Most methods lack security manager checks because they do not provide access to sensitive parts of the system, such as the file system. Most methods that do provide security manager checks verify that every class and method in the call stack is authorized before they proceed. This security model allows restricted programs, such as Java applets, to have full access to the core Java library. It also prevents a sensitive method from acting on behalf of a malicious method that hides behind trusted methods in the call stack.

However, certain methods use a reduced-security check that checks only that the calling method is authorized rather than checking every method in the call stack. Any code that invokes these methods must guarantee that they cannot be invoked on behalf of untrusted code. These methods are listed in the following table.

Because the java.lang.reflect.Field.setAccessible() and getAccessible() methods are used to instruct the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to override the language access checks, they perform standard (and more restrictive) security manager checks and consequently lack the vulnerability described by this guideline. Nevertheless, these methods should also be used with extreme caution. The remaining set* and get* field reflection methods perform only the language access checks and are consequently vulnerable.

Class Loaders

Class loaders allow a Java application to be dynamically extended at runtime by loading additional classes. For each class that is loaded, the JVM tracks the class loader that was used to load loaders's allow an application to dynamically extend a Java application at runtime by loading classes.  For each class it loads, the JVM keeps track of which class loader loaded the class. When a loaded class first refers to another class, the virtual machine requests that the referenced class from be loaded by the same class loader that originally loaded loader that was used to load the referencing class.  Classes loaded by different class  loaders are in different name-spaces and cannot gain access to each other unless the application explicitly allows it. By default, classes can only see other classes that were loaded by the same class loader. Java's class loader architecture to control controls interaction between code loaded from different sources by using allowing the use of different class loaders to load code from different sources.  This . This separation of class loaders is fundamental to the separation of code: it prevents malicious code from gaining access to and subverting trusted code.                                                     

A class loader that loads untrusted code should not interact with trusted code that invokes any of the methods from the following table:

Several methods that are charged with loading classes delegate their work to the class loader of the class of the method that called them. The security checks associated with loading classes are performed by class loaders. Consequently, any method that invokes one of these class loading methods must guarantee that these methods cannot act on behalf of untrusted code. These methods are listed in the following table.

With the exception of the loadLibrary() and load() methods, the tabulated methods do not perform any security manager checks; they delegate security checks to the appropriate class loader. 

In practice, The invocation of these methods is allowed by the trusted code's class loader , however, frequently allows these methods to be invoked, whereas the untrusted code's class loader may lack these privileges. Failure to comply with this guideline may result in compromise of the trust boundary between the trusted and untrusted code. When However, when the untrusted code's class loader delegates to the trusted code's class loader, the untrusted code has gains visibility to the trusted code according to the declared visibility of the trusted code. In the absence of such a delegation relationship, the class loaders would ensure namespace separation; consequently, the untrusted code would be unable to observe members or to invoke methods belonging to the trusted code. Such a

The class loader delegation model is imperative fundamental to many Java implementations and frameworks so the best advice is to avoid exposing these methods . Avoid exposing the methods listed in the preceding tables to untrusted code. Consider, for example, an attack scenario where untrusted code is attempting to load a privileged class. Its If its class loader lacks permission to load the requested privileged class on its own, but the class loader is permitted to delegate the class loading to the a trusted class's class loader. This can result in privilege escalation, because the untrusted code's class loader may lack permission to load the requested privileged class. Further, privilege escalation can occur. Furthermore, if the trusted code accepts tainted inputs, the trusted code's class loader could be persuaded to load additional privileged — or even , malicious — classes on behalf of the untrusted code.

Classes that have the same defining class loader will exist in the same namespace, but may they can have different privileges , depending on the security policy. Security vulnerabilities can also arise when trusted privileged code coexists with untrusted unprivileged code (or less privileged code) that was loaded by the same defining class loader. In this case, the untrusted less privileged code can freely access members of the trusted privileged code according to their the privileged code's declared accessibility. When the trusted privileged code uses any of the tabulated APIs, no it bypasses security manager checks are carried out (with the exception of loadLibrary and load).A security sensitive class loader typically employs the security manager to enforce a security policy. For example, the applet class loader ensures that an applet cannot directly invoke methods of classes present in the com.sun.* package. A security manager check ensures that specific actions are allowed or denied depending on the privileges of the caller methods on the call stack (the privileges are associated with the code source that encompasses the class). A security manager complements the security offered by the class loader architecture and does not supersede it. Consequently, APIs that perform security manager checks may still violate this guideline at the class loader level when exposed to untrusted callers.

With the exception of loadLibrary() and load() methods, the tabulated methods do not perform any security manager checks. Because the loadLibrary and load APIs are typically used from within a doPrivileged block, unprivileged callers can directly invoke them without requiring any special permissions. That means that the security manager checks are curtailed at the immediate caller and the entire call stack is not examined, resulting in no enhanced security. Accepting tainted inputs from untrusted code and allowing them to be used by these APIs may also expose vulnerabilities.

and load()).

This guideline is similar to SEC03-J. Do not load trusted classes after allowing untrusted code to load arbitrary classesThis guideline is an instance of SEC04-J. Protect sensitive operations with security manager checks. Many examples also violate SEC00-J. Do not allow privileged blocks to leak sensitive information across a trust boundary.

Noncompliant Code Example

In this noncompliant code example, a call to System.loadLibrary() is embedded in a doPrivileged block. This is insecure because a library can be loaded on behalf of untrusted code. In essence, the untrusted code's class loader may be able to indirectly load a library even though it lacks sufficient permissions. After loading the library, untrusted code can call native methods on it if the methods are accessible. This is possible because the doPrivileged block stops security manager checks being applied to callers further up the execution chain.

public void load(String libName) {
  AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction() {
    public Object run() { 
      System.loadLibrary(libName);
      return null; 
    }
  });
}

This code is insecure because it could load a library on behalf of untrusted code. In essence, the untrusted code's class loader may be able to use this code to load a library even though it lacks sufficient permissions to do so directly. After loading the library, the untrusted code can call native methods from the library, if those methods are accessible, because the doPrivileged block stops any security manager checks from being applied to callers further up the execution stack.

Nonnative library code can also be susceptible to related security flaws. Loading a nonnative safe Suppose there exists a library that contains a vulnerability that is not directly exposed, perhaps because it lies in an unused method. Loading this library may not directly expose a vulnerability, but after loading . However, an attacker could then load an additional unsafe library, an attacker can easily exploit the safe library if it contains other vulnerabilitieslibrary that exploits the first library's vulnerability. Moreover, nonnative libraries often use doPrivileged blocks, making them lucrative attractive targets.

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution reduces hard codes the name of the library to prevent the possibility of tainted values. It also reduces the accessibility of method the load() method from public to private. Consequently, untrusted callers are prohibited from loading the awt library. Also, the name of the library is hard-coded to reject the possibility of tainted values. 

private void load() {
  AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction() {
    public Object run() { 
      System.loadLibrary("awt");
      return null; 
    }
  });
}

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example returns an instance of java.sql.Connection from trusted to untrusted code.

public Connection getConnection(String url, String username, String password) {
  // ...
  return DriverManager.getConnection(url, username, password);
}

Untrusted code that lacks the permissions required to create a SQL connection can bypass these restrictions by using the acquired instance directly. The getConnection() method is unsafe because it uses the url argument to indicate a class to be loaded; this class serves as the database driver.

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution prevents malicious users from supplying their own URL to the database connection, thereby limiting their ability to load untrusted drivers.

private String url = // Hardwired value

public Connection getConnection(String username, String password) {
  // ...
  return DriverManager.getConnection(this.url, username, password);
}

Noncompliant Code Example (CERT Vulnerability 636312)

CERT Vulnerability Note VU#636312 describes a vulnerability in Java 1.7.0 update 6 that was widely exploited in August 2012. The exploit actually used two vulnerabilities; the other one is described in SEC05-J. Do not use reflection to increase accessibility of classes, methods, or fields.)

The exploit runs as a Java applet. The applet class loader ensures that an applet cannot directly invoke methods of classes present in the com.sun.* package. A normal security manager check ensures that specific actions are allowed or denied depending on the privileges of all of the caller methods on the call stack (the privileges are associated with the code source that encompasses the class).

The first goal of the exploit code was to access the private sun.awt.SunToolkit class. However, invoking class.forName() directly on the name of this class would cause a SecurityException to be thrown. Consequently, the exploit code used the following method to access any class, bypassing the security manager:A method that passes untrusted inputs to the Class.forName() method might permit an attacker to access classes with escalated privileges. The single argument Class.forName() method is another API method that uses its immediate caller's class loader to load a requested class. Untrusted code can misuse this API to indirectly manufacture classes that have the same privileges as those of the attacker's immediate caller.

public Class loadClass(String className) {
  // className may be the name of a privileged or even a malicious class
  return Class.forName(className);
}

Compliant Solution (Hardcoded Name)

This compliant solution hard-codes the class's name.

public Class loadClass() {
  return Class.forName("Foo");
}

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example returns an instance of java.sql.Connection from trusted to untrusted code. Untrusted code that lacks the permissions required to create a SQL connection can bypass these restrictions by using the acquired instance directly.

public Connection getConnection(String url, String username, String password) {
  // ...
  return DriverManager.getConnection(url, username, password);
}

Compliant Solution

The getConnection() method is unsafe because it uses the url to indicate a class to be loaded; this class serves as the database driver. This compliant solution prevents a malicious user from supplying their own URL to the database connection; thereby limiting their ability to load untrusted drivers.

private String url = // hardwired value

public Connection getConnection(String username, String password) {
  // ...
  return DriverManager.getConnection(this.url, username, password);
}

Applicability

private Class GetClass(String paramString)
    throws Throwable
{
    Object arrayOfObject[] = new Object[1];
    arrayOfObject[0] = paramString;
    Expression localExpression = new Expression(Class.class, "forName", arrayOfObject);
    localExpression.execute();
    return (Class)localExpression.getValue();
}

The java.beans.Expression.execute() method delegates its work to the following method:

private Object invokeInternal() throws Exception {
  Object target = getTarget();
  String methodName = getMethodName();

  if (target == null || methodName == null) {
    throw new NullPointerException(
      (target == null ? "target" : "methodName") + 
       " should not be null");
  }

  Object[] arguments = getArguments();
  if (arguments == null) {
    arguments = emptyArray;
  }
  // Class.forName() won't load classes outside
  // of core from a class inside core, so it
  // is handled as a special case.
  if (target == Class.class && methodName.equals("forName")) {
    return ClassFinder.resolveClass((String)arguments[0], this.loader);
  }

// ...

The com.sun.beans.finder.ClassFinder.resolveClass() method delegates its work to the findClass() method:

public static Class<?> findClass(String name) 
   throws ClassNotFoundException {
  try {
    ClassLoader loader = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
    if (loader == null) {
      loader = ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader();
    }
    if (loader != null) {
      return Class.forName(name, false, loader);
    }
  } catch (ClassNotFoundException exception) {
    // Use current class loader instead
  } catch (SecurityException exception) {
    // Use current class loader instead
  }
  return Class.forName(name);
}

Although this method is called in the context of an applet, it uses Class.forName() to obtain the requested class. Class.forName() delegates the search to the calling method's class loader. In this case, the calling class (com.sun.beans.finder.ClassFinder) is part of core Java, so the trusted class loader is used in place of the more restrictive applet class loader, and the trusted class loader loads the class, unaware that it is acting on behalf of malicious code.

Compliant Solution (CVE-2012-4681)

Oracle mitigated this vulnerability in Java 1.7.0 update 7 by patching the com.sun.beans.finder.ClassFinder.findClass() method. The checkPackageAccess() method checks the entire call stack to ensure that Class.forName(), in this instance only, fetches classes only on behalf of trusted methods.

public static Class<?> findClass(String name) 
   throws ClassNotFoundException {
  checkPackageAccess(name);
  try {
    ClassLoader loader = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
    if (loader == null) {
      // Can be null in IE (see 6204697)
      loader = ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader();
    }
    if (loader != null) {
      return Class.forName(name, false, loader);
    }

  } catch (ClassNotFoundException exception) {
    // Use current class loader instead
  } catch (SecurityException exception) {
    // Use current class loader instead
  }
  return Class.forName(name);
}

Noncompliant Code Example (CVE-2013-0422)

Java 1.7.0 update 10 was widely exploited in January 2013 because of several vulnerabilities. One vulnerability in the MBeanInstantiator class granted unprivileged code the ability to access any class regardless of the current security policy or accessibility rules. The MBeanInstantiator.findClass() method could be invoked with any string and would attempt to return the Class object named after the string. This method delegated its work to the loadClass() method, whose source code is shown here:

/**
 * Load a class with the specified loader, or with this object
 * class loader if the specified loader is null.
 **/
static Class<?> loadClass(String className, ClassLoader loader)
    throws ReflectionException {

    Class<?> theClass;
    if (className == null) {
        throw new RuntimeOperationsException(new
            IllegalArgumentException("The class name cannot be null"),
                          "Exception occurred during object instantiation");
    }
    try {
        if (loader == null)
            loader = MBeanInstantiator.class.getClassLoader();
        if (loader != null) {
            theClass = Class.forName(className, false, loader);
        } else {
            theClass = Class.forName(className);
        }
    } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
        throw new ReflectionException(e,
        "The MBean class could not be loaded");
    }
    return theClass;
}

This method delegates the task of dynamically loading the specified class to the Class.forName() method, which delegates the work to its calling method's class loader. Because the calling method is MBeanInstantiator.loadClass(), the core class loader is used, which provides no security checks.

Compliant Solution (CVE-2013-0422)

Oracle mitigated this vulnerability in Java 1.7.0 update 11 by adding an access check to the MBeanInstantiator.loadClass() method. This access check ensures that the caller is permitted to access the class being sought:

// ...
    if (className == null) {
        throw new RuntimeOperationsException(new
            IllegalArgumentException("The class name cannot be null"),
                          "Exception occurred during object instantiation");
    }
    ReflectUtil.checkPackageAccess(className);
    try {
        if (loader == null)
// ...

Applicability

Allowing untrusted code to invoke methods with reduced-security checks can result in privilege escalation. Likewise, allowing untrusted code to perform Allowing untrusted code to carry out actions using the immediate caller's class loader may allow the untrusted code to execute with the same privileges as the immediate caller.

It is permissible to use APIs that do not use Methods that avoid using the immediate caller's class loader instance fall outside the scope of this guideline. For example, the three-argument java.lang.Class.forName() method requires an explicit argument that specifies the class loader instance to use. Do not use the immediate caller's class loader as the third argument if instances must be returned to untrusted code.

public static Class forName(String name, boolean initialize,
  ClassLoader loader) /* explicitly specify the classClassLoader loader) to use */ throws ClassNotFoundException

Risk Assessment

Related Guidelines

Bibliography

Do not use the immediate caller's class loader as the third argument when instances must be returned to untrusted code.

Bibliography

 [API 2011] Class ClassLoader

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