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Serialization and deserialization features can be exploited to bypass security manager checks. A serializable class may contain security manager checks in its constructors for various reasons, including preventing untrusted code from modifying the internal state of the class. Such security manager checks must be replicated anywhere wherever a class instance can be constructed. For example, if a class enables a caller to retrieve sensitive internal state contingent upon security checks, those checks must be replicated during deserialization . This ensures to ensure that an attacker cannot extract sensitive information by deserializing the object.

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Despite the security manager checks, the data in this example is not sensitive. Serializing unencrypted , sensitive data violates rule SER03-J. Do not serialize unencrypted sensitive data.

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Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
public final class Hometown implements Serializable {
  // ... allAll methods the same except the following:

  // writeObject() correctly enforces checks during serialization
  private void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream out) throws IOException {
    performSecurityManagerCheck();
    out.writeObject(town);
  }

  // readObject() correctly enforces checks during deserialization
  private void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException {
    in.defaultReadObject();
    // If the deserialized name does not match the default value normally
    // created at construction time, duplicate the checks
    if (!UNKNOWN.equals(town)) {
      performSecurityManagerCheck();
      validateInput(town);
    }
  }
}

Refer to rule SEC04-J. Protect sensitive operations with security manager checks for information about implementing the performSecurityManagerCheck() method, which is important for protection against finalizer attacks.

The ObjectInputStream.defaultReadObject() fills the object's fields with data from the input stream. Because each field is deserialized recursively, it is possible for the this reference to escape from control of the deserialization routines. This can happen if a referenced object publishes the this reference in its constructors or field initializers . See rule (see TSM01-J. Do not let the this reference escape during object construction for more information). To be compliant, recursively deserialized subobjects must not publish the this object reference.

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Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

SER04-J

highHigh

probableProbable

highHigh

P6

L2

Related Guidelines

Secure Coding Guidelines for the Java Programming LanguageSE, Version 35.0

Guideline 58-4 / SERIAL-4. : Duplicate the SecurityManager checks enforced in a class during serialization and deserialization

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The java.security package exists on Android for compatibility purposes only, and it should not be used.

Bibliography

[Long 2005]

Section 2.4, "Serialization"

 

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