EXP08-A. Ensure pointer arithmetic is used correctly

When performing pointer arithmetic, the size of the value to add to a pointer is automatically scaled to the size of the pointer's type. For instance, when adding a value to a pointer to a four-byte integer, the value is scaled by a factor of four and then added to the pointer. Failing to understand how pointer arithmetic works can lead to miscalculations that result in serious errors, such as buffer overflows.

Non-Compliant Code Example

In this non-compliant code example, integer values returned by parseint(getdata()) are stored into an array of INTBUFSIZE elements of type int called buf [[Dowd 06]]. If data is available for insertion into buf (which is indicated by havedata()) and buf_ptr has not been incremented past buf + sizeof(buf), an integer value is stored at the address referenced by buf_ptr. However, the sizeof operator returns the total number of bytes in buf, which is typically a multiple of the number of elements in buf. This value is scaled to the size of an integer and added to buf. As a result, the check to make sure integers are not written past the end of buf is incorrect and a buffer overflow is possible.

int buf[INTBUFSIZE];
int *buf_ptr = buf;

while (havedata() && buf_ptr < buf + sizeof(buf)) {
    *buf_ptr++ = parseint(getdata());
}

Compliant Solution

In this compliant solution, the size of buf is added directly to buf and used as an upper bound. The integer literal is scaled to the size of an integer and the upper bound of buf is checked correctly.

int buf[INTBUFSIZE];
int *buf_ptr = buf;

while (havedata() && buf_ptr < (buf + INTBUFSIZE)) {
    *buf_ptr++ = parseint(getdata());
}

Non-Compliant Code Example

The following example is based on a flaw in the OpenBSD operating system. An integer, skip, is added as an offset to a pointer of type struct big. The adjusted pointer is then used as a destination address in a call to memset(). However, when skip is added to the struct big pointer, it is automatically scaled by the size of struct big, which is 32 bytes (assuming 4 byte integers, 8 byte long long integers, and no structure padding). This results in the call to memset() writing to unintended memory.

struct big {
    unsigned long long ull_1; /* typically 8 bytes */
    unsigned long long ull_2; /* typically 8 bytes */
    unsigned long long ull_3; /* typically 8 bytes */
    int si_4; /* typically 4 bytes */
    int si_5; /* typically 4 bytes */
};
/* ... */
size_t skip = offsetof(struct big, ull_2);
struct big *s = (struct big *)malloc(sizeof(struct big));
if (!s) {
   /* Handle malloc() error */
}

memset(s + skip, 0, sizeof(struct big) - skip);
/* ... */
free(s);

A similar situation occurred in OpenBSD's make command [[Murenin 07]].

Compliant Solution

To correct this example, the struct big pointer is cast as a char *. This causes skip to be scaled by a factor of 1.

struct big {
    unsigned long long ull_1; /* typically 8 bytes */
    unsigned long long ull_2; /* typically 8 bytes */
    unsigned long long ull_3; /* typically 8 bytes */
    int si_4; /* typically 4 bytes */
    int si_5; /* typically 4 bytes */
};
/* ... */
size_t skip = offsetof(struct big, ull_2);
struct big *s = (struct big *)malloc(sizeof(struct big));
if (!s) {
   /* Handle malloc() error */
}

memset((char *)s + skip, 0, sizeof(struct big) - skip);
/* ... */
free(s);

Risk Assessment

Failure to understand and properly use pointer arithmetic can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Reference

[[Dowd 06]] Chapter 6, "C Language Issues" (Vulnerabilities)
[[Murenin 07]]

EXP07-A. Do not diminish the benefits of constants by assuming their values in expressions      03. Expressions (EXP)       EXP09-A. Use sizeof to determine the size of a type or variable