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Comment: Updated references from C11->C23

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Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#include <limits.h>
 
void f(signed int si_a, signed int si_b) {
  signed int sum;
  if (((si_b > 0) && (si_a > (INT_MAX - si_b))) ||
      ((si_b < 0) && (si_a < (INT_MIN - si_b)))) {
    /* Handle error */
  } else {
    sum = si_a + si_b;
  }
  /* ... */
}

Subtraction

Subtraction is between two operands of arithmetic type, two pointers to qualified or unqualified versions of compatible object types, or a pointer to an object type and an integer type. This rule applies only to subtraction between two operands of arithmetic type. (See ARR36-C. Do not subtract or compare two pointers that do not refer to the same array, ARR37-C. Do not add or subtract an integer to a pointer to a non-array object, and ARR30-C. Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts for information about pointer subtraction.)

Decrementing is equivalent to subtracting 1.

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example can result in a signed integer overflow during the subtraction of the signed operands si_a and si_b:

Compliant Solution (GNU)

This compliant solution uses the GNU extension __builtin_sadd_overflow, available with GCC, Clang, and ICC:

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
void f(signed int si_a, signed int si_b) {
  signed int sum;
  if (__builtin_sadd_overflow(si_a, si_b, &sum)) {
    /* Handle error */
  }
  /* ... */
}


Subtraction

Subtraction is between two operands of arithmetic type, two pointers to qualified or unqualified versions of compatible object types, or a pointer to an object type and an integer type. This rule applies only to subtraction between two operands of arithmetic type. (See ARR36-C. Do not subtract or compare two pointers that do not refer to the same array, ARR37-C. Do not add or subtract an integer to a pointer to a non-array object, and ARR30-C. Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts for information about pointer subtraction.)

Decrementing is equivalent to subtracting 1.

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example can result in a signed integer overflow during the subtraction of the signed operands si_a and si_b:

Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc
langc
void func(signed int si_a, signed int si_b) {
  signed int diff = si_a - si_b;
  /* ... */
}

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution tests the operands of the subtraction to guarantee there is no possibility of signed overflow, regardless of representation:

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#include <limits.h>
 
void func(signed int si_a, signed int si_b) {
  signed int diff;
  if ((si_b > 0 && si_a < INT_MIN + si_b) ||
      (si_b < 0 && si_a > INT_MAX + si_b)) {
    /* Handle error */
  } else {
   
Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc
langc
void func(signed int si_a, signed int si_b) {
  signed int diff = si_a - si_b;
  }

  /* ... */
}

Compliant Solution (GNU)

This compliant solution tests the operands of the subtraction to guarantee there is no possibility of signed overflow, regardless of representationuses the GNU extension __builtin_ssub_overflow, available with GCC, Clang, and ICC:

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#include <limits.h>
 
void func(signed int si_a, signed int si_b) {
  signed int diff;
  if ((si_b > 0 && int si_a, < INT_MIN +signed int si_b) ||{
  signed int diff;
  if (si_b < 0 && __builtin_ssub_overflow(si_a > INT_MAX + , si_b, &diff)) {
    /* Handle error */
  } else {
    diff = si_a - si_b; */
  }

  /* ... */
}


Multiplication

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The assertion fails if long long has less than twice the precision of int. The  PRECISION() macro and popcount() function provide the correct precision for any integer type. (See INT35-C. Use correct integer precisions.)

Compliant Solution

The following portable compliant solution can be used with any conforming implementation, including those that do not have an integer type that is at least twice the precision of int:

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#include <limits.h>
 
void func(signed int si_a, signed int si_b) {
  signed int result;  
  if (si_a > 0) {  /* si_a is positive */
    if (si_b > 0) {  /* si_a and si_b are positive */
      if (si_a > (INT_MAX / si_b)) {
        /* Handle error */
      }
    } else { /* si_a positive, si_b nonpositive */
      if (si_b < (INT_MIN / si_a)) {
        /* Handle error */
      }
    } /* si_a positive, si_b nonpositive */
  } else { /* si_a is nonpositive */
    if (si_b > 0) { /* si_a is nonpositive, si_b is positive */
      if (si_a < (INT_MIN / si_b)) {
        /* Handle error */
      }
    } else { /* si_a and si_b are nonpositive */
      if ( (si_a != 0) && (si_b < (INT_MAX / < (INT_MAX / si_a))) {
        /* Handle error */
      }
    } /* End if si_a and si_b are nonpositive */
  } /* End if si_a))) {
is nonpositive */

  result = si_a  /* Handle error */
      }
    } /* End if si_a and si_b are nonpositive */
  } /* End if si_a is nonpositive */

  result = si_a * si_b;* si_b;
}

Compliant Solution (GNU)

This compliant solution uses the GNU extension __builtin_smul_overflow, available with GCC, Clang, and ICC:

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
void func(signed int si_a, signed int si_b) {
  signed int result;
  if (__builtin_smul_overflow(si_a, si_b, &result)) {
    /* Handle error */
  }
}


Division

Division is between two operands of arithmetic type. Overflow can occur during two's complement signed integer division when the dividend is equal to the minimum (negative) value for the signed integer type and the divisor is equal to −1. Division operations are also susceptible to divide-by-zero errors. (See INT33-C. Ensure that division and remainder operations do not result in divide-by-zero errors.)

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The left-shift operator takes two integer operands. The result of E1 << E2 is E1 left-shifted E2 bit positions; vacated bits are filled with zeros. 

The C Standard,  66.5.78, paragraph 4 [ISO/IEC 9899:20112024], states

If E1 has a signed type and nonnegative value, and E1 × 2E2 is representable in the result type, then that is the resulting value; otherwise, the behavior is undefined.

In almost every case, an attempt to shift by a negative number of bits or by more bits than exist in the operand indicates a logic error. These issues are covered by INT34-C. Do not shift an expression by a negative number of bits or by greater than or equal to the number of bits that exist in the operand.

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example performs a left shift, after verifying that the number being shifted is not negative, and the number of bits to shift is valid.  The PRECISION() macro and popcount() function provide the correct precision for any integer type. (See INT35-C. Use correct integer precisions.) However, because this code does no overflow check, it can result in an unrepresentable value. 

Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc
langc
#include <limits.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
 
extern size_t popcount(uintmax_t);
#define PRECISION(umax_value) popcount(umax_value) 

void func(signed long si_a, signed long si_b) {
  signed long result;
  if ((si_a < 0) || (si_b < 0) ||
      (si_b >= PRECISION(ULONG_MAX))) {
    /* Handle error */
  } else {
    result = si_a << si_b;
  } 
  /* ... */
}

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution eliminates the possibility of overflow resulting from a left-shift operation:

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Code Block
bgColor#ccccff
langc
#include <limits.h>
 
void func(signed long s_a) {
  signed long result;
  if (s_a == LONG_MIN) {
    /* Handle error */
  } else {
    result = -s_a;
  }
  /* ... */
}

Risk Assessment

Integer overflow can lead to buffer overflows and the execution of arbitrary code by an attacker.

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Rule

...

Severity

...

Likelihood

...

Remediation Cost

...

Priority

...

Level

...

INT32-C

...

High

...

Likely

...

High

...

P9

...

L2

.. */
}

Risk Assessment

Integer overflow can lead to buffer overflows and the execution of arbitrary code by an attacker.

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

INT32-C

High

Likely

High

P9

L2

Automated Detection

Tool

Version

Checker

Description

Astrée
Include Page
Astrée_V
Astrée_V

integer-overflow

Fully checked
CodeSonar
Include Page
CodeSonar_V
CodeSonar_V

ALLOC.SIZE.ADDOFLOW
ALLOC.SIZE.IOFLOW
ALLOC.SIZE.MULOFLOW
ALLOC.SIZE.SUBUFLOW
MISC.MEM.SIZE.ADDOFLOW
MISC.MEM.SIZE.BAD
MISC.MEM.SIZE.MULOFLOW
MISC.MEM.SIZE.SUBUFLOW

Addition overflow of allocation size
Integer overflow of allocation size
Multiplication overflow of allocation size
Subtraction underflow of allocation size
Addition overflow of size
Unreasonable size argument
Multiplication overflow of size
Subtraction underflow of size

Coverity
Include Page
Coverity_V
Coverity_V

TAINTED_SCALAR

BAD_SHIFT

Implemented
Cppcheck Premium

Include Page
Cppcheck Premium_V
Cppcheck Premium_V

premium-cert-int32-cPartially implemented
Helix QAC

Include Page
Helix QAC_V
Helix QAC_V

C2800, C2860

C++2800, C++2860

DF2801, DF2802, DF2803, DF2861, DF2862, DF2863


Klocwork

Include Page
Klocwork_V
Klocwork_V

NUM.OVERFLOW
CWARN.NOEFFECT.OUTOFRANGE
NUM.OVERFLOW.DF

Automated Detection

' operator
Integer overflow or underflow in constant expression in '<<' operator

CERT C: Rule INT32-C

2800, 2801, 2802, 2803,

2860, 2861, 2862, 2863

Tool

Version

Checker

Description

Astrée
Include Page
Astrée_VAstrée_V

integer-overflow

Fully checkedCodeSonar
Include Page
CodeSonar_VCodeSonar_V

ALLOC.SIZE.ADDOFLOW
ALLOC.SIZE.IOFLOW
ALLOC.SIZE.MULOFLOW
ALLOC.SIZE.SUBUFLOW
MISC.MEM.SIZE.ADDOFLOW
MISC.MEM.SIZE.BAD
MISC.MEM.SIZE.MULOFLOW
MISC.MEM.SIZE.SUBUFLOW

Addition overflow of allocation size
Integer overflow of allocation size
Multiplication overflow of allocation size
Subtraction underflow of allocation size
Addition overflow of size
Unreasonable size argument
Multiplication overflow of size
Subtraction underflow of size

Coverity
Include Page
Coverity_VCoverity_V

TAINTED_SCALAR

BAD_SHIFT

Implemented


LDRA tool suite
Include Page
LDRA_V
LDRA_V

493 S, 494 S

Partially implemented
Parasoft C/C++test

Include Page
Parasoft_V
Parasoft_V

CERT_C-INT32-a
CERT_C-INT32-b
CERT_C-INT32-c

Avoid signed integer overflows
Integer overflow or underflow in constant expression in '+', '-', '*

Parasoft Insure++Runtime analysis

' operator
Integer overflow or underflow in constant expression in '<<' operator

Parasoft Insure++

Runtime analysis
Polyspace Bug Finder

Include Page
Polyspace Bug Finder_V
Polyspace Bug Finder_V

CERT C: Rule INT32-C


Checks for:

  • Integer overflow
  • Tainted division operand
  • Tainted modulo operand

Rule partially covered.

Polyspace Bug Finder
Include Page
Polyspace Bug Finder_VPolyspace Bug Finder_V

Checks for:

  • Integer overflow
  • Tainted division operand
  • Tainted modulo operand

Rule partially covered.

PRQA QA-C
Include Page
PRQA QA-C_vPRQA QA-C_v

2800, 2801, 2802, 2803,

2860, 2861, 2862, 2863

Fully implementedPRQA QA-C++
Include Page
cplusplus:PRQA QA-C++_Vcplusplus:PRQA QA-C++_V
PVS-Studio

Include Page
PVS-Studio_V
PVS-Studio_V

V1026, V1070, V1081, V1083, V1085, V5010
TrustInSoft Analyzer

Include Page
TrustInSoft Analyzer_V
TrustInSoft Analyzer_V

signed_overflow

Exhaustively verified (see one compliant and one non-compliant example).

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

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[Dowd 2006]Chapter 6, "C Language Issues" ("Arithmetic Boundary Conditions," pp. 211–223)
[ISO/IEC 9899:20112024]Subclause 6.5.58, "Multiplicative OperatorsBitwise shift operators"
[Seacord 2013b]Chapter 5, "Integer Security"
[Viega 2005]Section 5.2.7, "Integer Overflow"
[Warren 2002]Chapter 2, "Basics"

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