Both environment variables and system properties provide user-defined mappings between keys and their corresponding values and can be used to communicate those values from the environment to a process. According to the Java API [[API 2006]] java.lang.System
class documentation,
Environment variables have a more global effect because they are visible to all descendants of the process which defines them, not just the immediate Java subprocess. They can have subtly different semantics, such as case insensitivity, on different operating systems. For these reasons, environment variables are more likely to have unintended side effects. It is best to use system properties where possible. Environment variables should be used when a global effect is desired, or when an external system interface requires an environment variable (such as
PATH
).
When programs execute in a more trusted domain than their environment, the program must assume that the values of environment variables are untrusted and must sanitize and validate any environment values before use.
The default values of system properties are set by the JVM upon startup and can be considered trusted. However, they may be overridden by properties from untrusted sources, such as a configuration file. Properties from untrusted sources must be sanitized and validated before use.
The Java Tutorial [[Campione 1996]] states:
To maximize portability, never refer to an environment variable when the same value is available in a system property. For example, if the operating system provides a user name, it will always be available in the system property user.name.
In fact, relying on environment variables is more than a simple portability issue. An attacker can essentially control all environment variables that enter a program using a mechanism such as the java.lang.ProcessBuilder
class.
Consequently, when an environment variable contains information that is available by other means, including system properties, that environment variable should not be used. Untrusted environmental variables must not be used without appropriate validation.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example tries to get the user name, using an environment variable.
String username = System.getenv("USER");
This certainly is a portability issue. Campione 1996 further suggests:
The way environment variables are used also varies. For example, Windows provides the user name in an environment variable called
USERNAME
, while UNIX implementations might provide the user name inUSER
,LOGNAME
, or both.
Furthermore, an attacker can execute this program with the USER
environment variable set to any value he chooses. The following code example does just that:
public static void main(String args[]) { if (args.length != 1) { System.err.println("Please supply a user name as the argument"); return; } String user = args[0]; ProcessBuilder pb = new ProcessBuilder(); pb.command("/usr/bin/printenv"); Map<String,String> environment = pb.environment(); environment.put("USER", user); pb.redirectErrorStream(true); try { Process process = pb.start(); InputStream in = process.getInputStream(); int c; while ((c = in.read()) != -1) { System.out.print((char) c); } int exitVal = process.waitFor(); } catch (IOException x) { x.printStackTrace(System.err); } catch (InterruptedException x) { x.printStackTrace(System.err); } }
This program runs the program /usr/bin/printenv
, which prints out all environment variables and their values. It takes a single argument string and sets the USER
environment variable to that string. The subsequent output of the printenv
program will indicate that the USER
environment variable is indeed set to the string requested.
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution obtains the user name using the user.name
system property. This property always contains the correct user name, even when the USER
environment variable has been set to an incorrect value or is missing.
String username = System.getProperty("user.name");
Risk Assessment
Untrusted environment variables can provide data for injection and other attacks if not properly sanitized.
Rule |
Severity |
Likelihood |
Remediation Cost |
Priority |
Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ENV02-J |
low |
likely |
low |
P9 |
L2 |
Bibliography
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[[API 2006 |
AA. Bibliography#API 06]] |
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[[Campione 1996 |
AA. Bibliography#Campione 96]] |
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