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C library functions that make changes to arrays or objects usually take at least two arguments: a pointer to the array or object and an integer indicating the number of elements or bytes to be manipulated. If the arguments are supplied improperly during such a function call, the function may cause the pointer to not point to the object at all or to point For the purposes of this rule, the element count of a pointer is the size of the object to which it points, expressed by the number of elements that are valid to access. Supplying arguments to such a function might cause the function to form a pointer that does not point into or just past the end of the object, leading to resulting in undefined behavior.

Definitions

The C Secure Coding Rules Draft Technical Specification Annex J of the C Standard [ISO/IEC TR 17961] defines the following terms:

Given an integer expression E, the derived type T of E is determined as follows:

• if E is a sizeof expression then T is the type of the operand of the expression,
• otherwise, if E is an identifier, then T is the derived type of the expression last used to store a value in E,
• otherwise, if the derived type of each of E's subexpressions is the same, then T is that type,
• otherwise, the derived type is an unspecified character type compatible with any of char, signed char, and unsigned char.

EXAMPLE For the following declarations:

Code Block
lang c
double a[40]; size_t n0 = sizeof (int); size_t n1 = 256; size_t n2 = sizeof a / sizeof (*a);

The derived type of n0 is int, and the derived type of n1 and n2 is a (hypothetical) unspecified character type that is compatible with any of char, signed char, and unsigned char.

Consider the following code:

int val;
int arr[ARR_SIZE];
size_t c1 = sizeof (val);
size_t c2 = sizeof (arr) / sizeof (val);
size_t c3 = sizeof (arr) / sizeof (*arr);

The derived type for c1 and c2 is int, because both subexpressions have the same type. The derived type for c3 is an unspecified character type compatible with any of char, signed char, and unsigned char.

Expresses either the size of an object with an effective type, or the number of bytes allocated for such an object.

For an object with an effective type T the effective size of the object is the result of the sizeof(T) expression. For an object with no effective type (for example, an object for which space has just been allocated by a call to malloc(N)), the effective size is the number of bytes allocated for it (that is, N).

EXAMPLE 1 The effective size of *p refers to the effective size of the object or space referenced by p minus the offset of p from the beginning of the space or object, respectively.

EXAMPLE 2 For the following declarations

Code Block
lang c
int a[5]; void *p = a + 2;

the effective size of *p is equal to sizeof(a - 2) * sizeof(*a), or 12 when sizeof(int) is 4.

The effective size of a pointer is the size of the object to which it points.

In the following code:

int arr[5];
int *p = arr;

the effective size of the pointer p is sizeof(arr), that is, 5*sizeof(int).

The effective type of an object is defined as either its declared type or (if its type isn't declared) the effective type of the value assigned to it.

Consider the following code:

char *p;
void *q;
q = obj;

In this example, the effective type of p is char. The type of q's type is not declared, but it is later assigned obj. The effective type of q is therefore equal to the effective type of obj.

Standard Library Functions

Following is an incomplete list of C library functions to which this rule applies:

*Both functions take more than one size_t argument. In such cases, the compliant code must be consistent with the purpose of these arguments. For example, in the case of fread():

size_t fread(void *ptr, size_t size, size_t count, FILE *stream)

the programmer must ensure that the object referenced by ptr is at least (size * count) bytes.

Description

To guarantee that a library function does not construct an out-of-bounds pointer, programmers must heed the following rules when using functions that operate on pointed-to regions. These rules assume that func is a function, p and q are pointers, and n is an integer.

• For calls of the form func(p,n), the value of n should not be greater than the effective size of the pointer. In situations where n is an expression, the effective type of the pointer should be compatible with either the derived type of n or unsigned char.
• For calls of the form func(p,q,n), the value of n should not be greater than the effective size of any of the two pointers (p and q). The effective type of p should be compatible with the derived type of n or unsigned char when n is an expression. Similarly, the effective type of p should be compatible with the effective type of q or unsigned char.
• For any expression E of the form T* p = func(n), the value of n should not be less than sizeof(T). Also, the effective type of T should be compatible with either the derived type of n or unsigned char.

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example assigns a value greater than the size of available memory to n, which is then passed to memset().

void f1(size_t nchars) {
  char *p = (char *)malloc(nchars);
  const size_t n = nchars + 1;

  memset(p, 0, n);
  /* ... */
}

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution ensures that the value of n is not greater than the size of the dynamic memory pointed to by the pointer p:

void f1(size_t nchars, size_t val) {

  char *p = (char *)malloc(nchars);
  const size_t n = val;

  if (nchars < n) {
    /* Handle Error */
  } else {
    memset(p, 0, n);
  }
  /* ... */
}

Noncompliant Code Example

In this noncompliant code example, the effective type of *p is float, and the derived type of the expression n is int. This is calculated using the first rule from TR 17961's definition of derived types (see Definitions section [ISO/IEC TR 17961]). Because n contains the result of a sizeof expression, its derived type is equal to the type of the operand, which is int.

void f2() {
  const size_t ARR_SIZE = 4;
  float a[ARR_SIZE];
  const size_t n = sizeof(int) * ARR_SIZE;
  void *p = a;

  memset(p, 0, n);
  /* ... */
}

Note: Although it is noncompliant, this code has no ill effects on architectures where sizeof(int) is equal to sizeof(float).

Compliant Solution

In this compliant solution, the derived type of n is also float.

9899:2011] states that it is undefined behavior if the "pointer passed to a library function array parameter does not have a value such that all address computations and object accesses are valid." (See undefined behavior 109.)

In the following code,

int arr[5];
int *p = arr;

unsigned char *p2 = (unsigned char *)arr;
unsigned char *p3 = arr + 2;
void *p4 = arr;

the element count of the pointer p is sizeof(arr) / sizeof(arr[0]), that is, 5. The element count of the pointer p2 is sizeof(arr), that is, 20, on implementations where sizeof(int) == 4. The element count of the pointer p3 is 12 on implementations where sizeof(int) == 4, because p3 points two elements past the start of the array arr.  The element count of p4 is treated as though it were unsigned char * instead of void *, so it is the same as p2.

Pointer + Integer

The following standard library functions take a pointer argument and a size argument, with the constraint that the pointer must point to a valid memory object of at least the number of elements indicated by the size argument.

¹ Takes two pointers and an integer, but the integer specifies the element count only of the output buffer, not of the input buffer.
² Takes two pointers and an integer, but the integer specifies the element count only of the input buffer, not of the output buffer.
³ Takes two pointers and two integers; each integer corresponds to the element count of one of the pointers.
⁴ Takes a pointer and two size-related integers; the first size-related integer parameter specifies the number of bytes available in the buffer; the second size-related integer parameter specifies the number of bytes to write within the buffer.

For calls that take a pointer and an integer size, the given size should not be greater than the element count of the pointer.

 Noncompliant Code Example (Element Count)

In this noncompliant code example, the incorrect element count is used in a call to wmemcpy(). The sizeof operator returns the size expressed in bytes, but wmemcpy() uses an element count based on wchar_t *.

#include <string.h>
#include <wchar.h>
 
static const char str[] = "Hello world";
static const wchar_t w_str[] = L"Hello world";
void func(void) {
  char buffer[32];
  wchar_t w_buffer[32];
  memcpy(buffer, str, sizeof(str)); /* Compliant */
  wmemcpy(w_buffer, w_str, sizeof(w_str)); /* Noncompliant */
}

Compliant Solution (Element Count)

When using functions that operate on pointed-to regions, programmers must always express the integer size in terms of the element count expected by the function. For example, memcpy() expects the element count expressed in terms of void *, but wmemcpy() expects the element count expressed in terms of wchar_t *.  Instead of the sizeof operator, functions that return the number of elements in the string are called, which matches the expected element count for the copy functions. In the case of this compliant solution, where the argument is an array A of type T, the expression sizeof(A) / sizeof(T), or equivalently sizeof(A) / sizeof(*A), can be used to compute the number of elements in the array.

#include <string.h>
#include <wchar.h>
 
static const char str[] = "Hello world";
static const wchar_t w_str[] = L"Hello world";
void func(void) {
  char buffer[32];
  wchar_t w_buffer[32];
  memcpy(buffer, str, strlen(str) + 1);
  wmemcpy(w_buffer, w_str, wcslen(w_str) + 1);
} 

Noncompliant Code Example (Pointer + Integer)

This noncompliant code example assigns a value greater than the number of bytes of available memory to n, which is then passed to memset():

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
 
void f1(size_t nchars) {
  char *p = (char *)malloc(nchars);
  /* ... */

void f2() {
  const size_t ARR_SIZE = 4;
  float a[ARR_SIZE];
  const size_t n = sizeof(float) * ARR_SIZEnchars + 1;
  void /*p = a;

... */
  memset(p, 0, n);
  /* ... */
}

Noncompliant Code Example

Compliant Solution (Pointer + Integer)

This compliant solution ensures that the value of n is not greater than the number of bytes of the dynamic memory pointed to by the pointer p:In this noncompliant code example, the size of n could be greater than the size of *p. Also, the effective type of *p (int) is different than the effective type of *q (float).

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
 
void f3f1(int *asize_t nchars) {
  floatchar b*p = 3.14; (char *)malloc(nchars);
  /* ...  */
  const size_t n = sizeof(*b)nchars;
  void /*p = a;
  void *q = &b;

  memcpy...  */
  memset(p, q0, n);
  /* ... */
}

Note: Although it is noncompliant, this code does not constitute a vulnerability on implementations where sizeof(int) is equal to sizeof(float).

Compliant Solution

}

Noncompliant Code Example (Pointer + Integer)

In this noncompliant code example, the element count of the array a is ARR_SIZE elements. Because memset() expects a byte count, the size of the array is scaled incorrectly by sizeof(int) instead of sizeof(long), which can form an invalid pointer on architectures where sizeof(int) != sizeof(longThis compliant solution ensures that the value of n is not greater than the minimum of the effective sizes of *p and *q and that the effective types of the two pointers are identical (float).

void f3(float *a,#include <string.h>
 
void f2(void) {
  const size_t val) {ARR_SIZE = 4;
  float b = 3.14long a[ARR_SIZE];
  const size_t n = val;
  voidsizeof(int) *p = a ARR_SIZE;
  void *qp = &ba;

  ifmemset(p, 0, n);
}

Compliant Solution (Pointer + Integer)

In this compliant solution, the element count required by memset() is properly calculated without resorting to scaling:

#include <string.h>
 
void f2(void(n > sizeof(a)) || (n > sizeof(b)) ) {
  const  /* Handle error */size_t ARR_SIZE = 4;
  } else {long a[ARR_SIZE];
  const  memcpy(p, q, nsize_t n = sizeof(a);
   void /*p ... */= a;

  }memset(p, 0, n);
}

Noncompliant Code Example

...

Two Pointers + One Integer

The following standard library functions take two pointer arguments and a size argument, with the constraint that both pointers must point to valid memory objects of at least the number of elements indicated by the size argument. 

For calls that take two pointers and an integer size, the given size should not be greater than the element count of either pointer.

Noncompliant Code Example (Two Pointers + One Integer)

In this noncompliant code example, the value of n is incorrectly computed, allowing a read past the end of the object referenced by q:

wchar_t *f4(#include <string.h>

void f4() {
  char p[40];
  const wchar_tchar *pq = L"Hello,Too World!short";
  const size_t n = sizeof(p);
 * memcpy(wcslen(p) + 1);

  wchar_t *q = (wchar_t*) malloc(n);
  return q;
}

...

p, q, n);
}

Compliant Solution (Two Pointers + One Integer)

This compliant solution ensures that the derived type of n (wchar_t) is the same as the type of T (wchar_t) and that the value of n is not less than the size of T.equal to the size of the character array:

wchar_t *#include <string.h>

void f4() {
  char p[40];
  const wchar_tchar *pq = L"Hello,Too World!short";
  const size_t n = sizeof(wchar_tp) *< strlen(wcslen(pq) + 1);

  wchar_t *q = (wchar_t*) malloc(n);
  return q;
}

Risk Assessment

Depending on the library function called, the attacker may be able to use a heap overflow vulnerability to run arbitrary code.

Related Guidelines

C Secure Coding Standard, API00-C. Functions should validate their parameters

ISO/IEC TR 17961 (Draft) Forming invalid pointers by library functions [libptr]

Bibliography

[ISO/IEC TR 17961] "Programming Languages,Their Environments and System Software Interfaces"

? sizeof(p) : strlen(q) + 1;
  memcpy(p, q, n);
}

One Pointer + Two Integers

The following standard library functions take a pointer argument and two size arguments, with the constraint that the pointer must point to a valid memory object containing at least as many bytes as the product of the two size arguments.

For calls that take a pointer and two integers, one integer represents the number of bytes required for an individual object, and a second integer represents the number of elements in the array. The resulting product of the two integers should not be greater than the element count of the pointer were it expressed as an unsigned char *.  

Noncompliant Code Example (One Pointer + Two Integers)

This noncompliant code example allocates a variable number of objects of type struct obj. The function checks that num_objs is small enough to prevent wrapping, in compliance with INT30-C. Ensure that unsigned integer operations do not wrap. The size of struct obj is assumed to be 16 bytes to account for padding to achieve the assumed alignment of long long. However, the padding typically depends on the target architecture, so this object size may be incorrect, resulting in an incorrect element count.

#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
 
struct obj {
  char c;
  long long i;
};
 
void func(FILE *f, struct obj *objs, size_t num_objs) {
  const size_t obj_size = 16;
  if (num_objs > (SIZE_MAX / obj_size) ||
      num_objs != fwrite(objs, obj_size, num_objs, f)) {
    /* Handle error */
  }
}

Compliant Solution (One Pointer + Two Integers)

This compliant solution uses the sizeof operator to correctly provide the object size and num_objs to provide the element count:

#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
 
struct obj {
  char c;
  long long i;
};
 
void func(FILE *f, struct obj *objs, size_t num_objs) {
  const size_t obj_size = sizeof *objs;
  if (num_objs > (SIZE_MAX / obj_size) ||
      num_objs != fwrite(objs, obj_size, num_objs, f)) {
    /* Handle error */
  }
}

Noncompliant Code Example (One Pointer + Two Integers)

In this noncompliant code example, the function f() calls fread() to read nitems of type wchar_t, each size bytes in size, into an array of BUFFER_SIZE elements, wbuf. However, the expression used to compute the value of nitems fails to account for the fact that, unlike the size of char, the size of wchar_t may be greater than 1. Consequently, fread() could attempt to form pointers past the end of wbuf and use them to assign values to nonexistent elements of the array. Such an attempt is undefined behavior. (See undefined behavior 109.)  A likely consequence of this undefined behavior is a buffer overflow. For a discussion of this programming error in the Common Weakness Enumeration database, see CWE-121, "Stack-based Buffer Overflow," and CWE-805, "Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value."

#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>

void f(FILE *file) {
  enum { BUFFER_SIZE = 1024 };
  wchar_t wbuf[BUFFER_SIZE];

  const size_t size = sizeof(*wbuf);
  const size_t nitems = sizeof(wbuf);

  size_t nread = fread(wbuf, size, nitems, file);
  /* ... */
}

Compliant Solution (One Pointer + Two Integers)

This compliant solution correctly computes the maximum number of items for fread() to read from the file:

#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
 
void f(FILE *file) {
  enum { BUFFER_SIZE = 1024 };
  wchar_t wbuf[BUFFER_SIZE];

  const size_t size = sizeof(*wbuf);
  const size_t nitems = sizeof(wbuf) / size;

  size_t nread = fread(wbuf, size, nitems, file);
  /* ... */
}

Noncompliant Code Example (Heartbleed)

CERT vulnerability 720951 describes a vulnerability in OpenSSL versions 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f, popularly known as "Heartbleed." This vulnerability allows an attacker to steal information that under normal conditions would be protected by Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) encryption.

Despite the seriousness of the vulnerability, Heartbleed is the result of a common programming error and an apparent lack of awareness of secure coding principles. Following is the vulnerable code:

int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) {         
  unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
  unsigned short hbtype;
  unsigned int payload;
  unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
 
  /* Read type and payload length first */
  hbtype = *p++;
  n2s(p, payload);
  pl = p;
 
  /* ... More code ... */
 
  if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
    unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
    int r;
 
    /* 
     * Allocate memory for the response; size is 1 byte
     * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
     * payload, plus padding.
     */
    buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
    bp = buffer;
 
    /* Enter response type, length, and copy payload */
    *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
    s2n(payload, bp);
    memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
 
    /* ... More code ... */
  }
  /* ... More code ... */
}

The p pointer, along with payload and p1, contains data from a packet. The code allocates a buffer sufficient to contain payload bytes, with some overhead, then copies payload bytes starting at p1 into this buffer and sends it to the client. Notably absent from this code are any checks that the payload integer variable extracted from the heartbeat packet corresponds to the size of the packet data. Because the client can specify an arbitrary value of payload, an attacker can cause the server to read and return the contents of memory beyond the end of the packet data, which violates INT04-C. Enforce limits on integer values originating from tainted sources. The resulting call to memcpy() can then copy the contents of memory past the end of the packet data and the packet itself, potentially exposing sensitive data to the attacker. This call to memcpy() violates ARR38-C. Guarantee that library functions do not form invalid pointers. A version of ARR38-C also appears in ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013, "Forming invalid pointers by library functions [libptr]." This rule would require a conforming analyzer to diagnose the Heartbleed vulnerability.

int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) {         
  unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
  unsigned short hbtype;
  unsigned int payload;
  unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
 
  /* ... More code ... */
 
  /* Read type and payload length first */
  if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
    return 0; /* Silently discard */
  hbtype = *p++;
  n2s(p, payload);
  if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
    return 0; /* Silently discard per RFC 6520 */
  pl = p;
 
  /* ... More code ... */
 
  if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
    unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
    int r;
 
    /* 
     * Allocate memory for the response; size is 1 byte
     * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
     * payload, plus padding.
     */
    buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
    bp = buffer;
    /* Enter response type, length, and copy payload */
    *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
    s2n(payload, bp);
    memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
    /* ... More code ... */
  }
  /* ... More code ... */
}

Depending on the library function called, an attacker may be able to use a heap or stack overflow vulnerability to run arbitrary code.

Automated Detection

Related Vulnerabilities

CVE-2016-2208 results from a violation of this rule. The attacker can supply a value used to determine how much data is copied into a buffer via memcpy(), resulting in a buffer overlow of attacker-controlled data.

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

Key here (explains table format and definitions)

CERT-CWE Mapping Notes

Key here for mapping notes

CWE-121 and ARR38-C

Intersection( CWE-121, ARR38-C) =

• Stack buffer overflow from passing invalid arguments to library function

CWE-121 – ARR38-C =

• Stack buffer overflows from direct out-of-bounds write

ARR38-C – CWE-121 =

• Out-of-bounds read from passing invalid arguments to library function

• Buffer overflow on heap or data segment from passing invalid arguments to library function

CWE-119 and ARR38-C

See CWE-119 and ARR30-C

CWE-125 and ARR38-C

Independent( ARR30-C, ARR38-C, EXP39-C, INT30-C)

STR31-C = Subset( Union( ARR30-C, ARR38-C))

STR32-C = Subset( ARR38-C)

Intersection( ARR38-C, CWE-125) =

• Reading from an out-of-bounds array index or off the end of an array via standard library function

ARR38-C – CWE-125 =

• Writing to an out-of-bounds array index or off the end of an array via standard library function

CWE-125 – ARR38-C =

• Reading beyond a non-array buffer

• Reading beyond an array directly (using pointer arithmetic, or [] notation)

CWE-805 and ARR38-C

Intersection( CWE-805, ARR38-C) =

• Buffer access with incorrect length via passing invalid arguments to library function

CWE-805 – ARR38-C =

• Buffer access with incorrect length directly (such as a loop construct)

ARR38-C – CWE-805 =

• Out-of-bounds read or write that does not involve incorrect length (could use incorrect offset instead), that uses library function

CWE-123 and ARR38-C

Independent(ARR30-C, ARR38-C)

STR31-C = Subset( Union( ARR30-C, ARR38-C))

STR32-C = Subset( ARR38-C)

CWE-123 includes any operation that allows an attacker to write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary memory location. This could be accomplished via overwriting a pointer with data that refers to the address to write, then when the program writes to a pointed-to value, supplying a malicious value. Vulnerable pointer values can be corrupted by:

• Stack return address

• Buffer overflow on the heap (which typically overwrites back/next pointer values)

• Write to untrusted array index (if it is also invalid)

• Format string exploit

• Overwriting a C++ object with virtual functions (because it has a virtual pointer)

• Others?

Intersection( CWE-123, ARR38-C) =

• Buffer overflow via passing invalid arguments to library function

ARR38-C – CWE-123 =

• Buffer overflow to “harmless” memory from passing invalid arguments to library function

• Out-of-bounds read from passing invalid arguments to library function

CWE-123 – ARR38-C =

• Arbitrary writes that do not involve standard C library functions

CWE-129 and ARR38-C

ARR38-C -CWE-129 = making library functions create invalid pointers without using untrusted data.

E.g. : char[3] array;

strcpy(array, "123456");

CWE-129 - ARR38-C = not validating an integer used as an array index or in pointer arithmetic

E.g.: void foo(int i) {

  char array[3];

  array[i];

}

Intersection(ARR38-C, CWE-129) = making library functions create invalid pointers using untrusted data.

eg: void foo(int i) {

  char src[3], dest[3];

  memcpy(dest, src, i);

}

Bibliography

...

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