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Security checks based on untrusted sources can be bypassed. The untrusted object or parameter should be defensively copied before the security check is performed. The copy operation must be a deep copy; the implementation of the clone() method may produce a shallow copy, which can still be compromised. In addition, the implementation of the clone() method can be provided by the attacker. See rules VOID MET08-J. Do not use the clone method to copy untrusted method parameters and OBJ14-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components for more information.

Noncompliant Code Example (JDK 5.0 java.io.File)

This noncompliant code example describes a security vulnerability from the JDK 5.0 java.io package. In this release, java.io.File was non-final, allowing an attacker to supply an untrusted parameter constructed by extending the legitimate java.io.File class. In this manner, the getPath() method can be overridden so that the security check passes the first time it is called but the value changes the second time to refer to a sensitive file such as /etc/passwd. This is a form of time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability.

public RandomAccessFile openFile(final java.io.File f) {
  askUserPermission(f.getPath());
  // ...
  return (RandomAccessFile)AccessController.doPrivileged() {
    public Object run() {
      return new RandomAccessFile(f.getPath());
    }
  }
}

The attacker can could extend java.io.File as follows:

public class BadFile extends java.io.File {
  private int count;
  public String getPath() {
    return (++count == 1) ? "/tmp/foo" : "/etc/passwd";
  }
}

Compliant Solution (final)

This vulnerability could have been mitigated by making java.io.File final.

Compliant Solution (copy)

This compliant solution ensures that the java.io.File object can be trusted. First, its reference is declared to be final preventing an attacker from modifying the reference to substitute a different object. Second, the , despite not being final. The solution creates a new java.io.File object using the standard java.io.File constructor. This ensures that any methods invoked on the File object are the standard library methods rather than overriding methods potentially provided by the attacker.

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Note that using the clone() method instead of the openFile() method would copy the attacker's class, which is not desirable. (Refer to rule VOID MET08OBJ14-J. Do not use the clone method to copy untrusted method parametersDefensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal component.)

Risk Assessment

Basing security checks on untrusted sources can result in the check being bypassed.

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