Dereferencing a null pointer is undefined behavior.
On many platforms, dereferencing a null pointer results in abnormal program termination, but this is not required by the standard. See "Clever Attack Exploits Fully-Patched Linux Kernel" [Goodin 2009] for an example of a code execution exploit that resulted from a null pointer dereference.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example is derived from a real-world example taken from a vulnerable version of the libpng
library as deployed on a popular ARM-based cell phone [Jack 2007]. The libpng
library allows applications to read, create, and manipulate PNG (Portable Network Graphics) raster image files. The libpng
library implements its own wrapper to malloc()
that returns a null pointer on error or on being passed a 0-byte-length argument.
This code also violates ERR33-C. Detect and handle standard library errors.
Code Block | ||||
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| ||||
#include <png.h> /* From libpng */
#include <string.h>
void func(png_structp png_ptr, int length, const void *user_data) {
png_charp chunkdata;
chunkdata = (png_charp)png_malloc(png_ptr, length + 1);
/* ... */
memcpy(chunkdata, user_data, length);
/* ... */
} |
If length
has the value −1
, the addition yields 0, and png_malloc()
subsequently returns a null pointer, which is assigned to chunkdata
. The chunkdata
pointer is later used as a destination argument in a call to memcpy()
, resulting in user-defined data overwriting memory starting at address 0. In the case of the ARM and XScale architectures, the 0x0
address is mapped in memory and serves as the exception vector table; consequently, dereferencing 0x0
did not cause an abnormal program termination.
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution ensures that the pointer returned by png_malloc()
is not null. It also uses the unsigned type size_t
to pass the length
parameter, ensuring that negative values are not passed to func()
.
This solution also ensures that the user_data
pointer is not null. Passing a null pointer to memcpy() would produce undefined behavior, even if the number of bytes to copy were 0. The user_data
pointer could be invalid in other ways, such as pointing to freed memory. However there is no portable way to verify that the pointer is valid, other than checking for null.
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <png.h> /* From libpng */
#include <string.h>
void func(png_structp png_ptr, size_t length, const void *user_data) {
png_charp chunkdata;
if (length == SIZE_MAX) {
/* Handle error */
}
if (NULL == user_data) {
/* Handle error */
}
chunkdata = (png_charp)png_malloc(png_ptr, length + 1);
if (NULL == chunkdata) {
/* Handle error */
}
/* ... */
memcpy(chunkdata, user_data, length);
/* ... */
} |
Noncompliant Code Example
In this noncompliant code
Attempting to dereference an invalid pointer results in undefined behavior, typically abnormal program termination.
Non-Compliant Code Example
In this example, input_str
is copied into dynamically allocated memory referenced by c_str
. If malloc()
fails, it returns a null pointer that is assigned to c_str
. When
is dereferenced in c_str
strcpymemcpy()
, the program behaves in an unpredictable mannerexhibits undefined behavior. Additionally, if input_str
is a null pointer, the call to strlen()
dereferences a null pointer, also resulting in undefined behavior. This code also violates ERR33-C. Detect and handle standard library errors.
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> void f(const char *input_str) { /* ... */ size_t size = strlen(input_str) + 1; if (size == SIZE_MAX) { /* test for limit of size_t */ char *c_str = (char *)malloc(size); memcpy(c_str, input_str, size); /* ... */ free(c_str); c_str = NULL; /* ... */ } |
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution ensures that both input_str
and the pointer returned by malloc()
are not null:
Code Block | ||||
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| ||||
#include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> void f(const char *input_str) { size_t size; char *c_str; if (NULL == input_str) { /* Handle Errorerror */ } size = strlen(input_str) + 1; c_str = (char *)malloc(size+1); strcpy( if (NULL == c_str) { /* Handle error */ } memcpy(c_str, input_str, size); /* ... */ free(c_str); |
Wiki Markup |
---|
In accordance with rule \[[MEM35-C. Allocate sufficient memory for an object]\] the argument supplied to {{malloc()}} is checked to ensure a numeric overflow does not occur. In most cases it is preferable to check that this value does not exceed some maximum allocation that is typically much smaller than {{SIZE_MAX}}. |
Compliant Solution
Wiki Markup |
---|
To correct this error, ensure the pointer returned by {{malloc()}} is not null. This also ensures compilance with \[[MEM32-C. Detect and handle critical memory allocation errors]\]. |
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
/* ... */
size_t size = strlen(input_str);
if (size == SIZE_MAX) { /* test for limit of size_t */
/* Handle Error */
}
str = malloc(size+1);
if (str == NULL) {
/* Handle Allocation Error */
}
strcpy(str, input_str);
/* ... */
free(str);
|
Risk Assessment
c_str = NULL;
/* ... */
} |
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example is from a version of drivers/net/tun.c
and affects Linux kernel 2.6.30 [Goodin 2009]:
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
static unsigned int tun_chr_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) {
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct tun_struct *tun = __tun_get(tfile);
struct sock *sk = tun->sk;
unsigned int mask = 0;
if (!tun)
return POLLERR;
DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: tun_chr_poll\n", tun->dev->name);
poll_wait(file, &tun->socket.wait, wait);
if (!skb_queue_empty(&tun->readq))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sock_writeable(sk) ||
(!test_and_set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags) &&
sock_writeable(sk)))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
if (tun->dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED)
mask = POLLERR;
tun_put(tun);
return mask;
}
|
The sk
pointer is initialized to tun->sk
before checking if tun
is a null pointer. Because null pointer dereferencing is undefined behavior, the compiler (GCC in this case) can optimize away the if (!tun)
check because it is performed after tun->sk
is accessed, implying that tun
is non-null. As a result, this noncompliant code example is vulnerable to a null pointer dereference exploit, because null pointer dereferencing can be permitted on several platforms, for example, by using mmap(2)
with the MAP_FIXED
flag on Linux and Mac OS X, or by using the shmat()
POSIX function with the SHM_RND
flag [Liu 2009].
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution eliminates the null pointer deference by initializing sk
to tun->sk
following the null pointer check. It also adds assertions to document that certain other pointers must not be null.
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
static unsigned int tun_chr_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) {
assert(file);
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct tun_struct *tun = __tun_get(tfile);
struct sock *sk;
unsigned int mask = 0;
if (!tun)
return POLLERR;
assert(tun->dev);
sk = tun->sk;
assert(sk);
assert(sk->socket);
/* The remaining code is omitted because it is unchanged... */
}
|
Risk Assessment
Dereferencing a null pointer is undefined behavior, typically abnormal program termination. In some situations, however, dereferencing a null pointer can lead to the execution of arbitrary code [Jack 2007, van Sprundel 2006]. The indicated severity is for this more severe case; on platforms where it is not possible to exploit a null pointer dereference to execute arbitrary code, the actual severity is Dereferencing an invalid pointer results in undefined behavior, typically abnormal program termination. In some situations, however, dereferencing a null pointer can lead to the execution of arbitrary code \[[van Sprundel 06|AA. C References#van Sprundel 06], [Jack 07|AA. C References#Jack 07]\]. The indicated severity is for this more severe case; on platforms where it is not possible to exploit a null pointer dereference to execute arbitrary code the actual severity is low. Wiki Markup
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
EXP34-C |
3 (high)
3 (likely)
High | Likely | Medium | P18 | L1 |
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Astrée |
| null-dereferencing | Fully checked | ||||||
Axivion Bauhaus Suite |
| CertC-EXP34 | |||||||
CodeSonar |
|
...
| LANG.MEM.NPD | Null pointer dereference | |||||||
Compass/ROSE | Can detect violations of this rule. In particular, ROSE ensures that any pointer returned by | ||||||||
| CHECKED_RETURN NULL_RETURNS REVERSE_INULL FORWARD_NULL | Finds instances where a pointer is checked against |
...
and then later dereferenced |
...
Identifies functions that can return a null pointer but are not checked |
...
Identifies code that dereferences a pointer and then checks the pointer against Can find the instances where | |||||||||
Cppcheck |
| nullPointer, nullPointerDefaultArg, nullPointerRedundantCheck | Context sensitive analysis Detects when NULL is dereferenced (Array of pointers is not checked. Pointer members in structs are not checked.) Finds instances where a pointer is checked against Identifies code that dereferences a pointer and then checks the pointer against Does not guess that return values from | ||||||
Helix QAC |
| DF2810, DF2811, DF2812, DF2813 | Fully implemented | ||||||
Klocwork |
| NPD.CHECK.CALL.MIGHT | Fully implemented | ||||||
LDRA tool suite |
| 45 D, 123 D, 128 D, 129 D, 130 D, 131 D, 652 S | Fully implemented | ||||||
Parasoft C/C++test |
| CERT_C-EXP34-a | Avoid null pointer dereferencing | ||||||
Parasoft Insure++ | Runtime analysis | ||||||||
PC-lint Plus |
| 413, 418, 444, 613, 668 | Partially supported | ||||||
Polyspace Bug Finder |
| Checks for use of null pointers (rule partially covered) | |||||||
PVS-Studio |
| V522, V595, V664, V713, V1004 | |||||||
SonarQube C/C++ Plugin |
| S2259 | |||||||
Splint |
| ||||||||
TrustInSoft Analyzer |
| mem_access | Exhaustively verified (see one compliant and one non-compliant example). |
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
References
Wiki Markup |
---|
\[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\] Section 6.3.2.3, "Pointers"
\[[Jack 07|AA. C References#Jack 07]\]
\[[MITRE 07|AA. C References#MITRE 07]\] [CWE ID 476|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/476.html], "NULL Pointer Dereference"
\[[van Sprundel 06|AA. C References#van Sprundel 06]\]
\[[Viega 05|AA. C References#Viega 05]\] Section 5.2.18, "Null-pointer dereference" |
Related Guidelines
Key here (explains table format and definitions)
Taxonomy | Taxonomy item | Relationship |
---|---|---|
CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java | EXP01-J. Do not use a null in a case where an object is required | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | Pointer Casting and Pointer Type Changes [HFC] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | Null Pointer Dereference [XYH] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
ISO/IEC TS 17961 | Dereferencing an out-of-domain pointer [nullref] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
CWE 2.11 | CWE-476, NULL Pointer Dereference | 2017-07-06: CERT: Exact |
CERT-CWE Mapping Notes
Key here for mapping notes
CWE-690 and EXP34-C
EXP34-C = Union( CWE-690, list) where list =
- Dereferencing null pointers that were not returned by a function
CWE-252 and EXP34-C
Intersection( CWE-252, EXP34-C) = Ø
EXP34-C is a common consequence of ignoring function return values, but it is a distinct error, and can occur in other scenarios too.
Bibliography
[Goodin 2009] | |
[Jack 2007] | |
[Liu 2009] | |
[van Sprundel 2006] | |
[Viega 2005] | Section 5.2.18, "Null-Pointer Dereference" |
...
EXP33-C. Do not reference uninitialized variables 003. Expressions (EXP) EXP35-C. Do not access or modify the result of a function call after a subsequent sequence point