External programs are commonly invoked to perform a function required by the overall system. This practice is a form of reuse and might even be considered a crude form of component-based software engineering. Command and argument injection vulnerabilities occur when an application fails to sanitize untrusted input and uses it in the execution of external programs.
Every Java application has a single instance of class Runtime
that allows the application to interface with the environment in which the application is running. The current runtime can be obtained from the Runtime.getRuntime()
method. The semantics of Runtime.exec()
are poorly defined, so it 's is best not to rely on its behavior any more than necessary. It will invoke , but typically it invokes the command directly without a shell. If you want a shell, you can use "/bin/sh
", " -c
" on UNIX POSIX or "cmd.exe
" on Windows. The variants of exec()(
that take the command line as a single String string split it with using a StringTokenizer
. On Windows, these tokens will be are concatenated back into a single argument string somewhere along the linebefore being executed.
Consequently, command injection doesn't work attacks cannot succeed unless a command interpreter is explicitly invoked. However, particularly on Windows, there can be vulnerabilities where argument injection attacks can occur when arguments have spaces, double quotes, etc.and so forth, in or when they start with a -
or /
to indicate a switch.
This is a specific instance of the guideline IDS01-J. Sanitize data passed across a trust boundary. Any string data that originates from outside the program's trust boundary must be sanitized before being executed as a command on the current platform.
Noncompliant Code Example (Windows)
A weakness in a privileged program caused by relying on untrusted sources such as system properties or the environment (see guideline ENV06-J. Provide a trusted environment and sanitize all inputs) can result in the execution of a command or of a program that has privileges beyond those possessed by a typical user.
This noncompliant code example provides a directory listing of the directory that is provided by the dir
system property. It accomplishes this by using the dir
command. It is implemented using Runtime.exec()
to invoke the Windows dir
command.
Code Block | ||
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| ||
import java.io.InputStream; class DirList { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { String dir = System.getProperty("dir"); Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); Process proc = rt.exec("cmd.exe /C dir " + dir); int result = proc.waitFor(); if (result != 0) { System.out.println("process error: " + result); } InputStream in = (result == 0) ? proc.getInputStream() : proc.getErrorStream(); int c; while ((c = in.read()) != -1) { System.out.print((char) c); } } } |
Since Because Runtime.exec()
receives unsanitized data originating from the environment (see guideline ENV06-J. Provide a trusted environment and sanitize all inputs), this code is susceptible to a command injection attack.
An attacker can exploit this program using the following command:
Code Block |
---|
java -Ddir='dummy & echo bad' Java
|
the The command executed is actually two commands:
Code Block |
---|
cmd.exe /C dir dummy & echo bad
|
which first attempts to list a nonexistent dummy
folder , and then prints bad
to the console.
Noncompliant Code Example (POSIX)
This noncompliant code example provides the same functionality , but uses the POSIX ls
command. The only difference from the Windows version is the argument passed to proc
Runtime.exec()
.
Code Block | ||
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| ||
import java.io.InputStream; class DirList { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { String dir = System.getProperty("dir"); Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); Process proc = rt.exec(new String[] {"sh", "-c", "ls " + dir}); int result = proc.waitFor(); if (result != 0) { System.out.println("process error: " + result); } InputStream in = (result == 0) ? proc.getInputStream() : proc.getErrorStream(); int c; while ((c = in.read()) != -1) { System.out.print((char) c); } } } |
The attacker can supply the same command , with the same effects as aboveshown in the previous noncompliant code example with similar effects. The command executed is actually:
Code Block |
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sh -c 'ls dummy & echo bad'
|
Compliant Solution (Sanitization)
This compliant solution solution sanitizes the email address untrusted user input by permitting only a handful small group of correct characters to appearwhitelisted characters in the argument that will be passed to Runtime.exec()
; all other characters are excluded.
Code Block | ||
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| ||
String address = System.getProperty("email"); if (address == null) { // handle error }... if (!Pattern.matches("[0-9A-Za-z@.]+", addressdir)) { // Handle error } Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime(); Process proc = runtime.exec("mail " + address); // ... |
Although this it is a compliant solution, the sanitization method is weak because:
...
Code Block |
---|
"\b[A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,4}\b") |
...
this sanitization approach rejects valid directories. Also, because the command interpreter invoked is system dependent,
...
it is difficult to
...
establish that this solution
...
prevents command injections on every platform on which a Java program might run.
Compliant Solution (
...
Restricted User Choice)
A further improvement to the previous This compliant solution is to parametrize the call to the prevents command injection by passing only trusted strings to Runtime.exec()
method. There are six forms of the exec()
method, most of which are convenience methods for the following method:
Code Block |
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public Process exec(String[] cmdarray,
String[] envp,
File dir)
throws IOException
|
Using any form of the exec()
method where the first argument is an array containing the command to call and its arguments is generally safer because the command itself does not contain untrusted data. The user has control over which string is used but cannot provide string data directly to Runtime.exec()
.
Code Block | ||
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| ||
String address = System.getProperty("email"); if (address == null) { // handle error } if (!Pattern.matches("[0-9A-Za-z@.]+", address)) { // Handle error } String[] command = {"mail", address}; Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime(); Process proc = runtime.exec(command, null, null); |
...
. |
...
Compliant Solution (Not passing untrusted data to the exec()
method)
This compliant solution prevents command injection by requiring the user to select one of a predefined group of addresses. This prevents untrusted data from being added to the command.
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| ||
String addressdir = null; int filenamenumber = Integer.parseInt(System.getpropertygetProperty("addressdir")); // onlyOnly allow integer choices switch (filenamenumber) { case 1: addressdir = "root@localhostdata1"; break; // Option 1 case 2: addressdir = "postmaster@localhostdata2"; break; // Option 2 default: // invalidInvalid break; } if (addressdir == null) { // handleHandle error } Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime(); Process proc = runtime.exec("mail " + address); |
This compliant solution hard codes the directories that may be listed.
This solution can quickly become email addresses which becomes unmanageable if you have many email addressesavailable directories. A more extensible scalable solution is to read all the email addresses permitted directories from a properties file into a java.util.Properties
object.
Risk Assessment
OS command injection can cause arbitrary programs to be executed.
Guideline | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
IDS06-J | high | probable | medium | P12 | L1 |
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this guideline on the CERT website.
Bibliography
Wiki Markup |
---|
\[[Chess 2007|AA. Bibliography#Chess 07]\] Chapter 5: Handling Input, "Command Injection"
\[[MITRE 2009|AA. Bibliography#MITRE 09]\] [CWE ID 78|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html] "Failure to Preserve OS Command Structure (aka 'OS Command Injection')"
\[[OWASP 2005|AA. Bibliography#OWASP 05]\] [Reviewing Code for OS Injection|http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Reviewing_Code_for_OS_Injection]
\[[Permissions 2008|AA. Bibliography#Permissions 08]\] [Permissions in the Java⢠SE 6 Development Kit (JDK)|http://java.sun.com/javase/6/docs/technotes/guides/security/permissions.html], Sun Microsystems, Inc. (2008) |
Compliant Solution (Avoid Runtime.exec()
)
When the task performed by executing a system command can be accomplished by some other means, it is almost always advisable to do so. This compliant solution uses the File.list()
method to provide a directory listing, eliminating the possibility of command or argument injection attacks.
Code Block | ||
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| ||
import java.io.File;
class DirList {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
File dir = new File(System.getProperty("dir"));
if (!dir.isDirectory()) {
System.out.println("Not a directory");
} else {
for (String file : dir.list()) {
System.out.println(file);
}
}
}
}
|
Risk Assessment
Passing untrusted, unsanitized data to the Runtime.exec()
method can result in command and argument injection attacks.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
IDS07-J | High | Probable | Medium | P12 | L1 |
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Checker Framework |
| Tainting Checker | Trust and security errors (see Chapter 8) | ||||||
CodeSonar |
| JAVA.IO.INJ.COMMAND | Command Injection (Java) | ||||||
Coverity | 7.5 | OS_CMD_INJECTION | Implemented | ||||||
Parasoft Jtest |
| CERT.IDS07.EXEC | Do not use 'Runtime.exec()' | ||||||
SonarQube |
| OS commands should not be vulnerable to injection attacks |
Related Vulnerabilities
CVE-2010-0886 | |
CVE-2010-1826 | Command injection in |
T-472 | Mac OS X Java Command Injection Flaw in |
Related Guidelines
ENV03-C. Sanitize the environment when invoking external programs | |
ENV03-CPP. Sanitize the environment when invoking external programs | |
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard | IDS34-PL. Do not pass untrusted, unsanitized data to a command interpreter |
Injection [RST] | |
CWE-78, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in an OS Command ("OS Command Injection") |
Android Implementation Details
Runtime.exec()
can be called from Android apps to execute operating system commands.
Bibliography
Chapter 5, "Handling Input," section "Command Injection" | |
[OWASP 2005] | A Guide to Building Secure Web Applications and Web Services |
[Permissions 2008] | Permissions in the Java™ SE 6 Development Kit (JDK) |
[Seacord 2015] |
...
13. Input Validation and Data Sanitization (IDS) IDS07-J. Prevent SQL Injection