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A Serializable class can overload the Serializable.readObject() method, which is called when an object of that class is being deserialized.   This method (as well  Both this method and the method readResolve()) must  must treat the serialized data as potentially malicious and must refrain from performing potentially dangerous operations, unless the programmer has expressly indicated , for the particular deserialization at hand, that the class may should be permitted to perform potentially dangerous operations. 

This rule complements rule SER12-J. Prevent deserialization of untrusted classes.  Whereas SER12-J requires the programmer to validate data before deserializing it ( to ensure the absence of classes that might perform dangerous operations when deserialized )by validating data before deserializing it, SER13-J requires that all serializable classes refrain, by default, from performing dangerous operations during deserialization.  SER12-J and SER13-J both guard against the same class of deserialization vulnerabilities.  Theoretically, a given system is secure against this class of vulnerabilities if either (1) all deployed code on that system follows SER12-J or (2) all deployed code on that system follows SER13-J.  However, since there is a lot of because much existing code that violates these rules, the CERT Coding Standard takes the "belt and suspenders" approach of requiring and requires compliant code to follow both rules.

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The class OpenedFile in the following non-compliant code example opens a file during deserialization.  Operating systems typically impose a limit on the number of open file handles per process, and ; this limit is typically is not very large (e.g., 1024).  Consequently, deserializing a list of OpenedFile objects can exhaust consume all file handles available to the process 's available file handles and consequently cause the program to malfunction.

Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc
languagejava
import java.io.*;

class OpenedFile implements Serializable {
  public String filename;
  public BufferedReader reader;

  public OpenedFile(String _filename) {
    filename = _filename;
    init();
  }
  private void init() {
    try {
      reader = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(filename));
    } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { }
  }
    
  private void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream out) throws IOException {
    out.writeUTF(filename);
  }

  private void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
    filename = in.readUTF();
    init();
  }
} 

Compliant Solution

In the below this compliant solution, the readObject() method throws an exception unless the potentially dangerous class is whitelisted.

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