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Comment: Parasoft Jtest 2021.1

The serialization Serialization and deserialization features can be exploited to bypass security manager checks. A serializable class may install contain security manager checks in its constructors for various reasons. For example, the checks prevent , including preventing untrusted code from modifying the internal state of the class. Security Such security manager checks must be replicated at all points where wherever a class instance can be constructed. Because deserialization acts like a constructor, all the relevant methods must contain a security check. If the For example, if a class enables a caller to retrieve sensitive internal state contingent upon security checks, the same those checks must be replicated during deserialization . This ensures to ensure that an attacker cannot glean extract sensitive information by deserializing the object.

Noncompliant Code Example

In this noncompliant code example, security manager checks are used within the constructor but are not replicated within omitted from the writeObject() and readObject() methods that are used in the serialization-deserialization process. This omission allows untrusted code to maliciously create instances of the class.

Code Block
bgColor#FFcccc

public final class CreditCardHometown implements Serializable {
  // Private internal state
  private String credit_cardtown;
  private static final String DEFAULTUNKNOWN = "DEFAULT";
UNKNOWN";

  void performSecurityManagerCheck() throws AccessDeniedException {
    // ...
  }

  void validateInput(String newCC) throws InvalidInputException {
    // ...
  }

  public CreditCardHometown() {
    performSecurityManagerCheck();

    // Initialize credit_cardtown to default value
    credit_cardtown = DEFAULTUNKNOWN;
  }

  // Allows callers to retrieve internal state
  String getValue() {
    performSecurityManagerCheck();
    return town;
  }

  // Allows callers to modify (private) internal state
  public void changeCCchangeTown(String newCCnewTown) {
    if (credit_cardtown.equals(newCCnewTown)) {
      // No change
      return;
    } else {  
      performSecurityManagerCheck();
      validateInput(newCCnewTown);
      credit_cardtown = newCCnewTown;
    }
  }

  private //void readObjectwriteObject(ObjectOutputStream out) correctly enforces checks during deserialization throws IOException {
    out.writeObject(town);
  }

  private void readObject(ObjectInputStream in)  throws IOException {
    in.defaultReadObject();
    // If the deserialized name does not match the default value normally
    // created at construction time, duplicate the checks
    if (!DEFAULTUNKNOWN.equals(credit_cardtown)) {
      validateInput(credit_cardtown);
    }
  }

  // Allows callers to retrieve internal state
  String getValue() {
    return credit_card;
  }

  // writeObject() correctly enforces checks during serialization
  private void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream out)  throws IOException {
    out.writeObject(credit_card);
  }
}
}

(Although there are security manager checks, the data in this example is not sensitive. Serializing unencrypted sensitive data violates SER03-J. Do not serialize unencrypted sensitive data.)

AccessDeniedException and InvalidInputException are both security exceptions that can be thrown by any method without requiring a throws declaration.

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution implements the required security manager checks in all constructors and methods that can either modify or retrieve internal state. As a resultConsequently, an attacker cannot create a modified instance of the object (using deserialization) or read the serialized byte stream to uncover sensitive reveal serialized data.

Code Block
bgColor#ccccff

public final class SecureCreditCardHometown implements Serializable {
  // Private... internalAll state
methods the privatesame String credit_card;
  private static final String DEFAULT = "DEFAULT";except the following:

  public// SecureCreditCardwriteObject() {
correctly enforces checks  performSecurityManagerCheck();

    // Initialize credit_card to default value
    credit_card = DEFAULT;
  }

  //allows callers to modify (private) internal state
  public void changeCC(String newCC) {
    if (credit_card.equals(newCC)) {
      // No change
      return;
    } else {
      // Check permissions to modify credit_card
      during serialization
  private void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream out) throws IOException {
    performSecurityManagerCheck();
      validateInput(newCC);
      credit_card = newCC;
  out.writeObject(town);
  }
  }

  // readObject() correctly enforces checks during deserialization
  private void readObject(ObjectInputStream in)  throws IOException {
    in.defaultReadObject();
    // If the deserialized name does not match the default value normally
    // created at construction time, duplicate the checks
    if (!DEFAULTUNKNOWN.equals(credit_cardtown)) {
      performSecurityManagerCheck();
      validateInput(credit_card);
    }
  }

  // Allows callers to retrieve internal state
  public String getValue() {
    // Check permission to get value
    performSecurityManagerCheck(town);
    return somePublicValue;
  }

  // writeObject() correctly enforces checks during serialization
  private void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream out)  throws IOException {
    // Duplicate check from getValue()
    performSecurityManagerCheck();
    out.writeObject(credit_card);
  }
}

Refer to the guideline SEC08SEC04-J. Enforce Protect sensitive operations with security checks in code that performs sensitive operations to learn manager checks for information about implementing the performSecurityManagerCheck() method. As with SER04-J. Validate deserialized objects, it is important to protect against the finalizer attack, which is important for protection against finalizer attacks.

The ObjectInputStream.defaultReadObject() fills the object's fields with data from the input stream. Because each field is deserialized recursively, it is possible for the this reference to escape from control of the deserialization routines. This can happen if a referenced object publishes the this reference in its constructors or field initializers (see TSM01-J. Do not let the this reference escape during object construction for more information). To be compliant, recursively deserialized subobjects must not publish the this object reference.

Risk Assessment

Allowing serialization or deserialization to bypass the Security Manager security manager may result in sensitive data being exposed or modifiedclasses being constructed without required security checks.

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

SER05

SER04-J

high

High

probable

Probable

high

High

P6

L2

Automated Detection

TODO

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

References

Wiki Markup
\[[SCG 2007|AA. Bibliography#SCG 07]\] Guideline 5-3 Duplicate the SecurityManager checks enforced in a class during serialization and deserialization
\[[Long 2005|AA. Bibliography#Long 05]\] Section 2.4, Serialization

ToolVersionCheckerDescription
Parasoft Jtest
Include Page
Parasoft_V
Parasoft_V
CERT.SER04.SCSEREnforce 'SecurityManager' checks in methods of 'Serializable' classes

Related Guidelines

Secure Coding Guidelines for Java SE, Version 5.0

Guideline 8-4 / SERIAL-4: Duplicate the SecurityManager checks enforced in a class during serialization and deserialization

Android Implementation Details

The java.security package exists on Android for compatibility purposes only, and it should not be used.

Bibliography

[Long 2005]

Section 2.4, "Serialization"


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Image Added Image Added Image AddedSER04-J. Validate deserialized objects      18. Serialization (SER)      SER06-J. Do not serialize instances of inner classes