When security Security checks are based on untrusted sources , those sources could be compromised in such a way that the security check could be can be bypassed. The Any untrusted object or parameter should argument must be defensively copied before the a security check is carried outperformed. The copy operation must be a deep copy; the implementation of the clone()
method may produce a shallow copy, which could can still be compromised. FurtherIn addition, the implementation of the clone()
method may can be provided by the attacker . See guidelines MET08(see OBJ06-J. Do not use the clone method to copy untrusted method parameters and FIO00-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components for more information).
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example describes a security vulnerability from JDK the Java 1.5 java.
0 software. At the timeio
package. In this release, java.io.File
was non-final is nonfinal, allowing an attacker to supply an untrusted value as a parameter which was argument constructed by extending the legitimate java.io.File
class. In this waymanner, the getPath()
method could can be overridden so that the security check passes the first time it is called but the value mutates changes the second time to refer to a sensitive file such as /etc/passwd
. This is an example of a time-of-check-, time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability.
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
public RandomAccessFile openFile(final java.io.File f) { askUserPermission(f.getPath()); // ... return (RandomAccessFile)AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction <Object>() { public Object run() { return new RandomAccessFile(f, f.getPath()); } }); } |
The attacker can could extend java.io.File
as follows:
Code Block |
---|
public class BadFile extends java.io.File {
private int count;
public String getPath() {
return (++count == 1) ? "/tmp/foo" : "/etc/passwd";
}
}
|
Compliant Solution
...
(Final)
This vulnerability can be mitigated by declaring java.io.File
final.
Compliant Solution (Copy)
Security checks should not be based on untrusted sources. This compliant solution ensures that the java.io.File
object can be trusted , because:
...
despite not being final. The solution creates a new File
object using the standard
...
constructor. This technique ensures that any methods
...
invoked on the File
object are the standard library methods
...
and not overriding methods
...
that have been provided by the attacker.
Note that using the clone()
method instead of the openFile()
method would copy the attacker's class, which is not desirable. (Refer to guideline MET08-J. Do not use the clone method to copy untrusted method parameters.)
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
public RandomAccessFile openFile(java.io.File f) { final java.io.File copy = new java.io.File(f.getPath()); askUserPermission(copy.getPath()); // ... return (RandomAccessFile)AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction <Object>() { public Object run() { return new RandomAccessFile(copy, copy.getPath()); } }); } |
Note that using the clone()
method instead of the openFile()
method would copy the attacker's class, which is not desirable (see OBJ06-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components).
Risk Assessment
Basing security checks on untrusted sources can result in the check being bypassed.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|
SEC02-J |
High |
Probable |
Medium | P12 | L1 |
Automated Detection
TODO
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this guideline on the CERT website.
Bibliography
Wiki Markup |
---|
\[[Sterbenz 2006|AA. Bibliography#Sterbenz 06]\]
\[[MITRE 2009|AA. Bibliography#MITRE 09]\] [CWE ID 302|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/302.html] "Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data" |
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coverity | 7.5 | UNSAFE_REFLECTION | Implemented | ||||||
Parasoft Jtest |
| CERT.SEC02.TDRFL | Protect against Reflection injection |
Related Guidelines
Authentication Logic Error [XZO] | |
CWE-302, Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data |
Android Implementation Details
The code examples using the java.security
package are not applicable to Android, but the principle of the rule is applicable to Android apps.
Bibliography
...
SEC08-J. Enforce security checks in code that performs sensitive operations 02. Platform Security (SEC) SEC10-J. Define custom security permissions for fine grained security