File path names containing particular characters can be troublesome and can cause unexpected behavior resulting in vulnerabilities. If untrusted data is used in the construction of a file or path name, the following characters and patterns must be disallowed:
- Leading dashes: Leading dashes can cause problems when programs are called with the file name as a parameter because the first character or characters of the file name might be interpreted as an option switch.
- Control characters, such as newlines, carriage returns, and escape: Control characters in a file name can cause unexpected results from shell scripts and in logging.
- Spaces: Spaces can cause problems with scripts and when double quotes aren't used to surround the file name.
- Invalid character encodings: Character encodings can make it difficult to perform proper validation of string data. (See rule IDS11-J. Sanitize non-character code points before performing other sanitization.)
- Characters other than letters, numbers, and portable punctuation: These characters may be used as separators. Including them in a file or path name can cause unexpected and potentially insecure behavior.
As a result of the influence of MS-DOS, file names of the form xxxxxxxx.xxx
, where x denotes an alphanumeric character, are generally supported by modern systems. On some platforms, file names are case sensitive; while on other platforms, they are case insensitive. VU#439395 is an example of a vulnerability resulting from a failure to deal appropriately with case sensitivity issues [[VU#439395]].
In addition to the letters of the English alphabet ("A" through "Z" and "a" through "z"), the digits ("0" through "9"), and the space, only the following characters are portable:
% & + , - . : = _
Only these characters should be considered for use in file and path names. Punctuation characters not on this list are not unconditionally safe for file names even if they are portably available. These characters or patterns can cause problems for scripts and automated parsing, but because they are not commonly used, it is best to disallow their use to reduce potential problems. Interoperability concerns also exist because different operating systems handle file names of this sort in different ways.
This is an instance of rule IDS00-J. Sanitize untrusted data passed across a trust boundary.
Noncompliant Code Example
In the following noncompliant code, unsafe characters are used as part of a file name.
File f = new File("A\uD8AB"); OutputStream out = new FileOutputStream(f);
An implementation is free to define its own mapping of the non-"safe" characters. For example, when tested on an Ubuntu Linux distribution, this noncompliant code example resulted in the following file name:
A?
Compliant Solution
Use a descriptive file name, containing only the subset of ASCII previously described.
File f = new File("name.ext"); OutputStream out = new FileOutputStream(f);
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example creates a file with input from the user without sanitizing it.
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { if (args.length < 1) { // handle error } File f = new File(args[0]); OutputStream out = new FileOutputStream(f); // ... }
No checks are performed on the file name to prevent troublesome characters. If an attacker knew this code was in a program used to create or rename files that would later be used in a script or automated process of some sort, they could choose particular characters in the output file name to confuse the later process for malicious purposes.
Compliant Solution
In this compliant solution, the program uses a whitelist to reject unsafe file names.
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { if (args.length < 1) { // handle error } String filename = args[0]; Pattern pattern = Pattern.compile("[A-Za-z0-9%&+,.:=_]"); Matcher matcher = pattern.matcher(filename); if (matcher.find()) { // filename contains bad chars, handle error } File f = new File(filename); OutputStream out = new FileOutputStream(f); // ... }
Similarly, all file names originating from untrusted sources must be sanitized to ensure they contain only safe characters.
Risk Assessment
Failing to use only the subset of ASCII that is guaranteed to work can result in misinterpreted data.
Recommendation |
Severity |
Likelihood |
Remediation Cost |
Priority |
Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
IDS06-J |
medium |
unlikely |
medium |
P4 |
L3 |
Related Guidelines
MSC09-C. Character Encoding - Use Subset of ASCII for Safety |
|
MSC09-CPP. Character Encoding - Use Subset of ASCII for Safety |
|
"Choice of Filenames and other External Identifiers AJN" |
|
CWE-116, "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output" |
Bibliography
ISO 7-bit coded character set for information interchange |
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[[Kuhn 2006 |
AA. Bibliography#Kuhn 06]] |
UTF-8 and Unicode FAQ for UNIX/Linux |
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AA. Bibliography#Wheeler03]] |
5.4 File Names]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro> |
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[[VU#881872 |
AA. Bibliography#VU881872]] |
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IDS05-J. Limit the size of files passed to ZipInputStream IDS07-J. Do not pass untrusted, unsanitized data to the Runtime.exec() method