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Object Although serialization allows an object's state to be saved as a sequence of bytes and then reconstituted at a later time. The primary application of serialization is in Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) wherein objects must be packed (marshalled), exchanged between distributed virtual machines and subsequently unpacked (unmarshalled). It also finds extensive use in Java Beans.Java language's access control mechanisms are ineffective after a class is serialized. Consequently, any sensitive data that was originally protected using , it provides no mechanism to protect the serialized data. An attacker who gains access to the serialized data can use it to discover sensitive information and to determine implementation details of the objects. An attacker can also modify the serialized data in an attempt to compromise the system when the malicious data is deserialized. Consequently, sensitive data that is serialized is potentially exposed, without regard to the access qualifiers (such as the private keyword) are exposedthat were used in the original code. Moreover, the security manager does not provide any checks to guarantee cannot guarantee the integrity of the serialized deserialized data.

Examples of sensitive data that should not never be serialized are include cryptographic keys, digital certificates, and classes that may hold references to sensitive data at the time of serialization.

This rule is meant to prevent the unintentional serialization of sensitive information. SER02-J. Sign then seal objects before sending them outside a trust boundary applies to the intentional serialization of sensitive information.

Noncompliant Code Example

The data members of class Point are declared as private. The saveState() and readState() methods are used for serialization and de-serialization respectively. The coordinates (x,y) that are written to the data stream are susceptible Assuming the coordinates are sensitive, their presence in the data stream would expose them to malicious tampering.

public class Point implements Serializable {
  private double x;
  private double y;

  public Point(double x, double y) {
    this.x = x;
    this.y = y;
  }

  public Point() {
    // No -argument constructor
  }
}

public class Coordinates extends Point implements Serializable {
  public static void main(String[] args) {
    FileOutputStream fout = null;
    try {
      Point p = new Point(5, 2);
      FileOutputStream fout = new FileOutputStream("point.ser");
      ObjectOutputStream oout = new ObjectOutputStream(fout);
      oout.writeObject(p);
    } catch (Throwable t) { 
      // Forward to handler 
    } finally {
      if (fout != null) {
         oouttry {
          fout.close();
        } catch (ThrowableIOException tx) {
 
         // Forward to handler  Handle error
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

Compliant Solution

In the absence of sensitive data, a class classes can be serialized by simply implementing the java.io.Serializable interface (sensitive classes should not implement this interface). By doing so, the class indicates that no security issues may result from the object's serialization. Note that any derived sub classes subclasses also inherit this interface and are consequently serializable. This approach is inappropriate for any class that contains sensitive data.

Compliant Solution

When serializing a class that contains sensitive data, programs must ensure that sensitive data is omitted from the serialized form. This includes suppressing both serialization of data members that contain sensitive data and serialization of references to nonserializable or sensitive objects.

This compliant solution both When serialization is unavoidable, it is possible that the class suffers from serializability issues. Usually, this happens when there are references to non-serializable objects within the serializable class. This compliant solution avoids the possibility of incorrect serialization and also protects sensitive data members from being serialized accidentally. The basic idea is to declare the target member accidental serialization by declaring the relevant members as transient so that it is not included in they are omitted from the list of fields to be serialized , whenever by the default serialization is usedmechanism.

public class Point implements Serializable {
 private transient double x; // declaredDeclared transient
 private transient double y; // declaredDeclared transient

 public Point(double x, double y) {
  this.x = x;
  this.y = y;
 }

 public Point()
 {
   //no No-argument constructor
 }

}

public class Coordinates extends Point implements Serializable {
  public static void main(String[] args) {
    FileOutputStream fout = null;
    try {
      Point p = new Point(5,2);
      FileOutputStream fout = new FileOutputStream("point.ser");
      ObjectOutputStream oout = new ObjectOutputStream(fout);
      oout.writeObject(p);
      oout.close();
    } catch (Exception e) {
      // Forward to handler
    } finally {
      if (fout != null) {
        try {
          fout.close();
        } catch (IOException x) {
          // Handle error
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

Other compliant solutions include using

• Developing custom

...

• implementations of the writeObject(), writeReplace(), and writeExternal() methods

...

• that prevent sensitive fields

...

• from being written to the serialized stream

...

• .
• Defining the serialPersistentFields array field and

...

• ensuring that sensitive fields are

...

• omitted from the array

...

• (

...

• see SER00-J.

...

• Enable serialization compatibility during class evolution

...

• )

...

• .

Noncompliant Code Example

...

Serialization can also be used maliciously, for example, to return multiple instances of a singleton -like class object. In this noncompliant code example, a subclass {{SensitiveClass}} inadvertently becomes serializable as it extends the {{Exception}} class that implements {{Serializable}}. (This is based on \[[Bloch 2005|AA. Bibliography#Bloch 05]\].)example (based on [Bloch 2005]), a subclass SensitiveClass inadvertently becomes serializable because it extends the java.lang.Number class, which implements Serializable:

Code Block
bgColor #FFcccc
public class SensitiveClass extends ExceptionNumber { // ... Implement abstract methods, such as Number.doubleValue()… publicprivate static final SensitiveClass INSTANCE = new SensitiveClass(); public static SensitiveClass getInstance() { return INSTANCE; } private SensitiveClass() { // Perform security checks and parameter validation } protectedprivate int balance printBalance() {= 1000; protected int balance = 1000;getBalance() { return balance; } } class Malicious { public static void main(String[] args) { SensitiveClass sc = (SensitiveClass) deepCopy(SensitiveClass.INSTANCEgetInstance()); // Prints false; indicates new instance System.out.println(sc == SensitiveClass.INSTANCE); // Prints falsegetInstance()); indicates new instance System.out.println("Balance = " + sc.printBalancegetBalance()); } // This method should not be used in production quality code static public Object deepCopy(Object obj) { try { ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); new ObjectOutputStream(bos).writeObject(obj); ByteArrayInputStream bin = new ByteArrayInputStream(bos.toByteArray()); return new ObjectInputStream(bin).readObject(); } catch (Exception e) { throw new IllegalArgumentException(e); } } }

See MSC07-J. Prevent multiple instantiations of singleton objects for more information about singleton classes.

Compliant Solution

Ideally, extending Extending a class or interface that implements Serializable should be avoided whenever possible. For instance, a nonserializable class could contain an instance of a serializable class and delegate method calls to the serializable class.

When extension of a serializable class by an unserializable class is necessary, inappropriate When this is not possible, undue serialization of the subclass can be prohibited by throwing a NotSerializableException from a custom writeObject(), readObject() or readResolve, and readObjectNoData() method methods, defined in the subclass SensitiveClass. It is also required to declare the methods final to prevent a malicious subclass from overriding themnonserializable subclass. These custom methods must be declared private (see SER01-J. Do not deviate from the proper signatures of serialization methods for more information).

class SensitiveClass extends ExceptionNumber {
  // ...

  private final Object readResolve(writeObject(java.io.ObjectOutputStream out) throws NotSerializableException {
    throw new NotSerializableException();
  }
  private final Object readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream in) throws NotSerializableException {
    throw new NotSerializableException();
  }
  private final Object readObjectNoData(java.io.ObjectInputStream in) throws NotSerializableException {
    throw new NotSerializableException();
  }
}

It is still possible for an attacker to obtain uninitialized instances of SensitiveClass by catching NotSerializableException or by using a finalizer attack (see OBJ11-J. Be wary of letting constructors throw exceptions for more information). Consequently, an unserializable class that extends a serializable class must always validate its invariants before executing any methods. That is, any object of such a class must inspect its fields, its actual type (to prevent it being a malicious subclass), and any invariants it possesses (such as being a malicious second object of a singleton class).

Exceptions

SER03-J-EX0: Sensitive data that has been properly encrypted may be serialized.

Risk Assessment

If sensitive data can be serialized, it may be transmitted over an insecure linkconnection, or stored in an insecure mediumlocation, or disclosed inappropriately.

Automated Detection

TODO

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this guideline on the CERT website.

Bibliography

\[[JLS 2005|AA. Bibliography#JLS 05]\] [Transient modifier|http://java.sun.com/docs/books/jls/third_edition/html/classes.html#37020]
\[[SCG 2007|AA. Bibliography#SCG 07]\] Guideline 5-1 Guard sensitive data during serialization
\[[Sun 2006|AA. Bibliography#Sun 06]\] "Serialization specification: A.4  Preventing Serialization of Sensitive Data"
\[[Harold 1999|AA. Bibliography#Harold 99]\]
\[[Long 2005|AA. Bibliography#Long 05]\] Section 2.4, Serialization
\[[Greanier 2000|AA. Bibliography#Greanier 00]\] [Discover the secrets of the Java Serialization API|http://java.sun.com/developer/technicalArticles/Programming/serialization/]
\[[Bloch 2005|AA. Bibliography#Bloch 05]\] Puzzle 83: Dyslexic Monotheism
\[[Bloch 2001|AA. Bibliography#Bloch 01]\] Item 1: Enforce the singleton property with a private constructor
\[[MITRE 2009|AA. Bibliography#MITRE 09]\] [CWE ID 502|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html] "Deserialization of Untrusted Data", [CWE ID 499|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/499.html] "Serializable Class Containing Sensitive Data"

Related Guidelines

Bibliography

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Image Added Image Added Image AddedSER02-J. Extendable classes should not declare readResolve() and writeReplace() private or static      16. Serialization (SER)      SER04-J. Validate deserialized objects