Accepting user input in log files can result in log forging. For example, if a user enters A log injection vulnerability arises when a log entry contains unsanitized user input. A malicious user can insert fake log data and consequently deceive system administrators as to the system's behavior [OWASP 2008]. For example, an attacker might split a legitimate log entry into two log entries by entering a carriage return and line feed (CRLF) sequences, it may be possible to break apart a legit log entry into two. The second entry can be made to be purposely misleading, for instance, it may warn the administrator that a reboot is required to install critical security updatessequence to mislead an auditor. Log injection attacks can be prevented by sanitizing and validating any untrusted input sent to a log.
Logging unsanitized user input can also result in leaking sensitive data across a trust boundary. For example, an attacker might inject a script into a log file such that when the file is viewed using a web browser, the browser could provide the attacker with a copy of the administrator's cookie so that the attacker might gain access as the administrator.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example logs the user's login user name when an invalid request is received. No input sanitization is being performed untrusted data from an unauthenticated user without data sanitization.
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
if (loginSuccessful) {
logger.severe("User login succeeded for: " + username);
} else {
logger.severe("User login failed for: " + username);
}
|
Without sanitization, a log injection attack is possible. A standard log message when username
is guest
might look like this:
Code Block |
---|
May 15, 2011 2:19:10 PM java.util.logging.LogManager$RootLogger log
SEVERE: User login failed for: guest
|
If the username
that is used in a log message is not guest
but rather a multiline string like this:
Code Block |
---|
guest
May 15, 2011 2:25:52 PM java.util.logging.LogManager$RootLogger log
SEVERE: User login succeeded for: administrator
|
the log would contain the following misleading data:
Code Block |
---|
May 15, 2011 2:19:10 PM java.util.logging.LogManager$RootLogger log
SEVERE: User login failed for: guest
May 15, 2011 2:25:52 PM java.util.logging.LogManager log
SEVERE: User login succeeded for: administrator
|
Compliant Solution (Sanitized User)
This compliant solution sanitizes the username
before logging it, preventing injection attacks.
Code Block | |||
---|---|---|---|
| |||
if (loginSuccessful) { logger.severe("Invalid username:" + getUserName()); |
Compliant Solution
"User login succeeded for: " + sanitizeUser(username));
} else {
logger.severe("User login failed for: " + sanitizeUser(username));
} |
The sanitization is done by a dedicated method for sanitizing user names:
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
public String sanitizeUser(String username) {
return Pattern.matches("[A-Za-z0-9_]+", username))
? username : "unauthorized user";
} |
Compliant Solution (Sanitized Logger)
This compliant solution uses a text logger that automatically sanitizes its input. A sanitized logger saves the developer from having to worry about unsanitized log messages.
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
Logger sanLogger = new SanitizedTextLogger(logger);
if (loginSuccessful) {
sanLogger.severe("User login succeeded for: " + username);
} else {
sanLogger.severe("User login failed for: " + username);
} |
The sanitized text logger takes as delegate an actual logger. We assume the logger outputs text log messages to a file, network, or the console, and each log message has no indented lines. The sanitized text logger sanitizes all text to be logged by indenting every line except the first by two spaces. While a malicious user can indent text by more, a malicious user cannot create a fake log entry because all of her output will be indented, except for the real log outputThis compliant solution sanitizes the user name input before logging it. Refer to IDS08-J. Sanitize before processing or storing user input for more details on input sanitization.
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
class SanitizedTextLogger extends Logger { Logger delegate; public SanitizedTextLogger(Logger delegate) { super(delegate.getName(), delegate.getResourceBundleName()); this.delegate = delegate; } public String sanitize(String username msg) { Pattern newline = getUserName(Pattern.compile("\n"); sanitize(username Matcher matcher = newline.matcher(msg); logger.severe("Invalid username:" + username); return matcher.replaceAll("\n "); } public void severe(String msg) { delegate.severe(sanitize(msg)); } // .. Other Logger methods which must also sanitize their log messages } |
Risk Assessment
Allowing unvalidated user input to be logged can lead to result in forging of log entries, leaking secure information, or storing sensitive data in a manner that violates a local law or regulation.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|
IDS03-J |
Medium |
Probable |
Medium | P8 | L2 |
Automated Detection
...
TODO
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
References
Wiki Markup |
---|
\[[API 06|AA. Java References#API 06]\]
\[[MITRE 09|AA. Java References#MITRE 09]\] [CWE ID 144|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/144.html] and [CWE ID 150|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/150.html] |
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Checker Framework |
| Tainting Checker | Trust and security errors (see Chapter 8) | ||||||
CodeSonar |
| JAVA.IO.TAINT.LOG | Tainted Log (Java) | ||||||
Fortify | Log_Forging | Implemented | |||||||
Klocwork |
| SVLOG_FORGING | Implemented | ||||||
Parasoft Jtest |
| CERT.IDS03.TDLOG | Protect against log forging |
Related Guidelines
Injection [RST] | |
CWE-144, Improper neutralization of line delimiters | |
MITRE CAPEC | CAPEC-93, Log Injection-Tampering-Forging |
Bibliography
...
FIO36-J. Do not create multiple buffered wrappers on an InputStream 09. Input Output (FIO) 09. Input Output (FIO)