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Sensitive data stored in reusable resources may be inadvertently leaked to a less privileged user or attacker if not properly cleared. Examples of reusable resources include

• Dynamically allocated memory
• Statically allocated memory
• Automatically allocated (stack) memory
• Memory caches
• Disk
• Disk caches

The manner in which sensitive information can be properly cleared varies depending on the resource type and platform.

Noncompliant Code Example (free())

Dynamic memory managers are not required to clear freed memory and generally do not because of the additional runtime overhead. Furthermore, dynamic memory managers are free to reallocate this same memory. As a result, it is possible to accidentally leak sensitive information if it is not cleared before calling a function that frees dynamic memory. Programmers also cannot rely on memory being cleared during allocation.

To prevent information leakage, sensitive information must be cleared

Dynamic memory managers are not required to clear freed memory and generally do not because of the additional runtime overhead.  Furthermore, dynamic memory managers are free to reallocate this same memory.  As a result, it is possible to accidently leak sensitive information if it is not cleared before calling a function which frees, or may free, dynamic memory.  An example of this risk is the "Sun tarball" vulnerability described in \[Graff 03\].  Programmers cannot rely on memory being cleared during allocation either \[[MEM33-C. Do not assume memory allocation routines initialize memory]\].

In practice, this type of security flaw can expose sensitive information to unintended parties. The Sun tarball vulnerability discussed in _Secure Coding Principles & Practices: Designing and Implementing Secure Applications_ \[[Graf 03|AA. C References#Graf 03]\] and [Sun Security Bulletin #00122 | http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-22-00122-1] illustrates a violation of this recommendation leading to sensitive data being leaked. Attackers may also be able to leverage this defect to retrieve sensitive information using techniques, such as _heap inspection_.

To prevent information leakage it is necessary to clear sensitive information from dynamically allocated buffers before they are freed.

Non-Compliant Code Example: free()

Calling free() on a block of dynamic memory causes the space to be deallocated, ; that is, the memory block is made available for future allocation. However, the data stored in the block of memory to be recycled may be preserved. If this memory block contains sensitive information, that information may be unintentionally exposed.

In this noncompliant example, sensitive information stored in the dynamically allocated memory referenced by secret is copied to the dynamically allocated buffer, new_secret, which is processed and eventually deallocated by a call to free(). Because the memory is not cleared, it may be reallocated to another section of the program where the information stored in new_secret may be unintentionally leaked.

...
char *new_secret;
size_t size = strlen(secret);
if (size ==/* Initialize secret to a null-terminated byte string, 
   of less than SIZE_MAX) {
  /* Handle Error */
}
 chars */

size_t size = strlen(secret);
char *new_secret;
new_secret = (char *)malloc(size+1);
if (!new_secret) {
  /* Handle Errorerror */
}
strcpy(new_secret, secret);

/* Process new_secret... */

free(new_secret);
...new_secret = NULL;

Compliant Solution

...

To prevent information leakage, dynamic memory containing sensitive information should be sanitized before being freed. This Sanitization is commonly accomplished by clearing the allocated space (that is, filling the space with '\0' characters).

Code Block
bgColor #ccccff lang c
... char *new_secret; size_t size = strlen(secret); if (size == SIZE_MAX) { /* Handle Error/* Initialize secret to a null-terminated byte string, of less than SIZE_MAX chars */ } new_secretsize_t size = calloc(size+1,sizeof(char)); strlen(secret); char *new_secret; /* useUse calloc() to zero-out allocated space */ new_secret = (char *)calloc(size+1, sizeof(char)); if (!new_secret) { /* Handle Errorerror */ } strcpy(new_secret, secret); /* Process new_secret... */ /* Sanitize memory */ memset_s(new_secret, '\0', size); /* sanitize memory */ free(new_secret); ... new_secret = NULL;

The Wiki MarkupThe {{calloc()}} function ensures that the newly allocated memory has also be been cleared. Because {{sizeof(char)}} is guaranteed to be 1, this solution does not need to check for a numeric overflow as a result of using {{calloc()}} \[[MEM37-C | MEM37. (See MEM07-C. Ensure that size the arguments to calloc() , when multiplied, do not result in an integer overflow]\].

...

not wrap.)

See MSC06-C. Beware of compiler optimizations for a definition and discussion of using the memset_s() function.

Noncompliant Code Example (realloc()

...

)

Reallocating memory using the using realloc() function is a degenerative case of  can have the same problem as freeing memory. The realloc() function function deallocates the old object and returns a pointer to a new object. Wiki MarkupUsing {{Using realloc()}} to resize dynamic memory may inadvertently expose sensitive information, or it may allow heap inspection , as is described in Fortify Taxonomy: Software Security Errors [Fortify 2006] and NIST's Source Code Analysis Tool Functional Specification [Black 2007].

In this example, when realloc() is called, it may allocate a new, larger object, copy the contents of secret to this new object, free() the original object, and assign the newly allocated object to secret. However, the contents of the original object may remain in 's Taxonomy of Software Security Errors \[[vulncat|http://vulncat.fortifysoftware.com/2/HI.html]\] and NIST's Source Code Analysis Tool Functional Specification \[[SAMATE|http://samate.nist.gov/docs/SAMATE_source_code_analysis_tool_spec_09_15_06.pdf]\]. When {{realloc()}} is called it may allocate a new, larger object, copy the contents, of {{secret}} to this new object, {{free()}} the original object, and assign the newly allocated object to {{secret}}. However, the contents of the original object may remain in memory.

char *secret;

/* Initialize secret */

...
...
size_t secret_size = strlen(secret);
/* ... */
if (secret_size > SIZE_MAX/2) {
   /* handleHandle error condition */
}
else {
secret = (char *)realloc(secret, secret_size * 2);
...

A test is added at the beginning of this code to make sure that the integer multplication does not result in an integer overflow \[[INT32-C|INT32-C. Ensure that integer operations do not result in an overflow]\]. 

}

The secret_size is tested to ensure that the integer multiplication (secret_size * 2) does not result in an integer overflow. (See INT30-C. Ensure that unsigned integer operations do not wrap.)

Compliant Solution

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A compliant program cannot rely on realloc() because it is not possible to clear the memory prior to memory before the call.
Instead, a custom function must be used that operates similar similarly to realloc(), but sanitizes sensitive information as heap-based buffers are resized. Again, this sanitization is done by overwriting the space to be deallocated with '\0' characters.

Code Block
bgColor #ccccff lang c
char *secret; /* Initialize secret */ ... size_t secret_size = strlen(secret); char *temp_buff; /* ... */ if (secret_size > SIZE_MAX/2) { /* handleHandle error condition */ } /* calloc() initializes memory to zero */ temp_buff = (char *)calloc(secret_size * 2, sizeof(char)); /* calloc() initializes memory to zero */ if (temp_buff == NULL) { /* Handle Errorerror */ } memcpy(temp_buff, secret, secret_size); /* Sanitize the buffer */ memset((volatile char *)secret, '\0', secret_size); /* sanitize the buffer */ free(secret); secret = temp_buff; /* installInstall the resized buffer */ temp_buff = NULL; ...

Wiki MarkupThe {{calloc()}} function ensures that the newly allocated memory has also be cleared. Because {{allocated memory is also cleared. Because sizeof(char)}} is guaranteed to be 1, this solution does not need to check for a numeric overflow as a result of using {{calloc()}} \[[MEM37-C | MEM37. (See MEM07-C. Ensure that size the arguments to calloc() , when multiplied, do not result in an integer overflow]\].not wrap.)

Risk Assessment

Failure to clear dynamic memory can result in leaked information.

In practice, this type of security flaw can expose sensitive information to unintended parties. The Sun tarball vulnerability discussed in Secure Coding Principles & Practices: Designing and Implementing Secure Applications [Graf 2003] and Sun Security Bulletin #00122 [Sun 1993] shows a violation of this recommendation, leading to sensitive data being leaked. Attackers may also be able to leverage this defect to retrieve sensitive information using techniques such as heap inspection.

References

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Automated Detection

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

Bibliography

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