If a class implements Externalizable
, Classes that implement the Externalizable
interface must provide the readExternal()
and writeExternal()
methods must be provided. Unfortunately, these methods are public
and, consequently, . These methods have package-private or public access, and so they can be called by hostile code capable of overwriting trusted and untrusted code alike. Consequently, programs must ensure that these methods execute only when intended and that they cannot overwrite the internal state of the object at any point objects at arbitrary points during program execution.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example allows anyone any caller to reset the value of the object because of the public
access modifier of at any time because the readExternal()
method .is necessarily declared to be public and lacks protection against hostile callers:
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
public void readExternal(ObjectInput in) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { // Read instance fields this.name = (String) in.readObject(); this.UID = in.readInt(); // ... } |
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution is thread-safe and allows the caller to check the initialized
flag after which protects against multiple initialization through the use of a Boolean flag that is set after the instance fields are populated. Finally, the flag is set to true
so that the fields cannot be overwrittenhave been populated. It also protects against race conditions by synchronizing on a private lock object (see LCK00-J. Use private final lock objects to synchronize classes that may interact with untrusted code).
Code Block | ||
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| ||
private final Object lock = new Object(); private boolean initialized = false; public synchronized void readExternal(ObjectInput in) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { synchronized (lock) { if (!initialized) { // Read instance fields this.name = (String) in.readObject(); this.UID = in.readInt(); // ... initialized = true; } else { throw new IllegalStateException(); } } } |
Note that this compliant solution is inadequate to protect sensitive data.
Risk Assessment
Failure to prevent the overwriting of an externalizable objects object can corrupt the state of the object.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|
SER11-J |
Low |
Probable |
Low | P6 | L2 |
Automated Detection
...
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Parasoft Jtest |
| CERT.SER11.IRX | Avoid re-initializing fields in the 'readExternal()' method of 'Externalizable' classes |
Bibliography
[API 2014] | |
[Sun 2006] | Serialization Specification, A.7, Preventing Overwriting of Externalizable Objects |
...
TODO
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this guideline on the CERT website.
Bibliography
Wiki Markup |
---|
\[[API 2006|AA. Bibliography#API 06]\]
\[[Sun 2006|AA. Bibliography#Sun 06]\] "Serialization specification: A.7 Preventing Overwriting of Externalizable Objects" |
SER12-J. Avoid memory and resource leaks during serialization Serialization (SER) Miscellaneous (MSC)