The serialization Serialization and deserialization features can be exploited to bypass security manager checks. A serializable class may employ contain security manager checks in its constructors for various reasons. For example, the checks prevent an attacker , including preventing untrusted code from modifying the internal state of the class. Such security manager checks must be replicated wherever a class instance can be constructed. For example, if a class enables a caller to retrieve sensitive internal state contingent upon security checks, those checks must be replicated during deserialization to ensure that an attacker cannot extract sensitive information by deserializing the object.
Noncompliant Code Example
In this noncompliant code example, security manager checks are used within the constructor but are not replicated throughout, specifically, within the readObject
and writeObject
omitted from the writeObject()
and readObject()
methods that are used in the serialization-deserialization process. This omission allows an attacker untrusted code to maliciously create instances of the class that bypass security manager checks when deserialization is performed.
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
public final class CreditCardHometown implements java.io.Serializable { //private Private internal state private String credit_cardtown; private static final String DEFAULTUNKNOWN = "DEFAULTUNKNOWN"; public CreditCardvoid performSecurityManagerCheck() throws AccessDeniedException { // ... } void validateInput(String newCC) throws InvalidInputException { // ... } public Hometown() { performSecurityManagerCheck(); //initialize credit_card Initialize town to default value credit_card = DEFAULTtown = UNKNOWN; } // Allows callers to retrieve internal state String getValue() { performSecurityManagerCheck(); return town; } //allows Allows callers to modify (private) internal state public void changeCCchangeTown(String newCCnewTown) { if (credit_cardtown.equals(newCCnewTown)) { // noNo change return; } else { performSecurityManagerCheck(); validateInput(newCCnewTown); credit_cardtown = newCCnewTown; } } private void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream out) // readObject correctly enforces checks during deserializationthrows IOException { out.writeObject(town); } private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException { in.defaultReadObject(); // ifIf the deserialized name does not match the default value normally // created at construction time, duplicate the checks if (!DEFAULTUNKNOWN.equals(credit_cardtown)) { validateInput(credit_cardtown); } } // allows callers to retrieve internal state public String getValue() { return somePublicValue; } // writeObject correctly enforces checks during serialization private void writeObject(java.io.ObjectOutputStream out) { out.writeObject(credit_card); } } |
Compliant Solution
}
|
(Although there are security manager checks, the data in this example is not sensitive. Serializing unencrypted sensitive data violates SER03-J. Do not serialize unencrypted sensitive data.)
AccessDeniedException
and InvalidInputException
are both security exceptions that can be thrown by any method without requiring a throws
declaration.
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution implements the required The compliant solution correctly implements security manager checks in all constructors , and methods that can either modify internal state and methods that or retrieve internal state. As a resultConsequently, an attacker cannot create an a modified instance of the object with modified state (using deserialization) and cannot simply or read the serialized byte stream to uncover sensitive data (using serialization)reveal serialized data.
Code Block | ||
---|---|---|
| ||
public final class SecureCreditCardHometown implements java.io.Serializable { //private internal state private String credit_card; private static final String DEFAULT = "DEFAULT";... All methods the same except the following: public// SecureCreditCardwriteObject() { correctly enforces checks //initialize credit_card to default value credit_card = DEFAULT; } //allows callers to modify (private) internal state public void changeCC(String newCC) { if (credit_card.equals(newCC))during serialization private void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream out) throws IOException { // no change return; } else { // check permissions to modify credit_card performSecurityManagerCheck(); validateInput(newCCout.writeObject(town); credit_card = newCC; } } // readObject() correctly enforces checks during deserialization private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException { in.defaultReadObject(); // ifIf the deserialized name does not match the default value normally // created at construction time, duplicate the checks if (!DEFAULTUNKNOWN.equals(credit_cardtown)) { performSecurityManagerCheck(); validateInput(credit_cardtown); } } // allows callers to retrieve internal state public String getValue() { // check permission to get value performSecurityManagerCheck(); return somePublicValue; } // writeObject correctly enforces checks during serialization private void writeObject(java.io.ObjectOutputStream out) { // duplicate check from getValue() performSecurityManagerCheck(); out.writeObject(credit_card); } } |
Risk Assessment
}
|
Refer to SEC04-J. Protect sensitive operations with security manager checks for information about implementing the performSecurityManagerCheck()
method, which is important for protection against finalizer attacks.
The ObjectInputStream.defaultReadObject()
fills the object's fields with data from the input stream. Because each field is deserialized recursively, it is possible for the this
reference to escape from control of the deserialization routines. This can happen if a referenced object publishes the this
reference in its constructors or field initializers (see TSM01-J. Do not let the this reference escape during object construction for more information). To be compliant, recursively deserialized subobjects must not publish the this
object reference.
Risk Assessment
Allowing serialization or deserialization to bypass the security manager may result in classes being constructed without required security checks.TODO
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|
SER04-J |
High |
Probable |
??
P??
High | P6 | L2 |
Automated Detection
...
TODO
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
References
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Parasoft Jtest |
| CERT.SER04.SCSER | Enforce 'SecurityManager' checks in methods of 'Serializable' classes |
Related Guidelines
Guideline 8-4 / SERIAL-4: Duplicate the SecurityManager checks enforced in a class during serialization and deserialization |
Android Implementation Details
The java.security
package exists on Android for compatibility purposes only, and it should not be used.
Bibliography
Section 2.4, "Serialization" |
...