MEM03-A. Clear sensitive information stored in reusable resources returned for reuse

Sensitive data stored in reusable resources may be inadvertently leaked to a less privileged user or adversary if not properly cleared. Examples of reusable resources include

• dynamically allocated memory
• statically allocated memory
• automatically allocated (stack) memory
• memory caches
• disk
• disk caches

The manner in which sensitive information can be properly cleared varies depending on the resource type and platform.

Non-Compliant Code Example: free()

Dynamic memory managers are not required to clear freed memory and generally do not because of the additional runtime overhead. Furthermore, dynamic memory managers are free to reallocate this same memory. As a result, it is possible to accidentally leak sensitive information if it is not cleared before calling a function that frees dynamic memory. Programmers also cannot rely on memory being cleared during allocation (see MEM09-A. Do not assume memory allocation routines initialize memory).

To prevent information leakage, sensitive information must be cleared from dynamically allocated buffers before they are freed. Calling free() on a block of dynamic memory causes the space to be deallocated; that is, the memory block is made available for future allocation. However, the data stored in the block of memory to be recycled may be preserved. If this memory block contains sensitive information, that information may be unintentionally exposed.

In this example, sensitive information stored in the dynamically allocated memory referenced by secret is copied to the dynamically allocated buffer, new_secret, which is processed and eventually deallocated by a call to free(). Because the memory is not cleared, it may be reallocated to another section of the program where the information stored in new_secret may be unintentionally leaked.

char *new_secret;
size_t size = strlen(secret);
if (size == SIZE_MAX) {
  /* Handle Error */
}

new_secret = (char *)malloc(size+1);
if (!new_secret) {
  /* Handle Error */
}
strcpy(new_secret, secret);

/* Process new_secret... */

free(new_secret);
new_secret = NULL;

Compliant Solution

To prevent information leakage, dynamic memory containing sensitive information should be sanitized before being freed. This is commonly accomplished by clearing the allocated space (that is, filling the space with '\0' characters).

char *new_secret;
size_t size = strlen(secret);
if (size == SIZE_MAX) {
  /* Handle Error */
}
/* use calloc() to zero-out allocated space */
new_secret = (char *)calloc(size+1, sizeof(char));
if (!new_secret) {
  /* Handle Error */
}
strcpy(new_secret, secret);

/* Process new_secret... */

/* sanitize memory  */
memset(new_secret, '\0', size);
free(new_secret);
new_secret = NULL;

The calloc() function ensures that the newly allocated memory has also been cleared. Because sizeof(char) is guaranteed to be 1, this solution does not need to check for a numeric overflow as a result of using calloc() (see MEM07-A. Ensure that the arguments to calloc() when multiplied can be represented as a size_t).

NOTE: It is possible that the call to memset() in this example will be optimized out (see MSC06-A. Be aware of compiler optimization when dealing with sensitive data). Be very careful to ensure that any sensitive data is actually cleared from memory.

Non-Compliant Code Example: realloc()

Reallocating memory using the realloc() function is a regenerative case of freeing memory. The realloc() function deallocates the old object and returns a pointer to a new object.

Using realloc() to resize dynamic memory may inadvertently expose sensitive information, or it may allow heap inspection as described in the Fortify Taxonomy: Software Security Errors [[Fortify 06]] and NIST's Source Code Analysis Tool Functional Specification [[NIST 06b]]. When realloc() is called it may allocate a new, larger object, copy the contents of secret to this new object, free() the original object, and assign the newly allocated object to secret. However, the contents of the original object may remain in memory.

size_t secret_size;
/* ... */
if (secret_size > SIZE_MAX/2) {
   /* handle error condition */
}

secret = (char *)realloc(secret, secret_size * 2);

The secret_size is tested to ensure that the integer multiplication (secret_size * 2) does not result in an integer overflow (see INT32-C. Ensure that operations on signed integers do not result in overflow).

Compliant Solution

A compliant program cannot rely on realloc() because it is not possible to clear the memory prior to the call. Instead, a custom function must be used that operates similar to realloc() but sanitizes sensitive information as heap-based buffers are resized. Again, this is done by overwriting the space to be deallocated with '\0' characters.

size_t secret_size;
/* ... */
if (secret_size > SIZE_MAX/2) {
   /* handle error condition */
}
/* calloc() initializes memory to zero */
temp_buff = (char *)calloc(secret_size * 2, sizeof(char));
if (temp_buff == NULL) {
 /* Handle Error */
}

memcpy(temp_buff, secret, secret_size);

/* sanitize the buffer */
memset(secret, '\0', secret_size);

free(secret);
secret = temp_buff; /* install the resized buffer */
temp_buff = NULL;

The calloc() function ensures that the newly allocated memory has also been cleared. Because sizeof(char) is guaranteed to be 1, this solution does not need to check for a numeric overflow as a result of using calloc() (see MEM07-A. Ensure that the arguments to calloc() when multiplied can be represented as a size_t).

Risk Assessment

In practice, this type of security flaw can expose sensitive information to unintended parties. The Sun tarball vulnerability discussed in Secure Coding Principles & Practices: Designing and Implementing Secure Applications [[Graf 03]] and Sun Security Bulletin #00122 [[Sun]] shows a violation of this recommendation, leading to sensitive data being leaked. Attackers may also be able to leverage this defect to retrieve sensitive information using techniques such as heap inspection.

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

References

[[Fortify 06]]
[[Graff 03]]
[[ISO/IEC 9899:1999]] Section 7.20.3, "Memory management functions"
[[NIST 06b]]

MEM02-A. Immediately cast the result of a memory allocation function call into a pointer to the allocated type      08. Memory Management (MEM)       MEM04-A. Do not perform zero length allocations