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Evaluating a pointer—including dereferencing the pointer, using it as an operand of an arithmetic operation, type casting it, and using it as the right-hand side of an assignment—into memory that has been deallocated by a memory management function is undefined behavior. Pointers to memory that has been deallocated are
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called dangling pointers. Accessing a dangling pointer can result in exploitable vulnerabilities.
According to the C Standard, using the value of a pointer that refers to space deallocated by a call to the free()
or realloc()
function is undefined behavior. (See undefined behavior 177.)
Reading a pointer to deallocated memory is undefined behavior because the pointer value is indeterminate and might be a trap representation. Fetching a trap representation might perform a hardware trap (but is not required to).
It lead to security vulnerabilities.When memory is freed, its contents may remain intact and accessible. This is because it is at the memory manager's discretion when to reallocate or recycle the freed chunk. The freed memory. When memory is freed, all pointers into it become invalid, and its contents might either be returned to the operating system, making the freed space inaccessible, or remain intact and accessible. As a result, the data at the freed location may can appear valid. However, this can change unexpectedly, leading to unintended program behavior. As a result, it is necessary to guarantee that memory is not to be valid but change unexpectedly. Consequently, memory must not be written to or read from once it is freed.
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Noncompliant Code Example
This example from Brian Kernighan and Dennis Ritchie \[ [Kernighan 88|AA. C References#Kernighan 88]\] illustrates both the incorrect and correct techniques for deleting items from a linked list. The incorrect solution, clearly marked as wrong in the book, is bad because {{p}} is freed before the {{p->next}} is executed, so {{p->next}} reads memory that has already been 1988] shows both the incorrect and correct techniques for freeing the memory associated with a linked list. In their (intentionally) incorrect example, Wiki Markup p
is freed before p->next
is executed, so that p->next
reads memory that has already been freed.
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <stdlib.h> struct node { int value; struct node *next; }; void free_list(struct node *head) { for (struct node *p = head; p != NULL; p = p->next) /* WRONG */{ free(p); } } |
Compliant Solution
Kernighan and Ritchie also show the correct solution. To correct this error , by storing a reference to p->next
is stored in q
before freeing p
.:
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <stdlib.h> struct node { int value; struct node *next; }; void free_list(struct node *head) { struct node *q; for (struct node *p = head; p != NULL; p = q) { q = p->next; free(p); } head = NULL;} } |
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Noncompliant Code Example
In this noncompliant code example, buff
buf
is written to after it has been freed. These Write-after-free vulnerabilities can be relatively easily exploited to run arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process and are seldom this obvious. Typically, allocations and frees are far removed, making it difficult to recognize and diagnose these problems.
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) { char *buff; return_val = 0; const size_t bufsize = strlen(argv[0]) + 1; buffchar *buf = (char *)malloc(BUFSIZEbufsize); if (!buffbuf) { /* handle error condition */return EXIT_FAILURE; } /* ... */ free(buffbuf); /* ... */ strncpystrcpy(buffbuf, argv[1], BUFSIZE-1)0]); /* ... */ return EXIT_SUCCESS; } |
Compliant Solution
Do not free In this compliant solution, the memory until it is no longer required.is freed after its final use:
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) { char *buff; return_val = 0; const size_t bufsize = strlen(argv[0]) + 1; buffchar *buf = (char *)malloc(BUFSIZEbufsize); if (!buffbuf) { return EXIT_FAILURE; } /* handle error condition... */ strcpy(buf, argv[0]); /* ... */ free(buf); return EXIT_SUCCESS; } |
Noncompliant Code Example
In this noncompliant example, realloc()
may free c_str1
when it returns a null pointer, resulting in c_str1
being freed twice. The C Standards Committee's proposed response to Defect Report #400 makes it implementation-defined whether or not the old object is deallocated when size
is zero and memory for the new object is not allocated. The current implementation of realloc()
in the GNU C Library and Microsoft Visual Studio's Runtime Library will free c_str1
and return a null pointer for zero byte allocations. Freeing a pointer twice can result in a potentially exploitable vulnerability commonly referred to as a double-free vulnerability [Seacord 2013b].
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <stdlib.h>
void f(char *c_str1, size_t size) {
char *c_str2 = (char *)realloc(c_str1, size);
if (c_str2 == NULL) {
free(c_str1);
}
} |
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution does not pass a size argument of zero to the realloc()
function, eliminating the possibility of c_str1
being freed twice:
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <stdlib.h>
void f(char *c_str1, size_t size) {
if (size != 0) {
char *c_str2 = (char *)realloc(c_str1, size);
if (c_str2 == NULL) {
free(c_str1);
}
}
else {
free(c_str1);
}
} |
If the intent of calling f()
is to reduce the size of the object, then doing nothing when the size is zero would be unexpected; instead, this compliant solution frees the object.
Noncompliant Code Example
In this noncompliant example (CVE-2009-1364) from libwmf
version 0.2.8.4, the return value of gdRealloc
(a simple wrapper around realloc()
that reallocates space pointed to by im->clip->list
) is set to more
. However, the value of im->clip->list
is used directly afterwards in the code, and the C Standard specifies that if realloc()
moves the area pointed to, then the original block is freed. An attacker can then execute arbitrary code by forcing a reallocation (with a sufficient im->clip->count
) and accessing freed memory [xorl 2009].
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
void gdClipSetAdd(gdImagePtr im, gdClipRectanglePtr rect) { gdClipRectanglePtr more; if (im->clip == 0) { /* ... */ } if (im->clip->count == im->clip->max) { more = gdRealloc (im->clip->list,(im->clip->max + 8) * sizeof (gdClipRectangle)); /* * If the realloc fails, then we have not lost the * im->clip->list value. */ if (more == 0) return; im->clip->max += 8; } im->clip->list[im->clip->count] = *rect; im->clip->count++; } |
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution simply reassigns im->clip->list
to the value of more
after the call to realloc()
:
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
void gdClipSetAdd(gdImagePtr im, gdClipRectanglePtr rect) { gdClipRectanglePtr more; if (im->clip == 0) { strncpy(buff, argv[1], BUFSIZE-1); /* ... */ free(buff); } } if (im->clip->count == im->clip->max) { more = gdRealloc (im->clip->list,(im->clip->max + 8) * sizeof (gdClipRectangle)); if (more == 0) return; im->clip->max += 8; im->clip->list = more; } im->clip->list[im->clip->count] = *rect; im->clip->count++; } |
Risk Assessment
Reading memory that has already been freed can lead to abnormal program termination and denial-of-service attacks. Writing memory that has already been freed can additionally lead to the execution of arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process.
Freeing memory multiple times has similar consequences to accessing memory after it is freed. Reading a pointer to deallocated memory is undefined behavior because the pointer value is indeterminate and might be a trap representation. When reading from or writing to freed memory does not cause a trap, it may corrupt the underlying data structures that manage the heap in a manner that can be exploited to execute arbitrary code. Alternatively, writing to memory after it has been freed might modify memory that has been reallocated.
Programmers should be wary when freeing memory in a loop or conditional statement; if coded incorrectly, these constructs can lead to double-free vulnerabilities. It is also a common error to misuse the realloc()
function in a manner that results in double-free vulnerabilities. (See MEM04-C. Beware of zero-length allocations.)
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
MEM30-C |
3 (high)
3 (likely)
High | Likely | Medium | P18 | L1 |
Automated Detection
The LDRA tool suite V 7.6.0 is able to detect violations of this rule.
Fortify SCA Version 5.0 is able to detect violations of this rule.
The tool Compass Rose can detect violations of the rule, except for cases such as the for loop in the first example.
Related Vulnerabilities
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Astrée |
| dangling_pointer_use | Supported Astrée reports all accesses to freed allocated memory. | ||||||
Axivion Bauhaus Suite |
| CertC-MEM30 | Detects memory accesses after its deallocation and double memory deallocations | ||||||
CodeSonar |
| ALLOC.UAF | Use after free | ||||||
Compass/ROSE | |||||||||
| USE_AFTER_FREE | Can detect the specific instances where memory is deallocated more than once or read/written to the target of a freed pointer | |||||||
Cppcheck |
| doubleFree deallocret deallocuse | Partially implemented | ||||||
Cppcheck Premium |
| doubleFree deallocret deallocuse | Partially implemented | ||||||
Helix QAC |
| DF4866, DF4867, DF4868, DF4871, DF4872, DF4873 C++3339, C++4303, C++4304 | |||||||
Klocwork |
| UFM.DEREF.MIGHT UFM.DEREF.MUST UFM.FFM.MIGHT UFM.FFM.MUST UFM.RETURN.MIGHT UFM.RETURN.MUST UFM.USE.MIGHT UFM.USE.MUST | |||||||
LDRA tool suite |
| 51 D, 484 S, 112 D | Partially implemented | ||||||
Parasoft C/C++test |
| CERT_C-MEM30-a | Do not use resources that have been freed | ||||||
Parasoft Insure++ | Runtime analysis | ||||||||
PC-lint Plus |
| 449, 2434 | Fully supported | ||||||
Polyspace Bug Finder |
| Checks for:
Rule partially covered. | |||||||
PVS-Studio |
| V586, V774 | |||||||
Splint |
| ||||||||
TrustInSoft Analyzer |
| dangling_pointer | Exhaustively verified (see one compliant and one non-compliant example). |
Related Vulnerabilities
VU#623332 describes a double-free vulnerability in the MIT Kerberos 5 function krb5_recvauth().
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
Related Guidelines
Key here (explains table format and definitions)
Taxonomy | Taxonomy item | Relationship |
---|---|---|
CERT C Secure Coding Standard | MEM01-C. Store a new value in pointers immediately after free() | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
CERT C | MEM50-CPP. Do not access freed memory | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | Dangling References |
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Wiki Markup |
---|
\[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\] Section 7.20.3.2, "The free function"
\[[ISO/IEC PDTR 24772|AA. C References#ISO/IEC PDTR 24772]\] "DCM Dangling references to stack frames" and "XYK Dangling Reference to Heap"
\[[Kernighan 88|AA. C References#Kernighan 88]\] Section 7.8.5, "Storage Management"
\[[MISRA 04|AA. C References#MISRA 04]\] Rule 17.6
\[[MITRE 07|AA. C References#MITRE 07]\] [CWE ID 416|http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html], "Use After Free"
\[[OWASP Freed Memory|AA. C References#OWASP Freed Memory]\]
\[[Seacord 05|AA. C References#Seacord 05]\] Chapter 4, "Dynamic Memory Management"
\[[Viega 05|AA. C References#Viega 05]\] Section 5.2.19, "Using freed memory" |
to Stack Frames [DCM] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship | |
ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | Dangling Reference to Heap [XYK] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
ISO/IEC TS 17961 | Accessing freed memory [accfree] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
ISO/IEC TS 17961 | Freeing memory multiple times [dblfree] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
MISRA C:2012 | Rule 18.6 (required) | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
CWE 2.11 | CWE-416, Use After Free | 2017-07-07: CERT: Exact |
CWE 2.11 | CWE-672 | 2017-07-07: CERT: Rule subset of CWE |
CERT-CWE Mapping Notes
Key here for mapping notes
CWE-672 and MEM30-C
Intersection( MEM30-C, FIO46-C) = Ø CWE-672 = Union( MEM30-C, list) where list =
- Use of a resource, other than memory after it has been released (eg: reusing a closed file, or expired mutex)
CWE-666 and MEM30-C
Intersection( MEM30-C, FIO46-C) = Ø
CWE-672 = Subset( CWE-666)
CWE-758 and MEM30-C
CWE-758 = Union( MEM30-C, list) where list =
- Undefined behavior that is not covered by use-after-free errors
CWE-415 and MEM30-C
MEM30-C = Union( CWE-456, list) where list =
- Dereference of a pointer after freeing it (besides passing it to free() a second time)
Bibliography
[ISO/IEC 9899:2024] | 7.24.3, "Memory Management Functions" |
[Kernighan 1988] | Section 7.8.5, "Storage Management" |
[OWASP Freed Memory] | |
[MIT 2005] | |
[Seacord 2013b] | Chapter 4, "Dynamic Memory Management" |
[Viega 2005] | Section 5.2.19, "Using Freed Memory" |
[VU#623332] | |
[xorl 2009] | CVE-2009-1364: LibWMF Pointer Use after free() |
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MEM09-A. Do not assume memory allocation routines initialize memory 08. Memory Management (MEM) MEM31-C. Free dynamically allocated memory exactly once