Security manager checks may be allowed to get bypassed depending on the immediate caller's class loader. When an API (See see table below) is invoked on a class object, a comparison is run between the immediate caller's class loader and that of the class object. The class object is the object on which an API is invoked. For instance, in the presence of a security manager, the getSystemClassLoader
and getParent
methods succeed only if the caller's class loader is the delegation ancestor of the current class loader or if the caller's class loader is the same as the current one or if the code in the current execution context has the RunTimePermission
, namely "getClassLoader
".
APIs capable of bypassing SecurityManager's checks |
---|
java.lang.Class.newInstance |
java.lang.Class.getClassLoader |
java.lang.Class.getClasses |
java.lang.Class.getField(s) |
java.lang.Class.getMethod(s) |
java.lang.Class.getConstructor(s) |
java.lang.Class.getDeclaredClasses |
java.lang.Class.getDeclaredField(s) |
java.lang.Class.getDeclaredMethod(s) |
java.lang.Class.getDeclaredConstructor(s) |
java.lang.ClassLoader.getParent |
java.lang.ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader |
java.lang.Thread.getContextClassLoader |
...
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
import java.util.Date; public class exceptionExceptionExample { public static void untrustedCode() { Date now = new Date(); Class<?> dateClass = now.getClass(); createInstance(dateClass); } public static void createInstance(Class<?> dateClass) { try { // Create another Date object using the Date Class Object o = dateClass.newInstance(); if (o instanceof Date) { Date d = (Date)o; System.out.println("The time is: " + d.toString()); } } catch (InstantiationException ie) { System.out.println(ie.toString()); } catch (IllegalAccessException lae) { System.out.println(iae.toString()); } } } |
Compliant Solution
Do not accept Class
, ClassLoader
or Thread
instances from untrusted code. If inevitable, safely acquire these instances by ensuring they come from trusted sources. Additionally, make sure to discard tainted inputs from untrusted code. Likewise, objects returned by the affected methods should not be propagated back to the untrusted code.
Risk Assessment
TODOBypassing Securitymanager
checks may seriouslu compromise the security of a Java application.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
SEC02-J | ?? medium ?? | probable | ?? high | P?? | L?? |
Automated Detection
...
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
References
Wiki Markup |
---|
\[[Gong 03|AA. Java References#Gong 03]\] |
4.3.2 Class Loader Delegation |
Sun Secure Coding Guidelines
Hierarchy
\[[SCG 07|AA. Java References#SCG 07]\] Guideline 6-2 Safely invoke standard APIs that bypass SecurityManager checks depending on the immediate caller's class loader |