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Copying data to a buffer that is not large enough to hold that data results in a buffer overflow. While not limited to null-terminated byte strings (NTBS), buffer overflows often occur when manipulating NTBS dataBuffer overflows occur frequently when manipulating strings [Seacord 2013b]. To prevent such errors, limit either limit copies either through truncation or, preferably, ensure that the destination is of sufficient size to hold the character data to be copied and the null-termination character. (See recommendation STR03-C. Do not inadvertently truncate a null-terminated byte string.)

Noncompliant Code Example (Off-by-One Error)

When strings live on the heap, this rule is a specific instance of MEM35-C. Allocate sufficient memory for an object. Because strings are represented as arrays of characters, this rule is related to both ARR30-C. Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts and ARR38-C. Guarantee that library functions do not form invalid pointers.

Noncompliant Code Example (Off-by-One Error)

This noncompliant code example demonstrates an off-by-one error [Dowd 2006]. The loop copies data from src to dest. However, because the loop does not account for the null-termination character, it may be incorrectly written 1 byte past the end of dest Wiki MarkupThis noncompliant code example demonstrates what is commonly referred to as an _off-by-one_ error \[[Dowd 2006|AA. Bibliography#Dowd 06]\]. The loop copies data from {{src}} to {{dest}}. However, the null terminator may incorrectly be written one byte past the end of {{dest}} because the loop does not account for the null-termination character that must be appended to {{dest}}.

char dest[ARRAY_SIZE];
char src[ARRAY_SIZE];
size_t i;
/* ... */
for (i=#include <stddef.h>
 
void copy(size_t n, char src[n], char dest[n]) {
   size_t i;
 
   for (i = 0; src[i] && (i < sizeof(destn)); i++i) {
     dest[i] = src[i];
   }
   dest[i] = '\0';
/* ... */}

Compliant Solution (Off-by-One Error)

To correct In this examplecompliant solution, the loop termination condition must be is modified to account for the null-termination character that is appended to dest.:

#include <stddef.h>
 
void copy(size_t n, char destsrc[ARRAY_SIZE];
n], char srcdest[ARRAY_SIZE];
n]) {
   size_t i;
/* ... */
 
   for (i = 0; src[i] && (i < n sizeof(dest)- 1); i++i) {
     dest[i] = src[i];
   }
   dest[i] = '\0';
/* ... */}

Noncompliant Code Example (

...

gets(

...

))

Arguments read from the command line are stored in process memory. The function mainThe gets(), called at program startup, is typically declared as follows when the program accepts command-line arguments:

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { /* ... */ }

Command-line arguments are passed to {{main()}} as pointers to null-terminated byte strings in the array members {{argv\[0\]}} through {{argv\[argc-1\]}}. If the value of {{argc}} is greater than zero, the string pointed to by {{argv\[0\]}} is, by convention, the program name. If the value of {{argc}} is greater than one, the strings referenced by {{argv\[1\]}} through {{argv\[argc-1\]}} are the actual program arguments.

Vulnerabilities can occur when inadequate space is allocated to copy a command-line argument or other program input. In this noncompliant code example, the contents of {{argv\[0\]}} can be manipulated by an attacker to cause a buffer overflow:

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  /* ... */
  char prog_name[128];
  strcpy(prog_name, argv[0]);
  /* ... */
}

Compliant Solution (argv) (strcpy())

The {{strlen()}} function can be used to determine the length of the strings referenced by {{argv\[0\]}} through {{argv\[argc-1\]}} so that adequate memory can be dynamically allocated. Note that care must be taken to avoid assuming that {{argv\[0\]}} is non-null.

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  /* Be prepared for argv[0] to be null */
  const char* const name = argv[0] ? argv[0] : "";
  char *prog_name = (char *)malloc(strlen(name) + 1);
  if (prog_name != NULL) {
    strcpy(prog_name, name);
  }
  else {
    /* Failed to allocate memory - recover */
  }
  /* ... */
}

Remember to add a byte to accommodate the null-terminated byte string.

Compliant Solution (argv) (strcpy_s())

 function, which was deprecated in the C99 Technical Corrigendum 3 and removed from C11, is inherently unsafe and should never be used because it provides no way to control how much data is read into a buffer from stdin. This noncompliant code example assumes that gets() will not read more than BUFFER_SIZE - 1 characters from stdin. This is an invalid assumption, and the resulting operation can result in a buffer overflow.

The gets() function reads characters from the stdin into a destination array until end-of-file is encountered or a newline character is read. Any newline character is discarded, and a null character is written immediately after the last character read into the array.

#include <stdio.h>
 
#define BUFFER_SIZE 1024

void func(void) {
  char buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
  if (gets(buf) == NULL) {
    /* Handle error */
  }
}

See also MSC24-C. Do not use deprecated or obsolescent functions.

Compliant Solution (fgets())

The fgets() function reads, at most, one less than the specified number of characters from a stream into an array. This solution is compliant because the number of characters copied from stdin to buf cannot exceed the allocated memory:

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
 
enum { BUFFERSIZE = 32 };
 
void func(void) {
  char buf[BUFFERSIZE];
  int ch;

  if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)) {
    /* fgets() succeeded; scan for newline character */
    char *p = strchr(buf, '\n');
    if (p) {
      *p = '\0';
    } else {
      /* Newline not found; flush stdin to end of line */
      while ((ch = getchar()) != '\n' && ch != EOF)
        ;
      if (ch == EOF && !feof(stdin) && !ferror(stdin)) {
          /* Character resembles EOF; handle error */ 
      }
    }
  } else {
    /* fgets() failed; handle error */
  }
}

The fgets() function is not a strict replacement for the gets() function because fgets() retains the newline character (if read) and may also return a partial line. It is possible to use fgets() to safely process input lines too long to store in the destination array, but this is not recommended for performance reasons. Consider using one of the following compliant solutions when replacing gets().

Compliant Solution (gets_s())

The gets_s() function reads, at most, one less than the number of characters specified from the stream pointed to by stdin into an array.

The C Standard, Annex K 3.5.4.1 paragraph 4 [ISO/IEC 9899:2024], states

No additional characters are read after a new-line character (which is discarded) or after end-of-file. The discarded new-line character does not count towards number of characters read. A null character is written immediately after the last character read into the array.

If end-of-file is encountered and no characters have been read into the destination array, or if a read error occurs during the operation, then the first character in the destination array is set to the null character and the other elements of the array take unspecified values: Wiki MarkupThe {{strcpy_s()}} function provides additional safeguards, including accepting the size of the destination buffer as an additional argument. (See recommendation [STR07-C. Use the bounds-checking interfaces for remediation of existing string manipulation code].) Do not assume that {{argv\[0\]}} is non-null.

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  /* Be prepared for argv[0] to be null */
  const char* const name = argv[0] ? argv[0] : "";

  char * prog_name;
  size_t prog_size;

  prog_size = strlen(name) + 1;
  prog_name = (char *)malloc(prog_size);

  if (prog_name != NULL) {
    if (strcpy_s(prog_name, prog_size, name)) {
      /* Handle strcpy_s() error */
    }
  }
  else {

    /* Failed to allocate memory - recover */
  }
  /* ... */
}

The strcpy_s() function can be used to copy data to or from dynamically allocated memory or a statically allocated array. If insufficient space is available strcpy_s() returns an error.

Compliant Solution (argv) (memcpy())

The C standard {{memcpy()}} function provide a similar capability to {{strcpy_s()}}, but is universally available. Note that care must be taken to avoid assuming that {{argv\[0\]}} is non-null. Note also that {{memcpy}} must not be called with a null pointer even when the second (size) argument is zero.

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  /* Be prepared for argv[0] to be null */
  const char* const name = argv[0] ? argv[0] : "";

  char *prog_name;
  size_t prog_size;

  prog_size = strlen(name) + 1;
  prog_name = (char *)malloc(prog_size);

  if (prog_name != NULL) {
    memcpy(prog_name, name, prog_size);
  }
  else {
    /* Failed to allocate memory - recover */
  }
  /* ... */
}

The memcpy() function differs from strcpy_s() in that it never returns an error. The memcpy() function returns a pointer to the destination string (that is, its first argument). However, memcpy() does not validate that the destination pointer has enough space for the memory being copied and cannot be used if the source and destination strings overlap.

Compliant Solution (argv)

If an argument is not going to be modified or concatenated, there is no reason to make a copy of the string. Not copying a string is the best way to prevent a buffer overflow, and is also the most efficient solution. Note that care must be taken to avoid assuming that {{argv\[0\]}} is non-null.

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  /* Be prepared for argv[0] to be null */
  const char *prog_name = argv[0] ? argv[0] : "";
  size_t prog_size;
  /* ... */
}

Noncompliant Code Example (getenv())

The getenv() function searches an environment list, provided by the host environment, for a string that matches the string pointed to by name. The set of environment names and the method for altering the environment list are implementation-defined. Environment variables can be arbitrarily large, and copying them into fixed-length arrays without first determining the size and allocating adequate storage can result in a buffer overflow.

/* ... */
char buff[256];
char *editor = getenv("EDITOR");
if (editor == NULL) {
  /* EDITOR environment variable not set */
} else {
  strcpy(buff, editor);
}
/* ... */

Compliant Solution (getenv())

Environmental variables are loaded into process memory when the program is loaded. As a result, the length of these null-terminated byte strings can be determined by calling the strlen() function, and the resulting length can be used to allocate adequate dynamic memory:

/* ... */
char *buff;
char *editor = getenv("EDITOR");
if (editor == NULL) {
  /* EDITOR environment variable not set */
} else {
  size_t len = strlen(editor)+1;
  buff = (char *)malloc(len);
  if (buff == NULL) {
    /* Handle malloc() error */
  }
  memcpy(buff, editor, len);
}
/* ... */

Noncompliant Code Example (sprintf())

In this example, name refers to an external string; it could have originated from user input, or from the file system, or from the network. The program constructs a filename from the string in preparation for opening the file.

char* name; /* initialized externally */
char filename[128];
sprintf(filename, "%s.txt", name);
/* open filename * /

However, because the sprintf() function makes no guarantees regarding the length of the string generated, a sufficiently-long string in name could generate a buffer overflow.

Compliant Solution (sprintf())

The buffer overflow can be prevented by providing a precision length to the %s specifier. The value 123 ensures that filename can contain the first 123 characters of name, the ".txt" extension, and the null terminator.

char* name; /* initialized externally */
char filename[128];
sprintf(filename, "%.123s.txt", name);
/* open filename * /

Compliant Solution (snprintf())

A more general solution is to use the snprintf() function.

char* name; /* initialized externally */
char filename[128];
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.txt", name);
/* open filename * /

Risk Assessment

Copying NTBS data to a buffer that is too small to hold that data results in a buffer overflow. Attackers can exploit this condition to execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process.

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#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
#include <stdio.h>
 
enum { BUFFERSIZE = 32 };
 
void func(void) {
  char buf[BUFFERSIZE];

  if (gets_s(buf, sizeof(buf)) == NULL) {
    /* Handle error */
  }
}

Compliant Solution (getline(), POSIX)

The getline() function is similar to the fgets() function but can dynamically allocate memory for the input buffer. If passed a null pointer, getline() dynamically allocates a buffer of sufficient size to hold the input. If passed a pointer to dynamically allocated storage that is too small to hold the contents of the string, the getline() function resizes the buffer, using realloc(), rather than truncating the input. If successful, the getline() function returns the number of characters read, which can be used to determine if the input has any null characters before the newline. The getline() function works only with dynamically allocated buffers. Allocated memory must be explicitly deallocated by the caller to avoid memory leaks. (See MEM31-C. Free dynamically allocated memory when no longer needed.)

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
 
void func(void) {
  int ch;
  size_t buffer_size = 32;
  char *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
 
  if (!buffer) {
    /* Handle error */
    return;
  }

  if ((ssize_t size = getline(&buffer, &buffer_size, stdin))
        == -1) {
    /* Handle error */
  } else {
    char *p = strchr(buffer, '\n');
    if (p) {
      *p = '\0';
    } else {
      /* Newline not found; flush stdin to end of line */
      while ((ch = getchar()) != '\n' && ch != EOF)
	    ;
	  if (ch == EOF && !feof(stdin) && !ferror(stdin)) {
         /* Character resembles EOF; handle error */
      }
    }
  }
  free (buffer);
}

Note that the getline() function uses an in-band error indicator, in violation of ERR02-C. Avoid in-band error indicators.

Noncompliant Code Example (getchar())

Reading one character at a time provides more flexibility in controlling behavior, though with additional performance overhead. This noncompliant code example uses the getchar() function to read one character at a time from stdin instead of reading the entire line at once. The stdin stream is read until end-of-file is encountered or a newline character is read. Any newline character is discarded, and a null character is written immediately after the last character read into the array. Similar to the noncompliant code example that invokes gets(), there are no guarantees that this code will not result in a buffer overflow.

#include <stdio.h>
 
enum { BUFFERSIZE = 32 };
 
void func(void) {
  char buf[BUFFERSIZE];
  char *p;
  int ch;
  p = buf;
  while ((ch = getchar()) != '\n' && ch != EOF) {
    *p++ = (char)ch;
  }
  *p++ = 0;
  if (ch == EOF) {
      /* Handle EOF or error */
  }
}

After the loop ends, if ch == EOF, the loop has read through to the end of the stream without encountering a newline character, or a read error occurred before the loop encountered a newline character. To conform to FIO34-C. Distinguish between characters read from a file and EOF or WEOF, the error-handling code must verify that an end-of-file or error has occurred by calling feof() or ferror().

Compliant Solution (getchar())

In this compliant solution, characters are no longer copied to buf once index == BUFFERSIZE - 1, leaving room to null-terminate the string. The loop continues to read characters until the end of the line, the end of the file, or an error is encountered. When truncated == true, the input string has been truncated.

#include <stdio.h>
 
enum { BUFFERSIZE = 32 };

void func(void) {
  char buf[BUFFERSIZE];
  int ch;
  size_t index = 0;
  bool truncated = false;

  while ((ch = getchar()) != '\n' && ch != EOF) {
    if (index < sizeof(buf) - 1) {
      buf[index++] = (char)ch;
    } else {
      truncated = true;
    }
  }
  buf[index] = '\0';  /* Terminate string */
  if (ch == EOF) {
    /* Handle EOF or error */
  }
  if (truncated) {
    /* Handle truncation */
  }
}

Noncompliant Code Example (fscanf())

In this noncompliant example, the call to fscanf() can result in a write outside the character array buf:

#include <stdio.h>
 
enum { BUF_LENGTH = 1024 };
 
void get_data(void) {
  char buf[BUF_LENGTH];
  if (1 != fscanf(stdin, "%s", buf)) {
    /* Handle error */
  }

  /* Rest of function */
}

Compliant Solution (fscanf())

In this compliant solution, the call to fscanf() is constrained not to overflow buf:

#include <stdio.h>
 
enum { BUF_LENGTH = 1024 };
 
void get_data(void) {
  char buf[BUF_LENGTH];
  if (1 != fscanf(stdin, "%1023s", buf)) {
    /* Handle error */
  }

  /* Rest of function */
}

Noncompliant Code Example (argv)

In a hosted environment, arguments read from the command line are stored in process memory. The function main(), called at program startup, is typically declared as follows when the program accepts command-line arguments:

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { /* ... */ }

Command-line arguments are passed to main() as pointers to strings in the array members argv[0] through argv[argc - 1]. If the value of argc is greater than 0, the string pointed to by argv[0] is, by convention, the program name. If the value of argc is greater than 1, the strings referenced by argv[1] through argv[argc - 1] are the program arguments.

Vulnerabilities can occur when inadequate space is allocated to copy a command-line argument or other program input. In this noncompliant code example, an attacker can manipulate the contents of argv[0] to cause a buffer overflow:

#include <string.h>
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  /* Ensure argv[0] is not null */
  const char *const name = (argc && argv[0]) ? argv[0] : "";
  char prog_name[128];
  strcpy(prog_name, name);
 
  return 0;
}

Compliant Solution (argv)

The strlen() function can be used to determine the length of the strings referenced by argv[0] through argv[argc - 1] so that adequate memory can be dynamically allocated.

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  /* Ensure argv[0] is not null */
  const char *const name = (argc && argv[0]) ? argv[0] : "";
  char *prog_name = (char *)malloc(strlen(name) + 1);
  if (prog_name != NULL) {
    strcpy(prog_name, name);
  } else {
    /* Handle error */
  }
  free(prog_name);
  return 0;
}

Remember to add a byte to the destination string size to accommodate the null-termination character.

Compliant Solution (argv)

The strcpy_s() function provides additional safeguards, including accepting the size of the destination buffer as an additional argument. (See STR07-C. Use the bounds-checking interfaces for string manipulation.)

#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  /* Ensure argv[0] is not null */
  const char *const name = (argc && argv[0]) ? argv[0] : "";
  char *prog_name;
  size_t prog_size;

  prog_size = strlen(name) + 1;
  prog_name = (char *)malloc(prog_size);

  if (prog_name != NULL) {
    if (strcpy_s(prog_name, prog_size, name)) {
      /* Handle  error */
    }
  } else {
    /* Handle error */
  }
  /* ... */
  free(prog_name);
  return 0;
}

The strcpy_s() function can be used to copy data to or from dynamically allocated memory or a statically allocated array. If insufficient space is available, strcpy_s() returns an error.

Compliant Solution (argv)

If an argument will not be modified or concatenated, there is no reason to make a copy of the string. Not copying a string is the best way to prevent a buffer overflow and is also the most efficient solution. Care must be taken to avoid assuming that argv[0] is non-null.

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  /* Ensure argv[0] is not null */
  const char * const prog_name = (argc && argv[0]) ? argv[0] : "";
  /* ... */
  return 0;
}

Noncompliant Code Example (getenv())

According to the C Standard, 7.22.4.6 [ISO/IEC 9899:2011]

The getenv function searches an environment list, provided by the host environment, for a string that matches the string pointed to by name. The set of environment names and the method for altering the environment list are implementation defined.

Environment variables can be arbitrarily large, and copying them into fixed-length arrays without first determining the size and allocating adequate storage can result in a buffer overflow.

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
 
void func(void) {
  char buff[256];
  char *editor = getenv("EDITOR");
  if (editor == NULL) {
    /* EDITOR environment variable not set */
  } else {
    strcpy(buff, editor);
  }
}

Compliant Solution (getenv())

Environmental variables are loaded into process memory when the program is loaded. As a result, the length of these strings can be determined by calling the strlen() function, and the resulting length can be used to allocate adequate dynamic memory:

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
 
void func(void) {
  char *buff;
  char *editor = getenv("EDITOR");
  if (editor == NULL) {
    /* EDITOR environment variable not set */
  } else {
    size_t len = strlen(editor) + 1;
    buff = (char *)malloc(len);
    if (buff == NULL) {
      /* Handle error */
    }  
    memcpy(buff, editor, len);
    free(buff);
  }
}

Noncompliant Code Example (sprintf())

In this noncompliant code example, name refers to an external string; it could have originated from user input, the file system, or the network. The program constructs a file name from the string in preparation for opening the file.

#include <stdio.h>
 
void func(const char *name) {
  char filename[128];
  sprintf(filename, "%s.txt", name);
}

Because the sprintf() function makes no guarantees regarding the length of the generated string, a sufficiently long string in name could generate a buffer overflow.

Compliant Solution (sprintf())

The buffer overflow in the preceding noncompliant example can be prevented by adding a precision to the %s conversion specification. If the precision is specified, no more than that many bytes are written. The precision 123 in this compliant solution ensures that filename can contain the first 123 characters of name, the .txt extension, and the null terminator.

#include <stdio.h>
 
void func(const char *name) {
  char filename[128];
  sprintf(filename, "%.123s.txt", name);
}

You can also use * to indicate that the precision should be provided as a variadic argument:

#include <stdio.h>
 
void func(const char *name) {
  char filename[128];
  sprintf(filename, "%.*s.txt", sizeof(filename) - 5, name);
}

Compliant Solution (snprintf())

A more general solution is to use the snprintf() function, which also truncates name if it will not fit in the filename.

#include <stdio.h>
 
void func(const char *name) {
  char filename[128];
  int result = snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.txt", name);
  if (result != strlen(filename) {
    /* truncation occurred */
  }
}

Risk Assessment

Copying string data to a buffer that is too small to hold that data results in a buffer overflow. Attackers can exploit this condition to execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process.

Automated Detection

Array access out of bounds, Buffer overflow from incorrect string format specifier, Destination buffer overflow in string manipulation, Invalid use of standard library string routine, Missing null in string array, Pointer access out of bounds, Tainted NULL or non-null-terminated string, Use of dangerous standard function 

Related Vulnerabilities

CVE-2009-1252 results from a violation of this rule. The Network Time Protocol daemon (NTPd), before versions 4.2.4p7 and 4.2.5p74, contained calls to sprintf that allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code by overflowing a character array [xorl 2009].

CVE-2009-0587 results from a violation of this rule. Before version 2.24.5, Evolution Data Server performed unchecked arithmetic operations on the length of a user-input string and used the value to allocate space for a new buffer. An attacker could thereby execute arbitrary code by inputting a long string, resulting in incorrect allocation and buffer overflow [xorl 2009].

CVE-2021-3156 results from a violation of this rule in versions of Sudo before 1.9.5p2. Due to inconsistencies on whether backslashes are escaped, vulnerable versions of Sudo enabled a user to create a heap-based buffer overflow and exploit it to execute arbitrary code. [BC].

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

Key here (explains table format and definitions)

CERT-CWE Mapping Notes

Key here for mapping notes

CWE-122 and STR31-C

STR31-C = Union( CWE-122, list) where list =

• Buffer overflows on strings in the stack or data segment

CWE-125 and STR31-C

Independent( ARR30-C, ARR38-C, EXP39-C, INT30-C)

STR31-C = Subset( Union( ARR30-C, ARR38-C))

STR32-C = Subset( ARR38-C)

Intersection( STR31-C, CWE-125) =

• Directly reading beyond the end of a string

STR31-C – CWE-125 =

• Directly writing beyond the end of a string

CWE-125 – STR31-C =

• Reading beyond a non-string array

• Reading beyond a string using library functions

CWE-676 and STR31-C

• Independent( ENV33-C, CON33-C, STR31-C, EXP33-C, MSC30-C, ERR34-C)

• STR31-C implies that several C string copy functions, like strcpy() are dangerous.

Intersection( CWE-676, STR31-C) =

• Buffer Overflow resulting from invocation of the following dangerous functions:

• gets(), fscanf(), strcpy(), sprintf()

STR31-C – CWE-676 =

• Buffer overflow that does not involve the dangerous functions listed above.

CWE-676 - STR31-C =

• Invocation of other dangerous functions

CWE-121 and STR31-C

STR31-C = Union( CWE-121, list) where list =

• Buffer overflows on strings in the heap or data segment

CWE-123 and STR31-C

Independent(ARR30-C, ARR38-C)

STR31-C = Subset( Union( ARR30-C, ARR38-C))

STR32-C = Subset( ARR38-C)

Intersection( CWE-123, STR31-C) =

• Buffer overflow that overwrites a (unrelated) pointer with untrusted data

STR31-C – CWE-123 =

• Buffer overflow that does not overwrite a (unrelated) pointer

CWE-123 – STR31-C =

• Arbitrary writes that do not involve buffer overflows

CWE-119 and STR31-C

Independent( ARR30-C, ARR38-C, ARR32-C, INT30-C, INT31-C, EXP39-C, EXP33-C, FIO37-C)

STR31-C = Subset( Union( ARR30-C, ARR38-C))

STR32-C = Subset( ARR38-C)

CWE-119 = Union( STR31-C, list) where list =

• Out-of-bounds reads or writes that are not created by string copy operations

CWE-193 and STR31-C

Intersection( CWE-193, STR31-C) = Ø

CWE-193 involves an integer computation error (typically off-by-one), which is often a precursor to (slight) buffer overflow. However the two errors occur in different operations and are thus unrelated.

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Related Vulnerabilities

[CVE-2009-1252|http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2009-1252] results from a violation of this rule. The Network Time Protocol (NTPd), before versions 4.2.4p7 and 4.2.5p74, contained calls to sprintf that allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code by overflowing a character array \[[xorl 2009|http://xorl.wordpress.com/2009/06/10/freebsd-sa-0911-ntpd-remote-stack-based-buffer-overflows/]\].

Search for additional vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

CERT C++ Secure Coding Standard: STR31-CPP. Guarantee that storage for character arrays has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator

ISO/IEC 9899:1999 Section 7.1.1, "Definitions of terms," Section 7.21, "String handling <string.h>," Section 5.1.2.2.1, "Program startup," and Section 7.20.4.5, "The getenv function"

ISO/IEC TR 24772 "CJM String Termination," "XYW Buffer Overflow in Stack", and "XYB Buffer Overflow in Heap"

MITRE CWE: CWE-119, "Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of an Allocated Memory Buffer"

MITRE CWE: CWE-120, "Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')"

MITRE CWE: CWE-193, "Off-by-one Error"

Bibliography

\[[Dowd 2006|AA. Bibliography#Dowd 06]\] Chapter 7, "Program Building Blocks" (Loop Constructs 327-336)
\[[Seacord 2005a|AA. Bibliography#Seacord 05]\] Chapter 2, "Strings"
\[[xorl 2009|AA. Bibliography#xorl 2009]\] ["FreeBSD-SA-09:11: NTPd Remote Stack Based Buffer Overflows"|http://xorl.wordpress.com/2009/06/10/freebsd-sa-0911-ntpd-remote-stack-based-buffer-overflows/]

Image Removed      07. Characters and Strings (STR)      STR32-C. Null-terminate byte strings as required