is being performed untrusted data from an unauthenticated user without data sanitization.

Code Block
bgColor#FFCCCC
if (loginSuccessful) {
  logger.severe("User login succeeded for: " + username);
} else {
  logger.severe("User login failed for: " + username);
}

Without sanitization, a log injection attack is possible. A standard log message when username is guest might look like this:

Code Block
May 15, 2011 2:19:10 PM java.util.logging.LogManager$RootLogger log
SEVERE: User login failed for: guest 

If the username that is used in a log message is not guest but rather a multiline string like this:

Code Block
guest 
May 15, 2011 2:25:52 PM java.util.logging.LogManager$RootLogger log
SEVERE: User login succeeded for: administrator

the log would contain the following misleading data:

Code Block
May 15, 2011 2:19:10 PM java.util.logging.LogManager$RootLogger log
SEVERE: User login failed for: guest 
May 15, 2011 2:25:52 PM java.util.logging.LogManager log
SEVERE: User login succeeded for: administrator

Compliant Solution (Sanitized User)

This compliant solution sanitizes the username before logging it, preventing injection attacks.

Code Block
bgColor#FFCCCC#ccccff
if (loginSuccessful) {
  
logger.severe("Invalid username:" + getUserName());

Compliant Solution

"User login succeeded for: " + sanitizeUser(username));
} else {
  logger.severe("User login failed for: " + sanitizeUser(username));
}

The sanitization is done by a dedicated method for sanitizing user names:

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
public String sanitizeUser(String username) {
  return Pattern.matches("[A-Za-z0-9_]+", username)) 
      ? username : "unauthorized user";
}

Compliant Solution (Sanitized Logger)

This compliant solution uses a text logger that automatically sanitizes its input. A sanitized logger saves the developer from having to worry about unsanitized log messages.


Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
Logger sanLogger = new SanitizedTextLogger(logger);

if (loginSuccessful) {
  sanLogger.severe("User login succeeded for: " + username);
} else {
  sanLogger.severe("User login failed for: " + username);
}

The sanitized text logger takes as delegate an actual logger. We assume the logger outputs text log messages to a file, network, or the console, and each log message has no indented lines. The sanitized text logger sanitizes all text to be logged by indenting every line except the first by two spaces. While a malicious user can indent text by more, a malicious user cannot create a fake log entry because all of her output will be indented, except for the real log outputThis compliant solution sanitizes the user name input before logging it. Refer to IDS01-J. Sanitize before processing or storing user input for more details on input sanitization.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
class SanitizedTextLogger extends Logger {
String username = getUserName();
sanitize(username);
logger.severe("Invalid username:" + username);
  Logger delegate;

  public SanitizedTextLogger(Logger delegate) {
    super(delegate.getName(), delegate.getResourceBundleName());
    this.delegate = delegate;
  }

  public String sanitize(String msg) {
    Pattern newline = Pattern.compile("\n");
    Matcher matcher = newline.matcher(msg);
    return matcher.replaceAll("\n  ");
  }

  public void severe(String msg) {
    delegate.severe(sanitize(msg));
  }

  // .. Other Logger methods which must also sanitize their log messages
}

Risk Assessment

Allowing unvalidated user input to be logged can result in forging of log entries, leaking secure information, or storing sensitive data in a manner that violates a local law or regulation.

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

EXC12

IDS03-J

medium

Medium

probable

Probable

medium

Medium

P8

L2

Automated Detection

...

TODO

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Bibliography

Wiki Markup
\[[API 2006|AA. Bibliography#API 06]\] 
\[[MITRE 2009|AA. Bibliography#MITRE 09]\] [CWE ID 144|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/144.html] and [CWE ID 150|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/150.html]

ToolVersionCheckerDescription
The Checker Framework

Include Page
The Checker Framework_V
The Checker Framework_V

Tainting CheckerTrust and security errors (see Chapter 8)
CodeSonar
Include Page
CodeSonar_V
CodeSonar_V

JAVA.IO.TAINT.LOG

Tainted Log (Java)

Fortify
Log_ForgingImplemented
Klocwork

Include Page
Klocwork_V
Klocwork_V

SVLOG_FORGINGImplemented
Parasoft Jtest
Include Page
Parasoft_V
Parasoft_V
CERT.IDS03.TDLOGProtect against log forging

Related Guidelines

ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013

Injection [RST]

MITRE CWE

CWE-144, Improper neutralization of line delimiters
CWE-150, Improper neutralization of escape, meta, or control sequences
CWE-117, Improper Output Neutralization for Logs 

MITRE CAPEC

CAPEC-93, Log Injection-Tampering-Forging

Bibliography


...

Image Added Image Added Image AddedEXC11-J. Restore prior object state on method failure      17. Exceptional Behavior (EXC)      EXC13-J. Throw specific exceptions as opposed to the more general RuntimeException or Exception