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Comment: Parasoft C/C++test 2023.1

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For saturation semantics, assume that the mathematical result of the computation is result. The value actually returned to the user is set out in the following table:

Range of Mathematical Result

Result Returned

MAX < result

MAX

MIN <= result <= MAX

result

result < MIN

MIN

Modwrap Semantics

In modwrap semantics (also called modulo arithmetic), integer values "wrap round." That is, adding 1 to MAX produces MIN. This is the defined behavior for unsigned integers in the C Standard, subclause 6.2.5, paragraph 9. It is frequently the behavior of signed integers, as well. However, it is more sensible in many applications to use saturation semantics instead of modwrap semantics. For example, in the computation of a size (using unsigned integers), it is often better for the size to stay at the maximum value in the event of overflow rather than to suddenly become a very small value.

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Out-of-range integer values can result in reading from or writing to arbitrary memory locations and the execution of arbitrary code.

Recommendation

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

INT08-C

Medium

Probable

High

P4

L3

Automated Detection

Tool

Version

Checker

Description

Astrée
Include Page
Astrée_V
Astrée_V
integer-overflowFully checked
Axivion Bauhaus Suite

Include Page
Axivion Bauhaus Suite_V
Axivion Bauhaus Suite_V

CertC-INT08
CodeSonar
Include Page
CodeSonar_V
CodeSonar_V

ALLOC.SIZE.ADDOFLOW

ALLOC.SIZE.IOFLOW

ALLOC.SIZE.MULOFLOW

ALLOC.SIZE.SUBUFLOW

MISC.MEM.SIZE.ADDOFLOW

MISC.MEM.SIZE.BAD

MISC.MEM.SIZE.MULOFLOW

MISC.MEM.SIZE.SUBUFLOW

Addition Overflow of Allocation Size

Integer Overflow of Allocation Size

Multiplication Overflow of Allocation Size

Subtraction Underflow of Allocation Size

Addition Overflow of Size

Unreasonable Size Argument

Multiplication Overflow of Size

Subtraction Underflow of Size

Compass/ROSE
 

 

Partially implemented



Could detect violations of this recommendation by flagging any comparison expression involving addition that could potentially overflow. For example, instead of comparing a + b < c (where b and c are compile-time constants) and b > c, the code should compare a < c - b. (This assumes a, b, c are unsigned ints. Usually b is small and c is an upper bound such as INT_MAX.)

Helix QAC

Include Page
Helix QAC_V
Helix QAC_V

C2800,  C2910

DF2801, DF2802, DF2803, DF2911, DF2912, DF2913


LDRA tool suite
Include Page
LDRA_V
LDRA_V

488 S, 493 S, 493 S

Partially implemented

PRQA QA-C Include PagePRQA QA-C_vPRQA QA-C_v

2800,2801,2802,2803,

2910,2911,2912,2913

Parasoft C/C++test

Include Page
Parasoft_V
Parasoft_V

CERT_C-INT08-a
CERT_C-INT08-b
CERT_C-INT08-c
CERT_C-INT08-d

Avoid data loss when converting between integer types
Avoid signed integer overflows
Avoid value change when converting between integer types
Avoid wraparounds when performing arithmetic integer operations

PC-lint Plus

Include Page
PC-lint Plus_V
PC-lint Plus_V

648, 650, 679, 680, 776,
952, 2704

Partially supported

Polyspace Bug Finder

Include Page
Polyspace Bug Finder_V
Polyspace Bug Finder_V

CERT C: Rec. INT08-CChecks for integer overflow or integer constant overflow (rec. fully covered)


Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

Bibliography

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