Callers Client code can trivially access and modify public static non-final fields. Neither accesses nor any modifications can be fields because access to such fields are not checked by a security manager. Furthermore, and newly set new values cannot be validated . Furthermore, multiple threads can modify non-final programmatically before they are stored in these fields.

In the presence of multiple threads, nonfinal public static fields can be modified in inconsistent ways .

Improper use of {{public static}} fields can also result in type safety issues. For example, untrusted code may supply an unexpected subtype when the variable is defined to be of a more general type such as {{java.lang.Object}}. \[[Gong 03|AA. Java References#Gong 03]\]

Noncompliant Code Example

(see TSM01-J. Do not let the this reference escape during object construction for an example).

Improper use of public static fields can also result in type-safety issues. For example, untrusted code can supply an unexpected subtype with malicious methods when the variable is defined to be of a more general type, such as java.lang.Object [Gong 2003]. As a result, classes must not contain nonfinal public static fields.

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example is taken from JDK v1.4.2 [FT 2008]. It declares a function table containing a public static field Wiki MarkupThis noncompliant code example is adopted from JDK v1.4.2 \[[FT 08|AA. Java References#FT 08]\]. It declares a function table.

package org.apache.xpath.compiler;

public class FunctionTable {
  public static FuncLoader m_functions;
}

An attacker can replace the function table as follows.:

FunctionTable.m_functions = <newnew_table>table;

Replacing the function table gives the attacker access to the XPathContext. The XPathContext , which is used to set the reference node for evaluating XPath expressions. Manipulating it XPathContext can allow cause XML fields to be modified in inconsistent ways, resulting in unexpected behavior. Also, because static variables are global across the Java Runtime Environment (JRE). They , they can be used as a covert communication channel between different application domains (e.g.for example, through code loaded by different class loaders).

This vulnerability was repaired in JDK v1.4.2_05.

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution declares the FuncLoader static field as final and treats it like as a constant.:

public static final FuncLoader m_functions;

// Initialize m_functions in a static initialization block

Fields declared static and final are also safe for multithreaded use (see TSM03-J. Do not publish partially initialized objects for more information). However, remember that As a cautionary note, however, simply changing the modifier to final may might not prevent attackers from indirectly retrieving an incorrect value from the static final variable before its initialization . See MSC00(see DCL00-J. Eliminate Prevent class initialization cycles and OBJ03-J. Be aware that a final reference may not always refer to immutable data for more details about such problems for more information). Furthermore, individual members of the referenced object can also be changed if the object itself is mutable.

It is also permissible to use a wrapper method to retrieve the value of m_functions, allowing m_functions to be declared private (see rule OBJ01-J. Limit accessibility of fields for more information).

Noncompliant Code Example (serialVersionUID)

This noncompliant code example uses a public static nonfinal serialVersionUID field in a class designed for serialization:

class DataSerializer implements Serializable {
  public static long serialVersionUID = 1973473122623778747L;
  // ...
}

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution declares the serialVersionUID field final and private:

class DataSerializer implements Serializable {
  private static final long serialVersionUID = 1973473122623778747L;
}

The serialization mechanism uses the serialVersionUID field internally, so accessible wrapper methods are unnecessary.

Risk Assessment

Unauthorized modifications of public static variables can result in unexpected behavior and violation of class invariants. Furthermore, because static variables can be visible to code loaded by different class loaders when those class loaders are in the same delegation chain, such variables can be used as a covert communication channel between different application domains.

References

\[[FT 08|AA. Java References#FT 08]\] 
\[[Nisewanger 07|AA. Java References#Nisewanger 07]\] Antipattern 5, Misusing Public Static Variables
\[[SCG 07|AA. Java References#SCG 07]\] Guideline 3.1, Treat public static fields as constants
\[[Gong 03|AA. Java References#Gong 03]\] 9.3 Static Fields
\[[MITRE 09|AA. Java References#MITRE 09]\] [CWE ID 582|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/582.html] "Array Declared Public, Final, and Static", [CWE ID 493|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/493.html] "Critical Public Variable Without Final Modifier", [CWE ID 500|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/500.html] "Public Static Field Not Marked Final"

Automated Detection

Related Guidelines

Bibliography

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Field isn't final but should be refactored to be soOBJ30-J. Do not ignore return values of methods that operate on immutable objects      08. Object Orientation (OBJ)      OBJ32-J. Do not allow partially initialized objects to be accessed