Versions Compared

Key

  • This line was added.
  • This line was removed.
  • Formatting was changed.

Null-terminated byte strings are, by definition, Many library functions accept a string or wide string argument with the constraint that the string they receive is properly null-terminated. String operations cannot determine the length or end of strings that are not properly null-terminated, which can consequently result in buffer overflows and other undefined behavior.

...

Passing a character sequence or wide character sequence that is not null-terminated to such a function can result in accessing memory that is outside the bounds of the object. Do not pass a character sequence or wide character sequence that is not null-terminated to a library function that expects a string or wide string argument. 

Noncompliant Code Example

This code example is noncompliant because the character sequence c_str will not be null-terminated when passed as an argument to printf(). (See STR11-C. Do not specify the bound of a character array initialized with a string literal on how to properly initialize character arrays.)

Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc
langc
#include <stdio.h>
 
void func(void) {
  char c_str[3] = "abc";
  printf("%s\n", c_str);
}

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution does not specify the bound of the character array in the array declaration. If the array bound is omitted, the compiler allocates sufficient storage to store the entire string literal, including the terminating null character.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#include <stdio.h>
 
void func(void) {
  char c_str[] = "abc";
  printf("%s\n", c_str);
}

Noncompliant Code Example

This code example is noncompliant because the wide character sequence cur_msg will not be null-terminated when passed to wcslen(). This will occur if lessen_memory_usage() is invoked while cur_msg_size still has its initial value of 1024.

Code Block
bgColor#ffcccc
langc
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <wchar.h>
 
wchar_t *cur_msg = NULL;
size_t cur_msg_size = 1024;
size_t cur_msg_len = 0;

void lessen_memory_usage(void) {
  wchar_t *temp;
  size_t temp_size;

  /* ... */

  if (cur_msg != NULL) {
    temp_size = cur_msg_size / 2 + 1;
    temp = realloc(cur_msg, temp_size * sizeof(wchar_t));
    /* temp &and cur_msg may no longer be null-terminated */
    if (temp == NULL) {
      /* Handle error */
    }

    cur_msg = temp;
    cur_msg_size = temp_size;
    cur_msg_len = wcslen(cur_msg); 
  }
}

Compliant Solution

In this compliant solution, cur_msg will always be null-terminated when passed to wcslen():

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <wchar.h>
 
wchar_t *cur_msg = NULL;
size_t cur_msg_size = 1024;
size_t cur_msg_len = 0;

void lessen_memory_usage(void) {
  wchar_t *temp;
  size_t temp_size;

  /* ... */

  if (cur_msg != NULL) {
    temp_size = cur_msg_size / 2 + 1;
    temp = realloc(cur_msg, temp_size * sizeof(wchar_t));
    /* temp and cur_msg may no longer be null-terminated */
    if (temp == NULL) {
      /* Handle error */
    }

    cur_msg = temp;
    /* Properly null-terminate cur_msg */
    cur_msg[temp_size - 1] = L'\0'; 
    cur_msg_size = temp_size;
    cur_msg_len = wcslen(cur_msg); 
  }
}

Noncompliant Code Example (strncpy())

Although the strncpy() function takes a string as input, it does not guarantee that the resulting value is still null-terminated. In the following noncompliant code example, if no null character is contained in the first n characters of the source array, the result will not be null-terminated. Passing a non-null-terminated character sequence to strlen() is undefined behavior.

Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc
langc
#include <string.h>
 
enum { STR_SIZE = 32 };
 
size_t func(const char *source) {
  char c_str[STR_SIZE];
  size_t ret = 0;

  if (source) {
    c_str[sizeof(c_str) - 1] = '\0';
    strncpy(c_str, source, sizeof(c_str));
    ret = strlen(c_str);
  } else {
    /* Handle null pointer */
  }
  return ret;
}

Compliant Solution (Truncation)

This compliant solution is correct if the programmer's intent is to truncate the string:

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#include <string.h>
 
enum { STR_SIZE = 32 };
 
size_t func(const char *source) {
  char c_str[STR_SIZE];
  size_t ret = 0;

  if (source) {
    strncpy(c_str, source, sizeof(c_str) - 1);
    c_str[sizeof(c_str) - 1] = '\0';
    ret = strlen(c_str);
  } else {
    /* Handle null pointer */
  }
  return ret;
}

Compliant Solution (Truncation, strncpy_s())

The C Standard, Annex K strncpy_s() function can also be used to copy with truncation. The strncpy_s() function copies up to n characters from the source array to a destination array. If no null character was copied from the source array, then the nth position in the destination array is set to a null character, guaranteeing that the resulting string is null-terminated.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
#include <string.h>

enum { STR_SIZE = 32 };

size_t func(const char *source) {
  char c_str[STR_SIZE];
  size_t ret = 0;

  if (source) {
    errno_t err = strncpy_s(
      c_str, sizeof(c_str), source, strnlen(source, sizeof(c_str))
    );
    if (err != 0) {
      /* Handle error */
    } else {
      ret = strnlen(c_str, sizeof(c_str));
    }
  } else {
     /* Handle null pointer */
  }
  return ret;
}

Compliant Solution (Copy without Truncation)

If the programmer's intent is to copy without truncation, this compliant solution copies the data and guarantees that the resulting array is null-terminated. If the string cannot be copied, it is handled as an error condition.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#include <string.h>
 
enum { STR_SIZE = 32 };
 
size_t func(const char *source) {
  char c_str[STR_SIZE];
  size_t ret = 0;

  if (source) {
    if (strnlen(source, sizeof(c_str)) < sizeof(c_str)) {
      strcpy(c_str, source);
      ret = strlen(c_str);
    } else {
      /* Handle string-too-large */
    }
  } else {
    /* Handle null pointer */
  }
  return ret;
}

Note that this code is not bulletproof. It gracefully handles the case where source  is NULL, when it is a valid string, and when source is not null-terminated, but at least the first 32 bytes are valid. However, in cases where source is not NULL, but points to invalid memory, or any of the first 32 bytes are invalid memory, the first call to strnlen() will access this invalid memory, and the resulting behavior is undefined. Unfortunately, standard C provides no way to prevent or even detect this condition without some external knowledge about the memory source points to.

Risk Assessment

Failure to properly null-terminate a character sequence that is passed to a library function that expects a string can result in buffer overflows and the execution of arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process. Null-termination errors can also result in unintended information disclosure.

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

STR32-C

High

Probable

Medium

P12

L1

Automated Detection

Tool

Version

Checker

Description

Astrée
Include Page
Astrée_V
Astrée_V

Supported

Astrée supports the implementation of library stubs to fully verify this guideline.

Axivion Bauhaus Suite

Include Page
Axivion Bauhaus Suite_V
Axivion Bauhaus Suite_V

CertC-STR32Partially implemented: can detect some violation of the rule
CodeSonar
Include Page
CodeSonar_V
CodeSonar_V
MISC.MEM.NTERM.CSTRINGUnterminated C String
Compass/ROSE



Can detect some violations of this rule

Coverity
Include Page
Coverity_V
Coverity_V
STRING_NULLFully implemented
Helix QAC

Include Page
Helix QAC_V
Helix QAC_V

DF2835, DF2836, DF2839


Klocwork
Include Page
Klocwork_V
Klocwork_V

NNTS.MIGHT
NNTS.MUST
SV.STRBO.BOUND_COPY.UNTERM


LDRA tool suite
Include Page
LDRA_V
LDRA_V

404 S, 600 S

Partially implemented

Parasoft C/C++test
Include Page
Parasoft_V
Parasoft_V
CERT_C-STR32-a

Avoid overflow due to reading a not zero terminated string

Polyspace Bug Finder

Include Page
Polyspace Bug Finder_V
Polyspace Bug Finder_V

CERT C: Rule STR32-C


Checks for:

  • Invalid use of standard library string routine
  • Tainted NULL or non-null-terminated string

Rule partially covered.

PVS-Studio

Include Page
PVS-Studio_V
PVS-Studio_V

V692
TrustInSoft Analyzer

Include Page
TrustInSoft Analyzer_V
TrustInSoft Analyzer_V

match format and argumentsPartially verified.

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

Key here (explains table format and definitions)

Taxonomy

Taxonomy item

Relationship

ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013String Termination [CMJ]Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship
ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013Passing a non-null-terminated character sequence to a library function that expects a string [strmod]Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship
CWE 2.11CWE-119, Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer2017-05-18: CERT: Rule subset of CWE
CWE 2.11CWE-123, Write-what-where Condition2017-06-12: CERT: Partial overlap
CWE 2.11CWE-125, Out-of-bounds Read2017-05-18: CERT: Rule subset of CWE
CWE 2.11CWE-170, Improper Null Termination2017-06-13: CERT: Exact

CERT-CWE Mapping Notes

Key here for mapping notes

CWE-119 and STR32-C

Independent( ARR30-C, ARR38-C, ARR32-C, INT30-C, INT31-C, EXP39-C, EXP33-C, FIO37-C) STR31-C = Subset( Union( ARR30-C, ARR38-C)) STR32-C = Subset( ARR38-C)

CWE-119 = Union( STR32-C, list) where list =


  • Out-of-bounds reads or writes that do not involve non-null-terminated byte strings.


CWE-125 and STR32-C

Independent( ARR30-C, ARR38-C, EXP39-C, INT30-C) STR31-C = Subset( Union( ARR30-C, ARR38-C)) STR32-C = Subset( ARR38-C)

CWE-125 = Union( STR32-C, list) where list =


  • Out-of-bounds reads that do not involve non-null-terminated byte strings.


CWE-123 and STR32-C

Independent(ARR30-C, ARR38-C) STR31-C = Subset( Union( ARR30-C, ARR38-C)) STR32-C = Subset( ARR38-C)

Intersection( CWE-123, STR32-C) =


  • Buffer overflow from passing a non-null-terminated byte string to a standard C library copying function that expects null termination, and that overwrites an (unrelated) pointer


STR32-C - CWE-123 =


  • Buffer overflow from passing a non-null-terminated byte string to a standard C library copying function that expects null termination, but it does not overwrite an (unrelated) pointer


CWE-123 – STR31-C =


  • Arbitrary writes that do not involve standard C library copying functions, such as strcpy()


Bibliography

[Seacord 2013] Chapter 2, "Strings" 
[Viega 2005]Section 5.2.14, "Miscalculated NULL Termination"


...

Image Added Image Added Image Added

...

Exception

An exception to this rule applies if the intent of the programmer is to convert a null-terminated byte string to a character array.  To be compliant with this standard, this intent must be clearly stated in comments.

Risk Assessment

Failure to properly null terminate null-terminated byte strings can result in buffer overflows and the execution of arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process by an attacker.

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

STR32-C

3 (high)

2 (probable)

2 (medium)

P12

L1

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Mitigation Strategies

(Section under construction by Ciera. Just wanted to get some current notes down here before I clean it up.)

Static Analysis

A local analysis should work fine here. We will assume that all byte string parameters to a method are required to be null terminated and are guaranteed to be null terminated after the function.

In the case where it is not required or not guaranteed, we will have to create a separate specification. Given that this is C, the best option might be two hardcoded handling routines in the analysis. If the function either accepts an open string (not null terminated) or can return an open string, we can write some code to specify this. The analysis calls these handling routines to retrieve these specifications.

Another option would be to utilize the preprocessor. However, I don't think that is in the style of C programmers. Additionally, we can't add these specs to libraries that way. Given the environment, a separate specification, in C, is probably the best option.

We also need to assume that there is a string length analysis.

Once we have this information, we can do a local flow analysis. The lattice has 4 elements, bottom, NT(null terminating), O(open) and top(unknown). If we index into the string and set a character to '\0', move the string to NT. The hard part here is knowing the size of the string. We need to make sure the index is not past the existing size of the string, measured either as strlen() on an NT char* or sizeof().

Check that we do not pass in O or M strings to methods that require NT. Also check that we meet our own out specifications.

Wiki Markup
There is a question of what to do about character arrays. One option is to assume that char\[\] is open, and using it as a char\* means that we first must make it null terminating. This could get annoying for developers very quickly. I think it's better to treat char\[\] as char*, that is, we assume NT and check for it. If the exception case does occur, it will have to be specified.

This analysis also impacts STR03-A, STR07-A, and STR31-C.

Combined attack (SA/DA/T)

Static analysis to generate test cases, dynamic analysis instruments the code that the test cases run on. Will have slightly different tradeoffs to SA. Good if we don't know the codebase well enough to create the handlers for non-NT functions. More work up front to create this kind of analysis, but reusable to many codebases. Provides the breadth of static analysis, the preciseness of dynamic analysis, and the repeatability of testing. Will have to think through this algorithm more carefully.

Rejected Strategies

Testing

It would probably be prohibitively expensive to come up with the test cases by hand.

Dynamic Analysis

It seems the analysis won't be very different from the static analysis, in which case, we should just do this statically.

Inspection

An inspection would essentially grep for known problem functions and inspect the usage. Obviously, this is extremely costly, as there would be a lot of false positives, and this does not scale well. There may also be many false negatives. Say Dev A inspects a function that returns an open string. Dev A considers it ok and documents it as such, perhaps this is one of the exception cases. Dev B might be inspecting another part of the code and might not realize that Dev A allowed an open string. It might be documented, but this is not very reliable. This might lead to a false sense of confidence that since the developers hand inspected every case that the code is fine, when in fact, a miscommunication can cause a defect.

References

Wiki Markup\[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\] Section 7.1.1, "Definitions of terms," and Section 7.21, "String handling <string.h>" \[[Seacord 05|AA. C References#Seacord 05]\] Chapter 2, "Strings" \[[ISO/IEC TR 24731-2006|AA. C References#ISO/IEC TR 24731-2006]\] Section 6.7.1.4, "The strncpy_s function" \[[Viega 05|AA. C References#Viega 05]\] Section 5.2.14, "Miscalculated null termination"