It is possible to safely use the same handler for multiple signals, but doing so increases the likelihood of a security vulnerability. The delivered signal is masked and is not delivered until the registered signal handler exits. However, if this same handler is registered to handle a different signal, execution of the handler may be interrupted by this new signal. If a signal handler is constructed with the expectation that it cannot be interrupted, a vulnerability might exist. To eliminate this attack vector, each signal handler should be registered to handle only one type of signal.
Non-Compliant Coding Example
This non-compliant program registers a single signal handler to process both SIGUSR1
and SIGUSR2
. The variable sig2
should be set to one if one or more SIGUSR1
signals are followed by SIGUSR2
.
#include <signal.h> volatile sig_atomic_t sig1 = 0; volatile sig_atomic_t sig2 = 0; void handler(int signum) { if (signum == SIGUSR1) { sig1 = 1; } else if (sig1) { sig2 = 1; } } int main(void) { signal(SIGUSR1, handler); signal(SIGUSR2, handler); while (sig2 == 0) { /* do nothing or give up CPU for a while */ } /* ... */ return 0; }
The problem with this code is that there is a race condition in the implementation of handler()
. If handler()
is called to handle SIGUSR1
and is interrupted to handle SIGUSR2
, it is possible that sig2
will not be set. This non-compliant code example also violates SIG31-C. Do not access or modify shared objects in signal handlers.
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution registers two separate signal handlers to process SIGUSR1
and SIGUSR2
. The sig1_handler()
handler waits for SIGUSER1
. After this signal occurs, the sig2_handler()
is registered to handle SIGUSER2
. This solution is fully compliant and accomplishes the goal of detecting whether one or more SIGUSR1
signals are followed by SIGUSR2
.
#include <signal.h> volatile sig_atomic_t sig1 = 0; volatile sig_atomic_t sig2 = 0; void sig1_handler(int signum) { sig1 = 1; } void sig2_handler(int signum) { sig2 = 1; } int main(void) { signal(SIGUSR1, sig1_handler); signal(SIGUSR2, SIG_IGN); while (sig1 == 0) { /* do nothing or give up CPU for a while */ } signal(SIGUSR2, sig2_handler); while (sig2 == 0) { /* do nothing or give up CPU for a while */ } /* ... */ return 0; }
Risk Assessment
Depending on the code, this could lead to any number of attacks, many of which could give root access. For an overview of some software vulnerabilities, see Zalewski's signal article.
Recommendation |
Severity |
Likelihood |
Remediation Cost |
Priority |
Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
SIG00-A |
3 (high) |
3 (likely) |
1 (high) |
P9 |
L2 |
Automated Detection
The tool Compass Rose can detect violations of the recommendation for single-file programs.
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
References
[[ISO/IEC 03]] Section 5.2.3, "Signals and interrupts"
[[Open Group 04]] longjmp
[OpenBSD] signal()
Man Page
[Zalewski] http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/signals.txt
[[Dowd 06 ]] Chapter 13, "Synchronization and State" (Signal Interruption and Repetition)
12. Signals (SIG) 12. Signals (SIG) SIG01-A. Understand implementation-specific details regarding signal handler persistence