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Every serializable container class that has private mutable instance variables must defensively copy them in the readObject() method. An adversary can append attacker can tamper with the serialized form of such a class, appending extra references to the variables to generate a new byte stream. When deserialized, this byte stream allows could allow the creation of a container class instance whose internal variable references are controlled by the attacker controllable. Consequently, this allows the class instance of the container class to can mutate and violate its guaranteesclass invariants.

This rule is an instance of OBJ06-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components, which applies to constructors and to other methods that accept untrusted mutable arguments. This rule applies the same principle to deserialized mutable fields.

Noncompliant Code Example

There is no defensive copying of the mutable components or sub-objects (Date object) in this noncompliant code example. An attacker may This noncompliant code example fails to defensively copy the mutable Date object date. An attacker might be able to create an instance of MutableSer with a mutated value of the date sub-object whose date object contains a nefarious subclass of Date and whose methods can perform actions specified by an attacker. Any code that depends on the immutability of the subobject is vulnerable.

Code Block
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class MutableSer implements Serializable {
  private static final Date epoch = new Date(0);
  private Date date = null; // Mutable component
  
  public MutableSer(Date d){
    date = new Date(d.getTime()); // Constructor performs defensive copying
  }

  private void readObject(ObjectInputStream ois) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
    ois.defaultReadObject();
    // Perform validation if necessary
  }
}

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution creates a defensive copy of the mutable Date object date in the readObject() method. Note the use of field-by-field input and validation of incoming fields. Additionally, note that this compliant solution is insufficient to protect sensitive data (see SER03-J. Do not serialize unencrypted sensitive data for additional information).

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff

private void readObject(ObjectInputStream ois) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
  ObjectInputStream.GetField fields = ois.defaultReadObject(.readFields();
  Date inDate = (Date) fields.get("date", epoch);
  // Defensively copy the mutable component
  date = new Date(dateinDate.getTime());
  // Perform validation if necessary
}

Wiki MarkupThere is no need to copy immutable sub-objects subobjects. Also, avoid using the sub-objectsubobject's {{clone()}} method because it can be overridden when the sub-objectsubobject's class is non-final. The sub-objects ({{date}}) themselves must be non-final so that defensive copying can occur. It is also inadvisable to use the {{writeUnshared()}} and {{readUnshared()}} methods as an alternative \[[Bloch 08|AA. Java References#Bloch 08]\]not final and produces only a shallow copy. The references to the subobjects themselves must be nonfinal so that defensive copying can occur. It is also inadvisable to use the writeUnshared() and readUnshared() methods as an alternative [Bloch 2008].

Risk Assessment

Failure to defensively copy mutable components during deserialization can violate the immutability contract of an object.

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

SER34

SER06-J

low

Low

probable

Probable

medium

Medium

P4

L3

Automated Detection

...

TODO

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

References

Wiki Markup
\[[API 06|AA. Java References#API 06]\]
\[[Sun 06|AA. Java References#Sun 06]\] "Serialization specification: A.6  Guarding Unshared Deserialized Objects"
\[[Bloch 08|AA. Java References#Bloch 08]\] Item 76: "Write readObject methods defensively"

Tool
Version
Checker
Description
CodeSonar
Include Page
CodeSonar_V
CodeSonar_V

JAVA.CLASS.SER.ND

Serialization Not Disabled (Java)

Coverity7.5UNSAFE_DESERIALIZATIONImplemented

Related Guidelines

MITRE CWE

CWE-502, Deserialization of Untrusted Data

Bibliography

[API 2014]


[Bloch 2008]

Item 76, "Write readObject Methods Defensively"

[Sun 2006]

Serialization Specification, A.6, Guarding Unshared Deserialized Objects


...

Image Added Image Added Image AddedSER06-J. Do not serialize instances of inner classes      14. Serialization (SER)      SER13-J. Prevent overwriting of Externalizable Objects