abnormal end [ISO/IEC/IEEE 24765:2010]Termination of a process prior to completion. Anchor |
---|
| abnormal termination |
---|
| abnormal termination |
---|
|
Anchor |
---|
| abnormal program termination |
---|
| abnormal program termination |
---|
|
abnormal program termination See abnormal end.
analyzer [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]
Mechanism that diagnoses coding flaws in software programs.
NOTE
Analyzers may include static analysis tools, tools within a compiler suite, or tools in other contexts.
Anchor |
---|
| async-signal-safe |
---|
| async-signal-safe |
---|
|
async-signal-safe function [ISO/IEC 9945:2008]A function that may be invoked, without restriction, from signal-catching functions. No function (defined in ISO/IEC 9945) is async-signal-safe unless explicitly described as such. See asynchronous-safe. Anchor |
---|
| asynchronous-safe |
---|
| asynchronous-safe |
---|
|
Anchor |
---|
| asynchronous-safe function |
---|
| asynchronous-safe function |
---|
|
Anchor |
---|
| async-signal-safe |
---|
| async-signal-safe |
---|
|
asynchronous-safe function [GNU Pth]A function is asynchronous-safe, or asynchronous-signal safe, if it can be called safely and without side effects from within a signal handler context. That is, it must be able to be interrupted at any point to run linearly out of sequence without causing an inconsistent state. It must also function properly when global data might itself be in an inconsistent state. Some asynchronous-safe operations are listed here: Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="00df8ffe-2f7c-47f3-9a6b-37488c6d2b88"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> asynchronous-safe</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*asynchronous-safe* \[[GNU Pth|AA. C References#GNU Pth]\]
A function is asynchronous-safe, or asynchronous-signal safe, if it can be called safely and without side effects from within a signal handler context. That is, it must be able to be interrupted at any point to run linearly out of sequence without causing an inconsistent state. It must also function properly when global data might itself be in an inconsistent state. Some asynchronous-safe operations are listed below: |
- call the
signal()
function to reinstall a signal handler. - unconditionally Unconditionally modify a
volatile sig_atomic_t
variable (as modification to this type is atomic). - call Call the
_Exit()
function to immediately terminate program execution. - invoke Invoke an asynchronous-safe function, as specified by your the implementation.
Few functions are portably asynchronous-safe. If a function performs any other operations, it is probably not portably asynchronous-safe.
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="57cd2f0e-e2ae-45ac-86d0-d4b474ae97f5"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> availability</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*availability* \[[IEEE Std 610.12 1990|AA. C References#IEEE Std 610.12 1990]\]
The degree to which a system or component is operational and accessible when required for use. Often expressed as a probability. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="28e60fc5-747f-4018-86f2-98470f069617"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> conforming program</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*conforming* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
Conforming programs may depend on nonportable features of a conforming implementation. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="224e041a-45d7-4871-a80c-127caebbf5b0"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> error tolerance</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*error tolerance* \[[IEEE Std 610.12 1990|AA. C References#IEEE Std 610.12 1990]\]
The ability of a system or component to continue normal operation despite the presence of erroneous inputs. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="fa0c7cb2-f7c3-44ab-8d91-2bc9c739d5c6"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> exploit</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*exploit* \[[Seacord 05a|AA. C References#Seacord 05]\]
A piece of software or a technique that takes advantage of a security vulnerability to violate an explicit or implicit [security policy|BB. Definitions#security policy]. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="8473cd87-ea82-40f9-94d6-5b4965f215c7"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> fail safe</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*fail safe* \[[IEEE Std 610.12 1990|AA. C References#IEEE Std 610.12 1990]\]
Pertaining to a system or component that automatically places itself in a safe operating mode in the event of a failure; for example, a traffic light that reverts to blinking red in all directions when normal operation fails. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="3ab4d5b8-db02-4697-a683-2f4a8850ef4d"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> fail soft</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*fail soft* \[[IEEE Std 610.12 1990|AA. C References#IEEE Std 610.12 1990]\]
Pertaining to a system or component that continues to provide partial operational capability in the event of certain failures; for example, a traffic light that continues to alternate between red and green if the yellow light fails. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="eb23d8f8-61a8-495e-b851-3fa2486ff8e9"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> fault tolerance</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*fault tolerance* \[[IEEE Std 610.12 1990|AA. C References#IEEE Std 610.12 1990]\]
The ability of a system or component to continue normal operation despite the presence of hardware or software faults. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="c5f9e79e-bc7d-4498-b766-ffb14f8e0989"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> freestanding environment</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*freestanding environment* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
An environment in which C program execution may take place without any benefit of an operating system. Program startup might occur at some function other than {{main()}}, complex types might not be implemented, and only certain minimal library facilities are guaranteed to be available. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="4e3de27d-11d5-4e11-b3e8-b27eac5b2c99"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> hosted environment</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*hosted environment* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
An environment that is not freestanding. Program startup occurs at {{main()}}, complex types are implemented, and all C standard library facilities are available. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="310d97e4-3c48-4c6b-baa3-50377e7e1fc5"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> implementation</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*implementation* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
Particular set of software, running in a particular translation environment under particular control options, that performs translation of programs for, and supports execution of functions in, a particular execution environment. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="6375a275-f6bb-449c-9fdb-2b231c434ee7"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> implementation-defined behavior</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*implementation-defined behavior* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
Unspecified behavior whereby each implementation documents how the choice is made. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="8efaa9a2-5ce7-4bfd-87a8-d0d326da1d5d"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> incomplete type</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*incomplete type* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
A type that describes an identifier but lacks information needed to determine the size of the identifier. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="da8653aa-f0f4-4721-8444-8ac3352b42fe"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> locale-specific behavior</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*locale-specific behavior* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
Behavior that depends on local conventions of nationality, culture, and language that each implementation documents. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="3bed3e7f-a316-47eb-be44-7615511a6b6b"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> lvalue</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*lvalue* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
An expression with an object type or an incomplete type other than {{void}}. The name _lvalue_ comes originally from the assignment expression {{E1 = E2}}, in which the left operand {{E1}} is required to be a (modifiable) lvalue. It is perhaps better considered as representing an object "locator value". |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="297964ad-1c0c-4560-8d1d-c0b78dac574c"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> mitigation</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*mitigation* \[[Seacord 05a|AA. C References#Seacord 05]\]
Methods, techniques, processes, tools, or runtime libraries that can prevent or limit exploits against vulnerabilities. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="dde6d022-8595-4a3c-8cad-8caa191705e4"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> reentrant</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*reentrant* \[[Dowd 06|AA. C References#Dowd 06]\]
A function is reentrant if multiple instances of the same function can run in the same address space concurrently without creating the potential for inconsistent states. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="04dc1ee0-d943-4585-a803-92a5b3e425af"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> reliability</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*reliability* \[[IEEE Std 610.12 1990|AA. C References#IEEE Std 610.12 1990]\]
The ability of a system or component to perform its required functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="088c5890-6c84-4d25-a6cc-905e9f050556"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> rvalue</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*rvalue* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
Value of an expression. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="be7ef2e3-7a6e-4bb6-83a9-9afa05427df0"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> security flaw</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*security flaw* \[[Seacord 05a|AA. C References#Seacord 05]\]
A software defect that poses a potential security risk. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="63ecfe34-5d5d-4e48-9b5b-3eff360a9180"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> security policy</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*security policy* \[[Internet Society 00|AA. C References#Internet Society 00]\]
A set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a system or organization provides security services to protect sensitive and critical system resources. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="adf68c1f-ef3d-41ac-9dc8-e01680eea4f3"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> sequence point</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*sequence point* C99 \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
Evaluation of an expression may produce side effects. At specific points in the execution sequence called _sequence points_, all side effects of previous evaluations have completed, and no side effects of subsequent evaluations have yet taken place. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
The following sequence points are defined by C99 \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]: |
- the call to a function, after the arguments have been evaluated
- the end of the first operand of the following operators: && (logical AND); || (logical OR); ? (conditional); , (comma operator)
- the end of a full declarator
- the end of a full expression: an initializer; the expression in an expression statement (that is, at the semicolon); the controlling expression of a selection statement (if or switch); the controlling expression of a while or do statement; each of the expressions of a for statement; the expression in a return statement
- immediately before a function returns
- after the actions associated with each formatted input/output function conversion specifier
- immediately before and immediately after each call to a comparison function, by a standard searching or sorting function, and between any call to a comparison function and any movement of the objects passed as arguments to that call
Note that not all instances of a comma in C code denote a usage of the comma operator. For example, the comma between arguments in a function call is not a sequence point.
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="c1d49fd9-526f-4e69-943e-3a89a0b21b42"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> strictly conforming</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*strictly conforming* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
A strictly conforming program is one that uses only those features of the language and library specified in the international standard. Strictly conforming programs are intended to be maximally portable among conforming implementations and can't, for example, depend on implementation-defined behavior. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="fb6c7aac-9e2b-43a3-a64c-9d4ac6f4c4bb"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> undefined behavior</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*undefined behavior* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
Behavior, upon use of a nonportable or erroneous program construct or of erroneous data, for which the standard imposes no requirements. An example of undefined behavior is the behavior on integer overflow. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="c14d2bea-3a7a-4c39-92d9-4d0c30ec35d5"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> unspecified behavior</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*unspecified behavior* \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\]
Behavior for which the standard provides two or more possibilities and imposes no further requirements on which is chosen in any instance. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="635b56b8-e786-416b-84a2-ef70d3a0c408"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> validation</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*validation* \[[IEC 61508-4|AA. C References#IEC 61508-4]\]
Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the particular requirements for a specific intended use are fulfilled. |
Wiki Markup |
---|
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="09ed5064-d867-4495-8be8-4d078bc238f3"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> verification</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*verification* \[[IEC 61508-4|AA. C References#IEC 61508-4]\]
Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the requirements have been fulfilled. |
availability [IEEE Std 610.12 1990]The degree to which a system or component is operational and accessible when required for use. Often expressed as a probability. Anchor |
---|
| condition predicate |
---|
| condition predicate |
---|
|
condition predicateAn expression constructed from the variables of a function that must be true for a thread to be allowed to continue execution. Anchor |
---|
| conforming program |
---|
| conforming program |
---|
|
conforming [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Conforming programs may depend on nonportable features of a conforming implementation. Anchor |
---|
| critical sections |
---|
| critical sections |
---|
|
critical sectionsCode that accesses shared data and would otherwise be protected from data races. Anchor |
---|
| dangling pointer |
---|
| dangling pointer |
---|
|
dangling pointer
A pointer to deallocated memory.
Anchor |
---|
| data flow analysis |
---|
| data flow analysis |
---|
|
data flow analysis
Tracking of value constraints along nonexcluded paths through the code.
NOTE
Tracking can be performed intraprocedurally, with various assumptions made about what happens at function call boundaries, or interprocedurally, where values are tracked flowing into function calls (directly or indirectly) as arguments and flowing back out either as return values or indirectly through arguments.
Data flow analysis may or may not track values flowing into or out of the heap or take into account global variables. When this specification refers to values flowing, the key point is contrast with variables or expressions because a given variable or expression may hold different values along different paths and a given value may be held by multiple variables or expressions along a path.
data race [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]The execution of a program contains a data race if it contains two conflicting actions in different threads, at least one of which is not atomic, and neither happens before the other. Any such data race results in undefined behavior. Anchor |
---|
| denial-of-service |
---|
| denial-of-service |
---|
|
denial-of-service attackAlso DoS attack. An attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. Anchor |
---|
| diagnostic message |
---|
| diagnostic message |
---|
|
diagnostic message [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]
A message belonging to an implementation-defined subset of the implementation’s message output. A diagnostic message may indicate a constraint violation or a valid but questionable language construct. Messages typically include the file name and line number pointing to the offending code construct. In addition, implementations often indicate the severity of the problem. Although the C Standard does not specify any such requirement, the most severe problems often cause implementations to fail to fully translate a translation unit. Diagnostics output in such cases are termed errors. Other problems may cause implementations simply to issue a warning message and continue translating the rest of the program. See error message and warning message.
Anchor |
---|
| double-free vulnerability |
---|
| double-free vulnerability |
---|
|
double-free vulnerabilityAn exploitable error resulting from the same allocated object being freed more than once. Anchor |
---|
| error message |
---|
| error message |
---|
|
error messageA diagnostic message generated when source code is encountered that prevents an implementation from translating a translation unit. See diagnostic message and warning message. Anchor |
---|
| error tolerance |
---|
| error tolerance |
---|
|
error tolerance [IEEE Std 610.12 1990]The ability of a system or component to continue normal operation despite the presence of erroneous inputs.exploit [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]Technique that takes advantage of a security vulnerability to violate an explicit or implicit security policy.
fail safe [IEEE Std 610.12 1990]Pertaining to a system or component that automatically places itself in a safe operating mode in the event of a failure—for example, a traffic light that reverts to blinking red in all directions when normal operation fails.fail soft [IEEE Std 610.12 1990]Pertaining to a system or component that continues to provide partial operational capability in the event of certain failures—for example, a traffic light that continues to alternate between red and green if the yellow light fails. Anchor |
---|
| fatal diagnostic |
---|
| fatal diagnostic |
---|
|
fatal diagnosticA diagnostic message that causes an implementation not to perform the translation. Anchor |
---|
| fault tolerance |
---|
| fault tolerance |
---|
|
fault tolerance [IEEE Std 610.12 1990]The ability of a system or component to continue normal operation despite the presence of hardware or software faults. Anchor |
---|
| freestanding environment |
---|
| freestanding environment |
---|
|
freestanding environment [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]An environment in which C program execution may take place without any benefit of an operating system. Program startup might occur at some function other than main()
, complex types might not be implemented, and only certain minimal library facilities are guaranteed to be available. Anchor |
---|
| function-like macro |
---|
| function-like macro |
---|
|
function-like macro [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]A #define
preprocessing directive that defines an identifier immediately followed by zero or more parameters, the ellipsis (...
), or a combination of the two, enclosed in parentheses, similar syntactically to a function call. Subsequent instances of the macro name followed by a parenthesized list of arguments in a translation unit are replaced by the replacement list of preprocessing tokens that constitute the remainder of the directive. See object-like macro and unsafe function-like macro. Anchor |
---|
| hosted environment |
---|
| hosted environment |
---|
|
hosted environment [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]An environment that is not freestanding. Program startup occurs at main()
, complex types are implemented, and all C standard library facilities are available. Anchor |
---|
| implementation |
---|
| implementation |
---|
|
implementation [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Particular set of software, running in a particular translation environment under particular control options, that performs translation of programs for, and supports execution of functions in, a particular execution environment. Anchor |
---|
| implementation-defined behavior |
---|
| implementation-defined behavior |
---|
|
implementation-defined behavior [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Unspecified behavior whereby each implementation documents how the choice is made. Anchor |
---|
| in-band error indicator |
---|
| in-band error indicator |
---|
|
in-band error indicator[ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]A library function return value on error that can never be returned by a successful call to that library function. Anchor |
---|
| incomplete type |
---|
| incomplete type |
---|
|
incomplete type [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]A type that describes an identifier but lacks information needed to determine the size of the identifier. Anchor |
---|
| indeterminate value |
---|
| indeterminate value |
---|
|
indeterminate value [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Either an unspecified value or a trap representation. Anchor |
---|
| invalid pointer |
---|
| invalid pointer |
---|
|
invalid pointerA pointer that is not a valid pointer.livenessEvery operation or method invocation executes to completion without interruptions, even if it goes against safety. Anchor |
---|
| locale-specific behavior |
---|
| locale-specific behavior |
---|
|
locale-specific behavior [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Behavior that depends on local conventions of nationality, culture, and language that each implementation documents.lvalue [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]An expression with an object type or an incomplete type other than void
. The name lvalue comes originally from the assignment expression E1 = E2
, in which the left operand E1
is required to be a (modifiable) lvalue. It is perhaps better considered as representing an object "locator value."mitigation [Seacord 2005a]Methods, techniques, processes, tools, or runtime libraries that can prevent or limit exploits against vulnerabilities. Anchor |
---|
| nonpersistent signal handler |
---|
| nonpersistent signal handler |
---|
|
nonpersistent signal handlerSignal handler running on an implementation that requires the program to again register the signal handler after occurrences of the signal to catch subsequent occurrences of that signal. Anchor |
---|
| normal termination |
---|
| normal termination |
---|
|
normal program termination [IEEE Std 1003.1-2013]Normal termination occurs by a return from main()
, when requested with the exit()
, _exit()
, or _Exit()
functions, or when the last thread in the process terminates by returning from its start function by calling the pthread_exit()
function, or through cancellation. See abnormal termination. Anchor |
---|
| object-like macro |
---|
| object-like macro |
---|
|
object-like macro [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]A #define
preprocessing directive that defines an identifier with no parentheses. Subsequent instances of the macro name in a translation unit are replaced by the replacement list of preprocessing tokens that constitute the remainder of the directive. See function-like macro. Anchor |
---|
| out-of-band error indicator |
---|
| out-of-band error indicator |
---|
|
out-of-band error indicator [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]A library function return value used to indicate nothing but the error status. Anchor |
---|
| out-of-domain value |
---|
| out-of-domain value |
---|
|
out-of-domain value [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]One of a set of values that is not in the domain of a particular operator or function.reentrant [ISO/IEC/IEEE 24765:2010 ]Pertaining to a software module that can be entered as part of one process while also in execution as part of another process and still achieve the desired results.reliability [IEEE Std 610.12 1990]The ability of a system or component to perform its required functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time. Anchor |
---|
| restricted sink |
---|
| restricted sink |
---|
|
restricted sink [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Operands and arguments whose domain is a subset of the domain described by their types.robustness [IEEE Std 610.12 1990]The degree to which a system or component can function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions.rvalue [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Value of an expression.sanitize [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]Assure by testing or replacement that a tainted or other value conforms to the constraints imposed by one or more restricted sinks into which it may flow.NOTE
If the value does not conform, either the path is diverted to avoid using the value or a different, known-conforming value is substituted—for example, adding a null character to the end of a buffer before passing it as an argument to the strlen
function.
Anchor |
---|
| security flaw |
---|
| security flaw |
---|
|
security flaw [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]Defect that poses a potential security risk. Anchor |
---|
| security policy |
---|
| security policy |
---|
|
security policy [Internet Society 2000]Set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a system or organization provides security services to protect sensitive and critical system resources. Anchor |
---|
| sequence point |
---|
| sequence point |
---|
|
sequence point [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Evaluation of an expression may produce side effects. At specific points in the execution sequence called sequence points, all side effects of previous evaluations have completed, and no side effects of subsequent evaluations have yet taken place.side effect [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Changes in the state of the execution environment achieved by accessing a volatile object, modifying an object, modifying a file, or calling a function that does any of those operations.NOTE
The IEC 60559 standard for binary floating-point arithmetic requires certain user-accessible status flags and control modes. Floating-point operations implicitly set the status flags; modes affect result values of floating-point operations. Implementations that support such a floating-point state are required to regard changes to it as side effects. These are detailed in Annex F of the C Standard.
Anchor |
---|
| static analysis |
---|
| static analysis |
---|
|
static analysis [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]
Any process for assessing code without executing it. Anchor |
---|
| strictly conforming |
---|
| strictly conforming |
---|
|
strictly conforming [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]A strictly conforming program is one that uses only those features of the language and library specified in the international standard. Strictly conforming programs are intended to be maximally portable among conforming implementations and cannot, for example, depend on implementation-defined behavior.
string [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]A contiguous sequence of characters terminated by and including the first null character. Anchor |
---|
| tainted source |
---|
| tainted source |
---|
|
tainted source [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]External source of untrusted data.NOTE
Tainted sources include
- parameters to the
main()
function - the returned values from
localeconv()
, fgetc()
, getc
, getchar()
, fgetwc()
, getwc()
, and getwchar
()
- the strings produced by
getenv()
, fscanf()
, vfscanf
()
, vscanf()
, fgets
()
, fread()
, fwscanf
()
, vfwscanf()
, vwscanf()
, wscanf()
, and fgetws
()
Anchor |
---|
| tainted value |
---|
| tainted value |
---|
|
tainted value [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]Value derived from a tainted source that has not been sanitized. Anchor |
---|
| target implementation |
---|
| target implementation |
---|
|
target implementation [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]
Implementation of the C programming language whose environmental limits and implementation-defined behavior are assumed by the analyzer during the analysis of a program.
TOCTOU, TOCTTOU
Time-of-check, time-of-use (TOCTOU), also referred to as time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU), represents a vulnerability in which access control checks are nonatomic with the operations they protect, allowing an attacker to violate access control rules.
Anchor |
---|
| trap representation |
---|
| trap representation |
---|
|
trap representation [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Object representation that does not represent a value of the object type. Attempting to read the value of an object that has a trap representation other than by an expression that has a character type is undefined. Producing such a representation by a side effect that modifies all or any part of the object other than by an expression that has a character type is undefined. Anchor |
---|
| undefined behavior |
---|
| undefined behavior |
---|
|
undefined behavior (UB) [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Behavior, upon use of a nonportable or erroneous program construct or of erroneous data, for which the C Standard imposes no requirements. An example of undefined behavior is the behavior on integer overflow. Anchor |
---|
| unexpected behavior |
---|
| unexpected behavior |
---|
|
unexpected behavior
Well-defined behavior that may be unexpected or unanticipated by the programmer; incorrect programming assumptions. Anchor |
---|
| unsafe function-like macro |
---|
| unsafe function-like macro |
---|
|
unsafe function-like macroA function-like macro whose expansion causes one or more of its arguments not to be evaluated exactly once. Anchor |
---|
| unsigned integer wrapping |
---|
| unsigned integer wrapping |
---|
|
unsigned integer wrapping
Computation involving unsigned operands whose result is reduced modulo the number that is one greater than the largest value that can be represented by the resulting type. Anchor |
---|
| unspecified behavior |
---|
| unspecified behavior |
---|
|
unspecified behavior [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]Behavior for which the standard provides two or more possibilities and imposes no further requirements on which is chosen in any instance. Anchor |
---|
| unspecified value |
---|
| unspecified value |
---|
|
unspecified value [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]A valid value of the relevant type where the C Standard imposes no requirements on which value is chosen in any instance. An unspecified value cannot be a trap representation. Anchor |
---|
| untrusted data |
---|
| untrusted data |
---|
|
untrusted data [ISO/IEC 11889-1:2009]Data originating from outside of a trust boundary. Anchor |
---|
| valid pointer |
---|
| valid pointer |
---|
|
valid pointer [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]Pointer that refers to an element within an array or one past the last element of an array. See invalid pointer.NOTE
For the purposes of this definition, a pointer to an object that is not an element of an array behaves the same as a pointer to the first element of an array of length one with the type of the object as its element type. (See C Standard, 6.5.8, paragraph 4.)
For the purposes of this definition, an object can be considered to be an array of a certain number of bytes; that number is the size of the object as produced by the sizeof
operator. (See C Standard, 6.3.2.3, paragraph 7.)
validation [IEC 61508-4]Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the particular requirements for a specific intended use are fulfilled.verification [IEC 61508-4]Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the requirements have been fulfilled. Anchor |
---|
| vulnerability |
---|
| vulnerability |
---|
|
vulnerability [ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013]Set of conditions that allows an attacker to violate an explicit or implicit security policy.
Anchor |
---|
| warning message |
---|
| warning message |
---|
|
warning messageA diagnostic message generated when source code is encountered that does not prevent an implementation from translating a translation unit. See diagnostic message and error message.
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<ac:structured-macro ac:name="anchor" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="742ed3cc-f364-4279-b8aa-02fc69058dc1"><ac:parameter ac:name=""> vulnerability</ac:parameter></ac:structured-macro>
*vulnerability* \[[Seacord 05a|AA. C References#Seacord 05]\]
A set of conditions that allows an attacker to violate an explicit or implicit security policy.