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It is important that a string not be modified after validation has occurred because doing so may allow an attacker to bypass validation. For example, a program may filter out the <script> tags from HTML input to avoid cross-site scripting (XSS) and other vulnerabilities. If exclamation marks (!) are deleted from the input following validation, an attacker may pass the string "<scr!ipt>" so that the validation check fails to detect the <script> tag, but the subsequent removal of the exclamation mark creates a <script> tag in the input. 

A programmer might decide to exclude many different categories of characters. For example, The Unicode Standard [Unicode 2012defines the following categories of characters, all of which can be matched using an appropriate regular expression:

AbbrLongDescription
CcControlA C0 or C1 control code
CfFormatA format control character
CsSurrogateA surrogate code point
CoPrivate_UseA private-use character
CnUnassignedA reserved unassigned code point or a noncharacter

Other programs may remove or replace any character belonging to a uniquely defined set of characters. Any string modifications must be performed before the string is validated.

Noncompliant Code Example (Noncharacter Code Points)

In some versions of The Unicode Standard prior to Unicode version 5.2, conformance clause C7 allows the deletion of noncharacter code points. For example, conformance clause C7 from Unicode 5.1 states [Unicode 2007] states:

C7. When a process purports not to modify the interpretation of a valid coded character sequence, it shall make no change to that coded character sequence other than the possible replacement of character sequences by their canonical-equivalent sequences or the deletion of noncharacter code points.

According to the Unicode Technical Report #36, Unicode Security Considerations [Davis 2008b], Section 3.5, "Deletion of Noncharacters"Code Points" [Davis 2008b]:

Whenever a character is invisibly deleted (instead of replaced), such as in this older version of C7, it may cause a security problem. The issue is the following: A gateway might be checking for a sensitive sequence of characters, say "delete". If what is passed in is "deXlete", where X is a noncharacter, the gateway lets it through: the sequence "deXlete" may be in and of itself harmless. However, suppose that later on, past the gateway, an internal process invisibly deletes the X. In that case, the sensitive sequence of characters is formed, and can lead to a security breach.

Any string modifications, including the removal or replacement of noncharacter code points, must be performed before any validation of the string is performed.

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example accepts only valid ASCII characters and deletes any non-ASCII characters. It also checks for the existence of a <script> tag.

Input validation is being performed before the deletion of non-ASCII characters. Consequently, an attacker can disguise a <script> tag and bypass The filterString() method in this noncompliant code example normalizes the input string, validates that the input does not contain <script> tag, and then removes any noncharacter code points from the input string. Because input validation is performed before the removal of any noncharacter code points, an attacker can include noncharacter code points in the <script> tag to bypass the validation checks.

Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc
// "\uFEFF" is a non-character code point
String s = "<scr" + "\uFEFF" + "ipt>"; 
import java.text.Normalizer;
import java.text.Normalizer.Form;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
 
public class TagFilter {
  public static String filterString(String str) {
    String s = Normalizer.normalize(sstr, Form.NFKC);

    // InputValidate validationinput
    Pattern pattern = Pattern.compile("<script>");
    Matcher matcher = pattern.matcher(s);
    if (matcher.find()) {
       System.out.printlnthrow new IllegalArgumentException("Found black listed tagInvalid input");
}   else {}

  // ... 
}

// Deletes all non-valid characters 
noncharacter code points
    s = s.replaceAll("[^\\p{ASCIICn}]", "");
    return s;
  }

  public static void main(String[] args) {
    // s now contains "\uFDEF" is a noncharacter code point
    String maliciousInput = "<scr" + "\uFDEF" + "ipt>";
    String sb = filterString(maliciousInput);
    // sb = "<script>"
  }
}

Compliant

...

Solution (Noncharacter Code Points)

This compliant solution replaces the unknown or unrepresentable character with Unicode sequence \uFFFD, which is reserved to denote this condition. It also does performs this replacement before doing any other sanitization, in particular, checking for <script>. This ensures , to ensure that malicious input cannot bypass filters.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
String s = "<scr" + "\uFEFF" + "ipt>";

import java.text.Normalizer;
import java.text.Normalizer.Form;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;

public class TagFilter {
 
  public static String filterString(String str) {
    String s = Normalizer.normalize(sstr, Form.NFKC);

    // Replaces all noncharacter non-validcode characterspoints with unicodeUnicode U+FFFD
    s = s.replaceAll("[^\\p{ASCIICn}]", "\uFFFD");

 

   // Validate input
    Pattern pattern = Pattern.compile("<script>");
    Matcher matcher = pattern.matcher(s);
    if (matcher.find()) {
  System.out.println    throw new IllegalArgumentException("FoundInvalid blacklisted taginput");
    }
    return s;
  } else
  public static void main(String[] args) {
    // ... 
}
 "\uFDEF" is a non-character code point
    String maliciousInput = "<scr" + "\uFDEF" + "ipt>";
    String s = filterString(maliciousInput);
    // s = <scr?ipt>
  }

According to According to the Unicode Technical Report #36, Unicode Security Considerations [Davis 2008b], "U+FFFD is usually unproblematic, because it is designed expressly for this kind of purpose. That is, because it doesn't have syntactic meaning in programming languages or structured data, it will typically just cause a failure in parsing. Where the output character set is not Unicode, though, this character may not be available."

Risk Assessment

Validating input before eliminating noncharacter code points removing or modifying characters in the input string can allow malicious input to bypass validation checks.

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

IDS11-J

high

High

probable

Probable

medium

Medium

P12

L1

Automated Detection

ToolVersionCheckerDescription
The Checker Framework

Include Page
The Checker Framework_V
The Checker Framework_V

Tainting CheckerTrust and security errors (see Chapter 8)
Parasoft Jtest

Include Page
Parasoft_V
Parasoft_V

CERT.IDS11.VPPDValidate all dangerous data

Related Guidelines

MITRE CWE

CWE-182

.

, Collapse of

data

Data into

unsafe value

Unsafe Value

Bibliography

[API 2006]

 


[Davis 2008b]

Section 3.5, "Deletion of Noncharacters"

[
Weber 2009
Seacord 2015]
Handling the Unexpected: Character-deletion

[Unicode 2007]

 


[Unicode 2011]

 

 


[Weber 2009]

"Handling the Unexpected: Character-deletion" (slides 72–74)


...

Image Added Image Added Image AddedIDS10-J. Do not split characters between two data structures      Image Removed      IDS12-J. Perform lossless conversion of String data between differing character encodings