Page History

Unrestricted deserializing from a privileged context allows an attacker to supply crafted input whichthat, upon deserialization, can yield objects that the attacker lacks would otherwise lack permissions to construct. One example of this is the construction of a sensitive object , such as a custom class loader. Consequently, avoid deserializing from a privileged context. When deserializing requires privileges, programs must strip all permissions other than the minimum set required for the intended usage. See the rule SEC02-J. Remove superfluous code from privileged blocks for additional information.

Noncompliant Code Example (CVE-2008-5353:

...

ZoneInfo)

Wiki Markup\[[CVE|AA. Bibliography#CVE]\] [CVE-2008-5353 |http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-5353 ] describes a Java vulnerability, discovered in August 2008 by Sami Koivu [CVE 2008]. Julien Tinnes subsequently wrote an exploit that allowed arbitrary code execution on multiple platforms that ran running vulnerable versions of Java. The problem resulted from deserializing untrusted input from within a privileged context. The vulnerability involves the ({{sun.util.Calendar.Zoneinfo}}) object, which being a serializable class, is deserialized by the {{readObject()}} method of the {{ObjectInputStream}} class.ZoneInfo class, which, being serializable, is deserialized by the readObject() method of the ObjectInputStream class.

The Consider the default security model of an applet that does not allow access to sun.util.calendar.ZoneInfo because all classes applets cannot be permitted to invoke any method from any class within the "sun" package are treated as untrusted. As a result, prior to JDK 1.6 u11, the acceptable method for an unsigned applet to deserialize a Zoneinfo ZoneInfo object was to execute the call from a privileged context, such as a doPrivileged() block. This constitutes a A vulnerability results because there is no guaranteed method of knowing whether the serialized stream contains a Zoneinfo object and not bona fide ZoneInfo object rather than a malicious serializable class. The vulnerable code casts the malicious object to the ZoneInfo type, which typically causes a ClassCastException if the actual deserialized class is not a ZoneInfo object. This exception, however, is of little consequence as because it is possible to store a reference to the newly created object in some a static context so that the garbage collector does not cannot act upon it.

A non-serializable nonserializable class can be extended and its subclass can be made serializable. Also, a subclass automatically becomes serializable if it derives from a serializable class. During deserialization of the subclass, the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) calls the no-argument constructor of the most derived superclass that does not implement java.io.Serializable either directly or indirectly. This Calling the no-argument constructor allows it to fix the state of this superclass.

In the following code snippet, class A's no-argument constructor is called when C is deserialized because A does not implement Serializable. Subsequently, Object's constructor is invoked. This procedure cannot be carried out programmatically, consequently so the JVM generates the equivalent bytecode at runtime. Typically, when the superclass's constructor is called by a subclass, the subclass remains on the stack. However, in deserialization this does not happen. Only the unvalidated bytecode is present. This , which allows any security checks within the superclass's constructor to be bypassed in that because the complete execution chain is not brought into scrutinyscrutinized.

class A { // hasHas Object as superclass
  A(int x) { }
  A() { }
}

class B extends A implements Serializable {
  B(int x) { super(x); }
}
 
class C extends class B {
  C(int x) { super(x); }
}    

At this point, there is no subclass code on the stack and the superclass's constructor is executed with no restrictions as because doPrivileged() allows the immediate caller to exert its full privileges. Because the immediate caller java.util.Calendar is trusted, it exhibits full system privileges.

For exploiting this condition, often, a A custom class loader is desirablecan be used to exploit this vulnerability. Instantiating a class loader object requires special permissions that are made available by the security policy that is enforced by the SecurityManager. An unsigned applet cannot carry out this step by default. If However, if an unsigned applet can execute a custom class loader's constructor, it can effectively bypass all the security checks (it has the requisite privileges as a direct consequence of the vulnerability). A custom class loader can be designed to extend the System Class Loadersystem class loader, undermine security, and carry out forbidden prohibited actions such as reading or deleting files on the user's file system. Moreover, any legitimate security checks in the constructor are meaningless as because the code is granted all privileges. The following noncompliant code example illustrates the vulnerability:

try {
  ZoneInfo zi = (ZoneInfo) AccessController.doPrivileged(
    new PrivilegedExceptionAction() {
      public Object run() throws Exception {
        return input.readObject();
      }
  });
  if (zi != null) {
    zone = zi;
  }
} catch (Exception e) 
{
  // Handle error
}

Compliant Solution (CVE-2008-5353: Zoneinfo)

This vulnerability was fixed in JDK v1.6 u11 by defining a new AccessControlContext INSTANCE, with a new ProtectionDomain. The ProtectionDomain encapsulated a RuntimePermission called accessClassInPackage.sun.util.calendar. Consequently, the code was granted the minimal set of permissions required to access the sun.util.calendar class. This whitelisting approach guaranteed that a security exception would be thrown in all other cases of invalid access. Finally, The code also uses the two-argument form of doPrivileged() allows stripping , which strips all permissions other than the ones specified in the ProtectionDomain.

private static class CalendarAccessControlContext {
  private static final AccessControlContext INSTANCE;
    static {
      RuntimePermission perm =
          new RuntimePermission("accessClassInPackage.sun.util.calendar");
      PermissionCollection perms = perm.newPermissionCollection();
      perms.add(perm);
      INSTANCE = new AccessControlContext(new ProtectionDomain[] {
          new ProtectionDomain(null, perms)
      });
    }
  }

// ...
try {
  zi = AccessController.doPrivileged(
       new PrivilegedExceptionAction<ZoneInfo>() {
         public ZoneInfo run() throws Exception {
           return (ZoneInfo) input.readObject();
         }
       }, CalendarAccessControlContext.INSTANCE);
} catch (PrivilegedActionException pae) { /* ... */ }
if (zi != null) {
  zone = zi;
}

...

Related

...

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

Bibliography

...

[[API 2006API 2014]
[CVE 2011]	AA. Bibliography#API 06]]		]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro>	<ac:structured-macro ac:name="unmigrated-wiki-markup" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="09a9470a-3dce-4648-ae5c-fc0b212db8c5"><ac:plain-text-body><![CDATA[	[[CVE	AA. Bibliography#CVE]]	[CVE-2008-5353	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-5353]	]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro>

 

...

Image Added Image Added Image AddedSER07-J. Do not use the default serialized form for implementation-defined invariants      13. Serialization (SER)      SER09-J. Do not invoke overridable methods from the readObject method