Regular expressions (regex) are widely used to match strings of text. For example, the POSIX {{ Wiki Markup grep
}} utility supports regular expressions for finding patterns in the specified text. For introductory information on regular expressions, see the Java Tutorials \ [[Tutorials 08|AA. Bibliography#Tutorials 08]\Java Tutorials]. The {{java.util.regex
}} package provides the {{Pattern
}} class that encapsulates a compiled representation of a regular expression and the {{Matcher
}} class, which is an engine that uses a {{Pattern
}} to perform matching operations on a {{CharSequence
}}.
Java's powerful regular expression ( regex ) facilities must be protected from misuse. An attacker may supply a malicious input that modifies the original regular expression in such a way that the regex fails to comply with the program's specification. This attack vector, called a regex injection, might affect control flow, cause information leaks, or result in denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerabilities.
Certain constructs and properties of Java regular expressions are susceptible to exploitation:
- Matching flags: Untrusted inputs may override matching options that may or may not have been passed to the
Pattern.compile()
method. - Greediness: An untrusted input may attempt to inject a regex that changes the original regex to match as much of the string as possible, exposing sensitive information.
- Grouping: The programmer can enclose parts of a regular expression in parentheses to perform some common action on the group. An attacker may be able to change the groupings by supplying untrusted input, leading to the security weaknesses described earlier.
Untrusted input should be sanitized before use to prevent regex injection. When the user must specify a regex as input, care must be taken to ensure that the original regex cannot be modified without restriction. Whitelisting characters (such as letters and digits) before delivering the user-supplied string to the regex parser is a good input sanitization strategy. A programmer must provide only a very limited subset of regular expression functionality to the user to minimize any chance of misuse.
Regex Injection Example
Suppose a system log file contains messages output by various system processes. Some processes produce public messages, and some processes produce sensitive messages marked "private." Here is an example log file:
Code Block |
---|
10:47:03 private[423] Successful logout name: usr1 ssn: 111223333
10:47:04 public[48964] Failed to resolve network service
10:47:04 public[1] (public.message[49367]) Exited with exit code: 255
10:47:43 private[423] Successful login name: usr2 ssn: 444556666
10:48:08 public[48964] Backup failed with error: 19
|
A user wishes to search the log file for interesting messages but must be prevented from seeing the private messages. A program might accomplish this by permitting the user to provide search text that becomes part of the following regex:
Code Block |
---|
(.*? +public\[\d+\] +.*<SEARCHTEXT>.*)
|
However, if an attacker can substitute any string for <SEARCHTEXT>
, he can perform a regex injection with the following text:
Code Block |
---|
.*)|(.* |
When injected into the regex, the regex becomes:
Code Block |
---|
(.*? +public\[\d+\] +.*.*)|(.*.*)
|
This regex will match any line in the log file, including the private ones.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example periodically loads the searches a log file into memory and allows clients to obtain keyword search suggestions by passing the keyword as an argument to suggestSearches()
. using search terms from an untrusted user:
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
public class Keywords { private static ScheduledExecutorService scheduler = Executors.newSingleThreadScheduledExecutor(); private static CharBuffer log; private static final Object lock = new Object(); // Map log file into memory, and periodically reload static try { FileChannel channel = new FileInputStream( "path").getChannel(); import java.io.FileInputStream; import java.io.IOException; import java.nio.CharBuffer; import java.nio.MappedByteBuffer; import java.nio.channels.FileChannel; import java.nio.charset.Charset; import java.nio.charset.CharsetDecoder; import java.util.regex.Matcher; import java.util.regex.Pattern; public class LogSearch { public static void FindLogEntry(String search) { // Construct regex dynamically from user string String regex = "(.*? +public\\[\\d+\\] +.*" + search + ".*)"; Pattern searchPattern = Pattern.compile(regex); try (FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream("log.txt")) { FileChannel channel = fis.getChannel(); // Get the file's size and map it into memory int long size = (int) channel.size(); final MappedByteBuffer mappedBuffer = channel.map( FileChannel.MapMode.READ_ONLY, 0, size); Charset charset = Charset.forName("ISO-8859-15"); final CharsetDecoder decoder = charset.newDecoder(); // Read file into char buffer CharBuffer log = decoder.decode(mappedBuffer); // Read file into char buffer Runnable periodicLogRead = new Runnable() { @Override public void run() { synchronized(lock) { try { log = decoder.decode(mappedBuffer); } catch (CharacterCodingException e) { // Forward to handler } } } }; scheduler.scheduleAtFixedRate(periodicLogRead, 0, 5, TimeUnit.SECONDS); } catch (Throwable t) { // Forward to handler } } public static Set<String> suggestSearches(String search) { synchronized(lock) { Set<String> searches = new HashSet<String>(); // Construct regex dynamically from user string String regex = "(.*? +public\\[\\d+\\] +.*" + search + ".*)"; Pattern keywordPattern = Pattern.compile(regex); Matcher logMatcher = keywordPattern.matcher(log); while (logMatcher.find()) { String found = logMatcher.group(1); searches.add(found); } return searches; } } } Matcher logMatcher = searchPattern.matcher(log); while (logMatcher.find()) { String match = logMatcher.group(); if (!match.isEmpty()) { System.out.println(match); } } } catch (IOException ex) { System.err.println("thrown exception: " + ex.toString()); Throwable[] suppressed = ex.getSuppressed(); for (int i = 0; i < suppressed.length; i++) { System.err.println("suppressed exception: " + suppressed[i].toString()); } } return; } |
This code permits an attacker to perform a regex injection. This code permits a trusted user to search for public log messages such as "error." However, it also allows a malicious attacker to perform the regex injection.
Compliant Solution (Whitelisting)
This compliant solution filters solution sanitizes the search terms at the beginning of the FindLogEntry()
, filtering out nonalphanumeric characters (except space and single quote) from the search string, which prevents regex injection.:
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
public class Keywords { // ... public static Set<String> suggestSearches public static void FindLogEntry(String search) { // Sanitize synchronized (lock) { Set<String> searches = new HashSet<String>(); search string StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(search.length()); for (int i = 0; i < search.length(); ++i) { char ch = search.charAt(i); if (Character.isLetterOrDigit(ch) || ch == ' ' || ch == '\'') { sb.append(ch); } } search = sb.toString(); // Construct regex dynamically from user string String regex = sb.append(ch); "(.*? +public\\[\\d+\\] +.*" + search + ".*)"; // ... } |
This solution prevents regex injection but also restricts search terms. For example, a user may no longer search for "name =
" because nonalphanumeric characters are removed from the search term.
Compliant Solution (Pattern.quote()
)
This compliant solution sanitizes the search terms by using Pattern.quote()
to escape any malicious characters in the search string. Unlike the previous compliant solution, a search string using punctuation characters, such as "name =" is permitted.
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
public static void FindLogEntry(String search) { // Sanitize search }string search = sbPattern.toStringquote(search); // Construct regex dynamically from user string String regex = "(.*? +public\\[\\d+\\] +.*" + search + ".*)"; // ... } } } |
The Matcher.quoteReplacement()
method can be used to escape strings used when doing regex substitutionThis solution also limits the set of valid search terms. For instance, a user may no longer search for "name =
" because the =
character would be sanitized out of the regex.
Compliant Solution
Another method of mitigating this vulnerability is to filter out the sensitive information prior to matching. Such a solution would require the filtering to be done every time the log file is periodically refreshed, incurring extra complexity and a performance penalty. Sensitive information may still be exposed if the log format changes but the class is not also refactored to accommodate these changes.
Risk Assessment
Failing to sanitize untrusted data included as part of a regular expression can result in the disclosure of sensitive information.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
IDS08-J |
Medium |
Unlikely |
Medium | P4 | L3 |
Related Guidelines
Bibliography
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="unmigrated-wiki-markup" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="ecb0150f-4417-4003-8475-b5c236411123"><ac:plain-text-body><![CDATA[ | [[Tutorials 08 | AA. Bibliography#Tutorials 08]] | [Regular Expressions | http://java.sun.com/docs/books/tutorial/essential/regex/index.html] | ]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro> |
<ac:structured-macro ac:name="unmigrated-wiki-markup" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="fa731f78-92c6-47d6-9a77-201e609485f7"><ac:plain-text-body><![CDATA[ | [[CVE 05 | AA. Bibliography#CVE]] | [CVE-2005-1949 | http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-1949] | ]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro> |
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Checker Framework |
| Tainting Checker | Trust and security errors (see Chapter 8) | ||||||
CodeSonar |
| JAVA.IO.TAINT.REGEX | Tainted Regular Expression (Java) | ||||||
SonarQube |
| Regular expressions should not be vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks |
Related Guidelines
Bibliography
...
IDS07-J. Do not pass untrusted, unsanitized data to the Runtime.exec() method IDS09-J. Do not use locale-dependent methods on locale-sensitive data without specifying the appropriate locale