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External programs are commonly invoked to perform a function required by the overall system. This is a form of reuse and might even be considered a crude form of component-based software engineering. Command and argument injection vulnerabilities occur when an application fails to sanitize untrusted input and uses it in the execution of external programs.

Every Java application has a single instance of class Runtime that allows the application to interface with the environment in which the application is running. The current runtime can be obtained from the Runtime.getRuntime() method. The semantics of Runtime.exec are poorly defined, so it's best not to rely on its behavior any more than necessary. It will invoke the command directly without a shell. If you want a shell, you can use /bin/sh, -c on POSIX or cmd.exe on Windows. The variants of exec() that take the command line as a single string, split it using a StringTokenizer. On Windows, these tokens are concatenated back into a single argument string somewhere before being executed.

Consequently, command injection doesn't work unless a command interpreter is explicitly invoked. However, particularly on Windows, there can be vulnerabilities where arguments have spaces, double quotes, and so forth, or start with a - or / to indicate a switch.

This is a specific instance of the rule IDS01-J. Sanitize untrusted data passed across a trust boundary. Any string data that originates from outside the program's trust boundary must be sanitized before being executed as a command on the current platform.

Noncompliant Code Example (Windows)

A weakness in a privileged program caused by relying on untrusted sources such as system properties or the environment (see rule IDS04-J. Validate all data passed in through environment variables and non-default properties) can result in the execution of a command or of a program that has privileges beyond those possessed by a typical user.

This noncompliant code example provides a directory listing using the dir command. It accomplishes this by using Runtime.exec() to invoke the Windows dir command.

  
class DirList {
  public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
    String dir = System.getProperty("dir");
    Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime();
    Process proc = rt.exec("cmd.exe /C dir " + dir);
    int result = proc.waitFor();
    if (result != 0) {
      System.out.println("process error: " + result);
    }
    InputStream in = (result == 0) ? proc.getInputStream() : proc.getErrorStream();
    int c;
    while ((c = in.read()) != -1) {
      System.out.print((char) c);
    }
  }
}

Because Runtime.exec() receives unsanitized data originating from the environment (see rule IDS04-J. Validate all data passed in through environment variables and non-default properties), this code is susceptible to a command injection attack.

An attacker can exploit this program using the following command:

java -Ddir='dummy & echo bad' Java

the command executed is actually two commands:

cmd.exe /C dir dummy & echo bad

which first attempts to list a nonexistent dummy folder, and then prints bad to the console.

Noncompliant Code Example (POSIX)

This noncompliant code example provides the same functionality, but uses the POSIX ls command. The only difference from the Windows version is the argument passed to proc.

  
class DirList {
  public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
    String dir = System.getProperty("dir");
    Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime();
    Process proc = rt.exec(new String[] {"sh", "-c", "ls " + dir});
    int result = proc.waitFor();
    if (result != 0) {
      System.out.println("process error: " + result);
    }
    InputStream in = (result == 0) ? proc.getInputStream() : proc.getErrorStream();
    int c;
    while ((c = in.read()) != -1) {
      System.out.print((char) c);
    }
  }
}

The attacker can supply the same command, with the same effects as above. The command executed is actually:

sh -c 'ls dummy & echo bad'

Compliant Solution (Sanitization)

This compliant solution sanitizes the untrusted user input by permitting only a handful of correct characters to appear.

// ...
if (!Pattern.matches("[0-9A-Za-z@.]+", dir)) {
  // Handle error
}
// ...

Although this is a compliant solution, the sanitization method is weak because it will reject valid directories. Also, because the command interpreter invoked is system dependent, it is difficult to say that this solution will not allow command injection on every possible platform in which a Java program might run.

Compliant Solution (Restricted User Choice)

This compliant solution prevents command injection by only passing trusted strings to Runtime.exec(). While the user has control over which string gets used, the user cannot send strings directly to Runtime.exec().

// ...
String dir = null;

int number = Integer.parseInt(System.getproperty("dir")); // only allow integer choices
switch (number) {
  case 1: 
    dir = "data1"
    break; // Option 1
  case 2: 
    dir = "data2"
    break; // Option 2
  default: // invalid
    break; 
}
if (dir == null) {
  // handle error
}

This compliant solution hard codes the directories that may be listed.

This solution can quickly become unmanageable if you have many available directories. A more scalable solution is to read all the email addresses from a properties file into a java.util.Properties object. Alternately, the switch statement can operator on an enum.

Compliant Solution (Avoid Runtime.exec())

When the task performed by executing a system command can be accomplished by some other means, it is almost always advisable to do so. This compliant solution uses the File.list() method to provide directory listing, thereby preventing command injection.

import java.io.File;

class DirList {
  public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
    File dir = new File(System.getProperty("dir"));
    if (!dir.isDirectory()) {
      System.out.println("Not a directory");
    } else {
      for (String file : dir.list()) {
        System.out.println(file);
      }
    }
  }
}

Risk Assessment

Passing untrusted, unsanitized data to the Runtime.exec() method can result in command and argument injection attacks.

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

IDS06-J

high

probable

medium

P12

L1

Related Guidelines

Examples of related vulnerabilities include:

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[CVE-2010-0886]

[Sun Java Web Start Plugin Command Line Argument Injection

http://www.securitytube.net/video/1465]

]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro>

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[CVE-2010-1826]

[Command injection in updateSharingD's handling of Mach RPC messages

http://securitytracker.com/id/1024617]

]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro>

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[T-472]

[Mac OS X Java Command Injection Flaw in updateSharingD Lets Local Users Gain Elevated Privileges

http://www.doecirc.energy.gov/bulletins/t-472.shtml]

]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro>

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[[MITRE 2009

AA. Bibliography#MITRE 09]]

[CWE ID 78

http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html] "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')"

]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro>

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Bibliography

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[[Chess 2007

AA. Bibliography#Chess 07]]

Chapter 5: Handling Input, "Command Injection"]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro>

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[[OWASP 2005

AA. Bibliography#OWASP 05]]

[Reviewing Code for OS Injection

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Reviewing_Code_for_OS_Injection]

]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro>

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[[Permissions 2008

AA. Bibliography#Permissions 08]]

[Permissions in the Java™ SE 6 Development Kit (JDK)

http://java.sun.com/javase/6/docs/technotes/guides/security/permissions.html], Sun Microsystems, Inc. (2008)

]]></ac:plain-text-body></ac:structured-macro>


IDS05-J. Do not log unsanitized user input            IDS13-J. Do not assume every character in a string is the same size

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