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In most cases, the distinction between the number of elements and number of bytes is moot: there is a clear mapping between the two, and it is easier to think in terms of number of elements anyway. Unfortunately, this issue can become muddled when working with multibyte strings because the logical entity being manipulated differs from that of the type being used to implement it. Here, it is important to remember that the type of the array is a character, not a multibyte character. Accordingly, the number of elements in the array is represented as a number of characters.
Noncompliant Code Example
It is not necessary to go beyond the standard C library to find examples that violate this recommendation because the C language often prioritizes performance at the expense of robustness. The following are two examples from the C Standard, subclause 7.24 [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]:
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These functions have two problems. First, there is no indication of the size of the first array, s1. As a result, it is not possible to discern within the function how large s1 is and how many elements may be written into it. Second, it appears that a size is supplied for s2, but the size_t parameter n actually gives the number of elements to copy. Consequently, there is no way for either function to determine the size of the array s2.
Compliant Solution
The C strncpy() and strncat() functions could be improved by adding element count parameters as follows:
| Code Block | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
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char *improved_strncpy(char * restrict s1, size_t s1count, const char * restrict s2, size_t s2count, size_t n); char *improved_strncat(char * restrict s1, size_t s1count, const char * restrict s2, size_t s2count, size_t n); |
The n parameter is used to specify a number of elements to copy that is less than the total number of elements in the source string.
Compliant Solution (C11 Annex K)
The C Standard, Annex K (normative) Bounds-checking interfaces, defines bounds-checking versions of standard C library string-handling functions:
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There are two notable differences between the compliant solution and the secure versions from Annex K. First, the Annex K versions use rsize_t instead of size_t, which allows the size to be compared against the reasonable limit for a single object, RSIZE_MAX. Second, the Annex K versions do not require an element count for the second array. Consequently, these functions have limited ability to validate the input for s2. However, a size value for s1 is required, so memory outside of the range for s1 should not be overwritten.
Exceptions
API02-C-EX1: Functions that can guarantee via their runtime-constraint handlers that no out-of-bounds read or write occurs may omit the maximum-elements argument. For instance, the s2 parameter to strcat_s() needs no max parameter.
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This function provides no explicit maximum argument to s2. However, it requires that s1max be larger than s2, thereby preventing an out-of-bounds read.
Risk Assessment
Failure to follow this recommendation can result in improper memory accesses and buffer overflows that are detrimental to the correct and continued execution of the program.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
API02-C | High | Likely | High | P9 | L2 |
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CodeSonar |
| BADFUNC.BO.* | A collection of checks that report uses of library functions prone to internal buffer overflows. | ||||||
| Parasoft C/C++test |
| CERT_C-API02-a | Avoid using unsafe string functions which may cause buffer overflows |
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
Related Guidelines
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Key here (explains table format and definitions)
Bibliography
| [ISO/IEC 9899:2011] | Annex K (normative) Bounds-checking Interfaces |
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