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Noncompliant Code Example (Seal then Sign)

Use This noncompliant code example uses the java.security.SignedObject class to sign an object, when the integrity of the object is to be ensured. The two new arguments passed in to the SignedObject() method to sign the object are Signature and a private key derived from a KeyPair object. To verify the signature, a PublicKey as well as a Signature argument is passed to the SignedObject.verify() method.

Wiki Markup
This noncompliant code example signs the object as well as seals
it. Unfortunately, the signing occurs after the sealing. As discussed earlier, anyone can sign a sealed object, and so it cannot be assumed that the signer is the true originator of the object.
 it. According to Abadi and Needham \[[Abadi 1996|AA. Bibliography#Abadi 96]\]

When a principal signs material that has already been encrypted, it should not be inferred that the principal knows the content of the message. On the other hand, it is proper to infer that the principal that signs a message and then encrypts it for privacy knows the content of the message.

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The rationale is that any malicious party can intercept the originally signed encrypted message from the originator, strip the signature and add its own signature to the encrypted message. Both the malicious party, and the receiver have no information about the contents of the original message as it is encrypted and then signed (it can only be decrypted after verifying the signature). The receiver has no way of confirming the sender's identity unless the legitimate sender's public key is obtained over a secure channel. One of the three CCITT X.509 standard protocols was susceptible to such an attack \[[CCITT 1988|AA. Bibliography#CCITT 88]\].  

Because the signing occurs after the sealing it cannot be assumed that the signer is the true originator of the object.

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public static void main(String[] args)
  throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException, ClassNotFoundException {
  // Build map
  SerializableMap<String, Integer> map = buildMap();

  // Generate sealing key & seal map
  KeyGenerator generator;
  generator = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES");
  generator.init(new SecureRandom());
  Key key = generator.generateKey();
  Cipher
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public static void main(String[] args)
  throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException, ClassNotFoundException {
  // Build map
  SerializableMap<String, Integer> map = buildMap();

  // Generate sealing key & seal map
  KeyGenerator generator;
  generator = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES");
  generator.init(new SecureRandom());
  Key key = generator.generateKey();
  Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
  cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key);
  SealedObject sealedMap = new SealedObject(map, cipher);

  // Generate signing public/private key pair & sign map
  KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSA");
  KeyPair kp = kpg.generateKeyPair();
  Signature sig = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA");
  SignedObject signedMap = new SignedObject(sealedMap, kp.getPrivate(), sig);

  // Serialize map
  ObjectOutputStream out = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("data"));
  out.writeObject(signedMap);
  out.close();

  // Deserialize map
  ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("data"));
  signedMap = (SignedObject) in.readObject();
  in.close();

  // Unsign map
  if (!signedMap.verify(kp.getPublic(), sig)) {
    throw new GeneralSecurityException("Map failed verification");
  }
  sealedMap = (SealedObject) signedMap.getObject();

  // Unseal map
  cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
  cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPTENCRYPT_MODE, key);
  SealedObject mapsealedMap = new SealedObject(SerializableMap<Stringmap, Integer>) sealedMap.getObject(cipher);

  // Inspect Generate signing public/private key pair & sign map
   InspectMap(map);
}

Compliant Solution (Sign then Seal)

This compliant solution correctly signs the object before sealing it. This provides a guarantee of authenticity to the object, in addition to protection from man-in-the-middle attacks.

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public static void main(String[] args)
  throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException, ClassNotFoundException {KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSA");
  KeyPair kp = kpg.generateKeyPair();
  Signature sig = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA");
  SignedObject signedMap = new SignedObject(sealedMap, kp.getPrivate(), sig);

  // BuildSerialize map
  ObjectOutputStream out  SerializableMap<String, Integer> map = buildMap= new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("data"));
  out.writeObject(signedMap);
  out.close();

  // GenerateDeserialize signingmap
 public/private keyObjectInputStream pairin &= sign map
  KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSA")new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("data"));
  KeyPairsignedMap kp= =(SignedObject) kpgin.generateKeyPairreadObject();
  Signature sig = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA"in.close();

  SignedObject// signedMapUnsign =map
  new SignedObject(map, kp.getPrivateif (!signedMap.verify(kp.getPublic(), sig);
) {
  // Generate sealingthrow key & seal mapnew GeneralSecurityException("Map failed verification");
  KeyGenerator generator;}
  generatorsealedMap = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES"(SealedObject) signedMap.getObject();

  generator.init(new SecureRandom());
  Key key = generator.generateKey();
  Cipher// Unseal map
  cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
  cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPTDECRYPT_MODE, key);
  SealedObject sealedMapmap = new SealedObject(signedMapSerializableMap<String, Integer>) sealedMap.getObject(cipher);

  // SerializeInspect map
  InspectMap(map);
}

Compliant Solution (Sign then Seal)

This compliant solution correctly signs the object before sealing it. This provides a guarantee of authenticity to the object, in addition to protection from man-in-the-middle attacks.

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public static void main(String[] args)
  throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException, ClassNotFoundException {
ObjectOutputStream out = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("data"));
  out.writeObject(sealedMap);
  out.close();

  // DeserializeBuild map
  SerializableMap<String, ObjectInputStreamInteger> inmap = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("data")buildMap();

  sealedMap// =Generate (SealedObject) in.readObject();
  in.close();

  // Unsealsigning public/private key pair & sign map
  cipherKeyPairGenerator kpg = CipherKeyPairGenerator.getInstance("AESDSA");
  KeyPair kp = cipherkpg.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, keygenerateKeyPair();
  Signature signedMapsig = (SignedObject) sealedMap.getObject(cipher);
Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA");
  //SignedObject UnsignsignedMap map
= new if (!signedMap.verify(SignedObject(map, kp.getPublicgetPrivate(), sig)) {;

  // Generate throwsealing new GeneralSecurityException("Map failed verification");
  }key & seal map
  KeyGenerator generator;
  mapgenerator = (SerializableMap<String, Integer>) signedMap.getObject();

  // Inspect map
  InspectMap(map);
}

Wiki Markup
Abadi and Needham have suggested \[[Abadi 1996|AA. Bibliography#Abadi 96]\] a useful principle of secure software design

When a principal signs material that has already been encrypted, it should not be inferred that the principal knows the content of the message. On the other hand, it is proper to infer that the principal that signs a message and then encrypts it for privacy knows the content of the message.

...

KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES");
  generator.init(new SecureRandom());
  Key key = generator.generateKey();
  Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
  cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key);
  SealedObject sealedMap = new SealedObject(signedMap, cipher);

  // Serialize map
  ObjectOutputStream out = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("data"));
  out.writeObject(sealedMap);
  out.close();

  // Deserialize map
  ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("data"));
  sealedMap = (SealedObject) in.readObject();
  in.close();

  // Unseal map
  cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
  cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key);
  signedMap = (SignedObject) sealedMap.getObject(cipher);

  // Unsign map
  if (!signedMap.verify(kp.getPublic(), sig)) {
    throw new GeneralSecurityException("Map failed verification");
  }
  map = (SerializableMap<String, Integer>) signedMap.getObject();

  // Inspect map
  InspectMap(map);
}

Exceptions

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*SER02-EX0:* A reasonable use for signing a sealed object is to certify the authenticity of a sealed object passed from elsewhere. This represents a commitment _about the sealed object itself_ rather than about its content \[[Abadi 1996|AA. Bibliography#Abadi 96]\].

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[[API 2006

AA. Bibliography#API 06]]

 

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[[Gong 2003

AA. Bibliography#Gong 03]]

9.10 Sealing Objects

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<ac:structured-macro ac:name="unmigrated-wiki-markup" ac:schema-version="1" ac:macro-id="5c242abc4c160bc1-5122433b-4e504531-8c1d9447-efa5a623fddfb7621f1fc4f4"><ac:plain-text-body><![CDATA[

[[Harold 1999

AA. Bibliography#Harold 99]]

Chapter 11: Object Serialization, Sealed Objects

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[[Neward 2004

AA. Bibliography#Neward 04]]

Item 64: Use SignedObject to provide integrity of Serialized objects

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Item 65: Use SealedObject to provide confidentiality of Serializable objects

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[[Steel 2005

AA. Bibliography#Steel 05]]

Chapter 10: Securing the Business Tier, Obfuscated Transfer Object

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