FIO03-J. Remove temporary files before termination

Temporary files can be used to

• share data between processes.
• store auxiliary program data (for example, to preserve memory).
• construct and/or load classes, JAR files, and native libraries dynamically.

Programmers frequently create temporary files in directories that are writable by everyone; examples include /tmp and /var/tmp on POSIX and C:\TEMP on Windows. Files in such directories may be purged regularly, such as every night or during reboot. However, an attacker who has access to the local file system can exploit operations on files in shared directories when those files are created insecurely or remain accessible after use. For example, an attacker who can both predict the name of a temporary file and change or replace that file can exploit a (TOCTOU) race condition to cause a failure in creating the temporary file from within program code or to cause the program to operate on a file determined by the attacker. This exploit is particularly dangerous when the vulnerable process is running with elevated privileges because the attacker can operate on any file accessible by the vulnerable process. On multiuser systems, a user can be tricked by an attacker into unintentionally operating on his or her own files. Consequently, temporary file management must comply with rule FIO00-J. Do not operate on files in shared directories.

Many programs that create temporary files attempt to give them unique and unpredictable file names. This is a common attempt at mitigating the risk of creating a file in an insecure or shared directory. If the file name is predictable, an attacker could guess or predict the name of the file to be created and could create a link with the same name to a normally inaccessible file. However, when temporary files are created in a secure directory, an attacker cannot tamper with them. Consequently, the need for unpredictable names is eliminated.

Temporary files are files and consequently must conform to the requirements specified by other rules governing operations on files, including rules FIO00-J. Do not operate on files in shared directories and FIO01-J. Create files with appropriate access permissions. Furthermore, temporary files have the additional requirement that they must be removed before program termination.

Removing temporary files when they are no longer required allows file names and other resources (such as secondary storage) to be recycled. Each program is responsible for ensuring that temporary files are removed during normal operation. There is no surefire method that can guarantee the removal of orphaned files in the case of abnormal termination, even in the presence of a finally block, because the finally block may fail to execute. For this reason, many systems employ temporary file cleaner utilities to sweep temporary directories and remove old files. Such utilities can be invoked manually by a system administrator or can be periodically invoked by a system process. However, these utilities are themselves frequently vulnerable to file-based exploits.

Noncompliant Code Example

This and subsequent code examples, assume that files are created in a secure directory in compliance with rule FIO00-J. Do not operate on files in shared directories and are created with proper access permissions in compliance with rule FIO01-J. Create files with appropriate access permissions. Both requirements may be managed outside the JVM.

This noncompliant code example fails to remove the file upon completion.

class TempFile {
  public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException{
    File f = new File("tempnam.tmp");
    if (f.exists()) {
      System.out.println("This file already exists");
      return;
    }

    FileOutputStream fop = null;
    try {
      fop = new FileOutputStream(f);
      String str = "Data";
      fop.write(str.getBytes());
    } finally {
      if (fop != null) {
        try {
          fop.close();
        } catch (IOException x) {
          // handle error
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

Noncompliant Code Example (createTempFile(), deleteOnExit())

This noncompliant code example invokes the File.createTempFile() method, which generates a unique temporary file name based on two parameters, a prefix and an extension. This is the only method currently designed and provided for producing unique file names, although the names produced can be easily predicted. A random number generator can be used to produce the prefix if a random file name is required.

This example also uses the deleteOnExit() method to ensure that the temporary file is deleted when the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) terminates. However, according to the Java API [[API 2006]] Class File, method deleteOnExit() documentation,

Deletion will be attempted only for normal termination of the virtual machine, as defined by the Java Language Specification. Once deletion has been requested, it is not possible to cancel the request. This method should consequently be used with care.
Note: this method should not be used for file-locking, as the resulting protocol cannot be made to work reliably.

Consequently, the file is not deleted if the JVM terminates unexpectedly. A longstanding bug on Windows-based systems reported as Bug ID: 4171239 [[SDN 2008]] causes JVMs to fail to delete a file when deleteOnExit() is invoked before the associated stream or RandomAccessFile is closed.

class TempFile {
  public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException{
    File f = File.createTempFile("tempnam",".tmp");
    FileOutputStream fop = null;
    try {
      fop = new FileOutputStream(f);
      String str = "Data";
      fop.write(str.getBytes());
      fop.flush();
    } finally {
      // Stream/file still open; file will
      // not be deleted on Windows systems
      f.deleteOnExit(); // Delete the file when the JVM terminates

      if (fop != null) {
        try {
          fop.close();
        } catch (IOException x) {
          // handle error
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

Compliant Solution (Java SE 7: DELETE_ON_CLOSE)

This compliant solution creates a temporary file using several methods from Java SE 7's NIO2 package. It uses the createTempFile() method, which creates an unpredictable name. (The actual method by which the name is created is implementation-defined and undocumented.) The file is opened using the try-with-resources construct, which automatically closes the file regardless of whether an exception occurs. Finally, the file is opened with the Java SE 7 DELETE_ON_CLOSE option, which removes the file automatically when it is closed.

class TempFile {
  public static void main(String[] args) {
    Path tempFile = null;
    try {
      tempFile = Files.createTempFile("tempnam", ".tmp");
      try (BufferedWriter writer =
          Files.newBufferedWriter(tempFile, Charset.forName("UTF8"),
                                  StandardOpenOption.DELETE_ON_CLOSE)) {
        // write to file
      }
      System.out.println("Temporary file write done, file erased");
    } catch (FileAlreadyExistsException x) {
      System.err.println("File exists: " + tempFile);
    } catch (IOException x) {
      // Some other sort of failure, such as permissions.
      System.err.println("Error creating temporary file: " + x);
    }
  }
}

Compliant Solution

When a secure directory for storing temporary files is not available, the vulnerabilities that result from using temporary files in insecure directories can be avoided by using alternative mechanisms, including

• other IPC mechanisms such as sockets and remote procedure calls.
• the low-level Java Native Interface (JNI).
• memory-mapped files.
• threads to share heap data within the same JVM (applies to data sharing between Java processes only).

Risk Assessment

Failure to remove temporary files before termination can result in information leakage and resource exhaustion.

Related Guidelines

Bibliography

      12. Input Output (FIO)