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The three types char, signed char, and unsigned char are collectively called the character types. Compilers have the latitude to define char to have the same range, representation, and behavior as either signed char or unsigned char. Irrespective of the choice made, char is a separate type from the other two and is not compatible with either.

Non-Compliant Code Example

This non-compliant code example is taken from an actual vulnerability in bash versions 1.14.6 and earlier that resulted in the release of CERT Advisory CA-1996-22. This vulnerability resulted from the declaration of the string variable in the yy_string_get() function as char * in the parse.y module of the bash source code:

Code Block

static int yy_string_get() {
  register char *string;
  register int c;

  string = bash_input.location.string;
  c = EOF;

  /* If the string doesn't exist, or is empty, EOF found. */
  if (string && *string) {
      c = *string++;
      bash_input.location.string = string;
    }
  return (c);
}

The string variable is used to traverse the character string containing the command line to be parsed. As characters are retrieved from this pointer, they are stored in a variable of type int. For compilers in which the char type defaults to signed char, this value is sign-extended when assigned to the int variable. For character code 255 decimal (-1 in two's complement form), this sign extension results in the value -1 being assigned to the integer (which is indistinguishable from the EOF integer constant expression.

Compliant Solution

This problem is easily repaired by explicitly declaring the string variable as unsigned char.

Code Block

static int yy_string_get() {
  register unsigned char *string;
  register int c;

  string = bash_input.location.string;
  c = EOF;

  /* If the string doesn't exist, or is empty, EOF found. */
  if (string && *string) {
      c = *string++;
      bash_input.location.string = string;
    }
  return (c);
}

Use only signed char and unsigned char types for the storage and use of numeric values because it is the only portable way to guarantee the signedness of the character types (see STR00-C. Represent characters using an appropriate type for more information on representing characters).

Noncompliant Code Example

In this noncompliant code example, the char-type variable c may be signed or unsigned. Assuming 8-bit, two's complement character types, this code may print out either i/c = 5 (unsigned) or i/c = -17 (signed). It is much more difficult to reason about the correctness of a program without knowing if these integers are signed or unsigned.

Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc
langc
char c = 200;
int i = 1000;
printf("i/c = %d\n", i/c);

Compliant Solution

In this compliant solution, the variable c is declared as unsigned char. The subsequent division operation is now independent of the signedness of char and consequently has a predictable result.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
unsigned char c = 200;
int i = 1000;
printf("i/c = %d\n", i/c);

Exceptions

INT07-C-EX1: void FIO34-C. Use int to capture the return value of character IO functions that might be used to check for end of file mentions that certain character IO functions return a value of type int. Despite being returned in an arithmetic type, the value is not actually numeric in nature, so it is acceptable to later store the result into a variable of type char.

Risk Assessment

This is a subtle error that result results in a disturbingly broad range of potentially severe vulnerabilitiles. vulnerabilities. At the very least, this error can lead to unexpected numerical results on different platforms. Unexpected arithmetic values when applied to arrays or pointers can yield buffer overflows or other invalid memory access.

Recommendation

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

INT35

INT07-C

2 (medium)

2 (probable)

2 (medium)

P8

L2

References

...

Medium

Probable

Medium

P8

L2

Automated Detection

Tool

Version

Checker

Description

Astrée
Include Page
Astrée_V
Astrée_V

Supported indirectly via MISRA C:2012 rules 10.1, 10.3 and 10.4.
Axivion Bauhaus Suite

Include Page
Axivion Bauhaus Suite_V
Axivion Bauhaus Suite_V

CertC-INT07
CodeSonar
Include Page
CodeSonar_V
CodeSonar_V
LANG.TYPE.IOTInappropriate operand type
Compass/ROSE



Can detect violations of this recommendation. In particular, it flags any instance of a variable of type char (without a signed or unsigned qualifier) that appears in an arithmetic expression

ECLAIR

Include Page
ECLAIR_V
ECLAIR_V

CC2.INT07

Fully implemented

Helix QAC

Include Page
Helix QAC_V
Helix QAC_V

C1292, C1293, C4401, C4421, C4431, C4441, C4451


Klocwork
Include Page
Klocwork_V
Klocwork_V
PORTING.SIGNED.CHAR
LDRA tool suite
Include Page
LDRA_V
LDRA_V

93 S, 96 S, 101 S, 329 S, 432 S, 458 S

Fully implemented

Parasoft C/C++test
Include Page
Parasoft_V
Parasoft_V

CERT_C-INT07-a
CERT_C-INT07-b

The plain char type shall be used only for the storage and use of character values
signed and unsigned char type shall be used only for the storage and use of numeric values

PC-lint Plus

Include Page
PC-lint Plus_V
PC-lint Plus_V

9112

Fully supported

Polyspace Bug Finder

Include Page
Polyspace Bug Finder_V
Polyspace Bug Finder_V

CERT C: Rec. INT07-C


Checks for use of plain char type for numeric value (rec. fully covered)

Splint
Include Page
Splint_V
Splint_V



RuleChecker

Include Page
RuleChecker_V
RuleChecker_V


Supported indirectly via MISRA C:2012 rules 10.1, 10.3 and 10.4.
SonarQube C/C++ Plugin
Include Page
SonarQube C/C++ Plugin_V
SonarQube C/C++ Plugin_V
S820

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

SEI CERT C++ Coding StandardVOID INT07-CPP. Use only explicitly signed or unsigned char type for numeric values
ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013Bit Representations [STR]
MISRA C:2012Rule 10.1 (required)
Rule 10.3 (required)
Rule 10.4 (required)
MITRE CWECWE-682, Incorrect calculation


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